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PREFACE
This is the 36th edition of How Ottawa Spends. As always we
gratefully thank our roster of contributing academic and other expert
authors from across Canada and abroad for their research, their
insights and for their willingness to contribute to informed public
debate in Canada.
This edition is different in two key respects. It is the first digital on-
line publication rather than the normal book version of the past 35
years. And it is also the first where contributing chapters have been
assessed under normal academic anonymous peer review processes.
We thank these peer reviewers as well.
Very special gratitude is owed to Sheena Kennedy for her skill in
helping us launch an on-line peer reviewed process and to Sarah Ingle
for her work and expertise in the overall on-line publication process.
We also extend our deep appreciation for the scholarly stimulation
and encouragement provided by our colleagues at the School of
Public Policy and Administration at Carleton University.
Christopher Stoney and G. Bruce Doern Ottawa
Chapter 1
THE LIBERAL RISE AND THE TORY DEMISE
Christopher Stoney and G. Bruce Doern
INTRODUCTION
Canadian voters on October 19th, 2015, delivered a decisive majority
government election victory for the Justin Trudeau-led Liberal Party
of Canada and a crushing defeat for the Stephen Harper Tories that
ended their decade in power. To lose to a Trudeau is Harper’s worst
political and personal nightmare, given Harper’s visceral opposition
to his opponent’s father, Pierre Trudeau’s energy and Western
Canada policies in the 1980s and also to his Charter of Rights and
Freedoms which the senior Trudeau secured through constitutional
amendment and which Harper has gone out of his way never to
celebrate in any public manner even though it is a central feature of
the Canadian constitution.
The Liberals won 184 seats in Parliament compared to 99 for
the Conservatives, 44 for the NDP, 10 for the Bloc Quèbecois and 1
for the Green Party. With almost a 68.5% voter turnout, the
percentage of total votes garnered are 39.5% for the Liberals, 31.9%
for the Conservatives, 19.7% for the NDP, 4.7% for the Bloc
Quèbecois, and 4.3% for Other (including the Green Party at 3.4%).1
While polls in the last couple of weeks of Canada’s longest-
ever modern election campaign showed Liberal potential for a
minority government victory, a majority government was not
expected. The Liberals, however, surged on election day as a high
voter turnout allowed voters finally to give meaning to consistent
earlier polls that showed that up to 70 percent of Canadians wanted a
change in government. In last year’s edition of How Ottawa Spends,
we posed the question of whether the Harper government was “good
to go” and Canadians have now given a resounding Yes to that
increasingly asked question in the run-up to 2015.
In this 2015-16 edition of How Ottawa Spends, we focus in this
chapter on four analytical imperatives: the contributing reasons and
forces for the Trudeau majority government victory; the Liberal Party
agenda as seen through a comparative look at selected policy domains
in the 2015 electoral platforms of the three main political parties; the
nature of the Harper legacy as an initial political success but then as a
failed and increasingly isolated one-man government; and a preview
of our contributing authors’ analyses in chapters 2 to 10 of several
key policy and governance issues in the Harper era that also extend in
some chapters to earlier Liberal governments in the Chretien-Martin
era as well.
WHY A TRUDEAU LIBERAL MAJORITY DECISION BY
CANADIANS?
Several factors and dynamics helped deliver a majority government
for Justin Trudeau. The first dynamic was his own emergence as a
political risk taker and leader of some genuine depth. A key factor
here was his decision to have the Liberals earmark three years of
deficit spending followed by a return to surplus in their fourth year
(see more below and in chapter 2). The focus of the proposed deficit
years is expected to be on cities-related infrastructure spending. This
macro economic and fiscal policy position marked the Liberals as the
only party of change, since Harper’s electoral campaign stressed
balanced budgets (after 7 years of deficits) to “protect the economy”,
which essentially meant protect it from the untrustworthy Liberals
and NDP. The NDP helped the Trudeau public position as leader and
risk-taker because it (the NDP) too had opted for balanced budgets to
cement its argument that it was actually a trustworthy and fiscally
responsible party. The unexpected fiscal deficit position announced
by the Liberals cemented the overall view that it was the party of
change and would link up with the underlying opinion polls that
showed that Canadians wanted a changed government.
The very long 78-day election campaign was designed by
Harper as a vehicle to show that Trudeau, or “Justin” was “not
ready”, as Tory attack ads oft repeated. But in very crucial ways it
was precisely what gave Trudeau the time and the multiple arenas of
electoral debate that showed his skills and more inclusive values and
which allowed him to stand up to both Harper and Mulcair and to
increasingly make his policy agenda case to Canadians. Ironically
Trudeau was also helped by the Tory attack ads that had lowered
expectations of his leadership abilities. In this context Trudeau
needed only to perform competently to excel in the eyes of the
watching public.
The long campaign had other positive impacts in that the two
main opposition parties, but also the Tories, felt the need to reveal
important policy initiatives and announcements early on that, in each
case, resulted in debate and exposure for longer periods than would
be typical of policy revelations in a normal five week or so election
campaign.2 For the NDP this included plans for a national day care
initiative built on the Quebec program and for an economic policy
that focussed on the manufacturing sector rather than Harper’s energy
and resources focus. For the Trudeau Liberals, the initiatives included
aspects of Senate reform but more crucially a democratic and
election/voting reform proposal that moves strongly towards a system
of proportional voting rather than the current first- past- the- post
system.3 Attention to these initiatives was a function of the greater
election run-up time available but also of course to the fact that the
polls for some time had been showing a virtual tie in voter intentions
for all three parties and then later showed the NDP as having a
serious chance to challenge for and win power while Liberal support
declined.
The long campaign also allowed for more debate and exchange
(and media and social media coverage) on whether the economy was
the dominant priority or whether democracy itself and Canadian
values were the main issues as Canadians tired of Harper’s one-man
rule and attack politics modus operandi. Young Canadians were also
engaged and thus many more of them voted and voted Liberal.4
The Harper election Budget of April 21st, 2015, delayed by a
month because of the impacts on forecasting of the fast plummeting
global oil prices, was the initial and continuing core Harper campaign
platform. The Budget was titled “Strong Leadership”5. It was the
Prime Minister’s Budget in every respect rather than Finance Minister
Joe Oliver’s first Budget. Its sub-title was “a balanced –budget, low-
tax plan for jobs, growth, and security”. It sought to show the
government’s entire record since 2006 (albeit selectively) as one of
sound economic management in troubled times to support the key
overriding claim of economic competence and make the case for re
re-election on October 19th. As we see further below, when the
Harper election campaign platform came out, the core budget themes
and discourse had morphed into the language of needing to “protect”
the economy (from the interventions of the other two parties).
As 2015 proceeded, Prime Minister Harper continued to stress
that he was the steady hand that Canadians could rely on and that
voters should avoid the risky options of either an NDP or Liberal
government amidst slumping oil prices, the Greek-EU Euro crisis,
and economic problems in China. Then, on July 15th, 2015, Bank of
Canada governor Stephen Poloz announced that he would reduce
Canada’s already low interest rate to 0.50 percent because the
Canadian economy had been below zero growth since the year
began.6 He avoided calling it a recession although it seemed to meet
the technical test. In any event, Harper and his Finance Minister
reacted by saying that international forces were the cause, not
Canada’s Tory policies. Again, the Harper message was that this was
no time to take further risks under the NDP or the Liberals. The retort
by some that the Harper Conservatives were now a “two recession”
government was irresistible. So too was the view that the Harper
government was a natural-resources government rather than a
government interested in the whole pan-Canadian economy, including
manufacturing.
When Harper conceded defeat on election night and the
Conservative Party announced that he had also resigned as party
leader, the full magnitude of his defeat was fully evident. So were the
reasons why. Sympathetic conservative journalists and commentators
gave Harper credit for his early leadership and some of his economic
policies and for bringing greater power to Western Canada. They also
stressed, however, that in the end, it was Harper’s controlling one-
man government hubris, his contempt for democratic conventions and
institutions and his continuous negative politics that brought about his
demise, along with his utter failure to reach out to Canadians with
whom he disagreed.7
THE LIBERAL POLICY AGENDA IN THE CONTEXT OF
COMPETING PARTY ELECTION PLATFORMS
Table 1.1 sets out several of the main electoral platforms in key
policy domains.8 The Trudeau Liberal platform will anchor their
initial agenda in power but it will also undoubtedly be changed in
content and discourse as governing takes hold and electoral
campaigning recedes. We focus here on some aspects of the Liberal
agenda per se, but the positions of the two other main parties will
certainly preview how they will critique, support and oppose a
Liberal agenda in Parliament and in the country.
Table 1.1 Main Political Party 2015 Election Platforms
 Conservative Liberal
New
Democrats
Policy
Domains    
Macro-
Economic
-Balanced Budget, Low Tax Plan
for Jobs and Growth as per April
2015 Budget;
-Election platform titled The
Conservative plan to protect the
economy;
-ensure federal budget remains
balanced so that more money is put
back into the pockets of hard-
working families;
-continue and extend New Build
Canada infrastructure investment as
per April 2015 Budget;
-new platform spending will be
$590.1 million in first mandate
year, increasing to $2998.5 in the
4th year; but planned fiscal surplus
in each year;
-continue to reduce Canada’s debt-
to-GDP ratio;
-aim to create 1.3 million new jobs
by 2020; cut business taxes from 11
to 9 percent;
-implement the Trans-Pacific
Partnership (TPP) free trade
agreement;
-announced multi-$ billion support
for auto and farming sectors
adversely impacted by TPP;
-permanent $1.5 billion home-
renovation tax credit;
-positive plan to sustain our
-presented as a “new
plan for a strong
middle class”;
-will run modest
short- term deficits of
less than “$10 billion
in each of next two
fiscal years to fund
investments in
infrastructure but
then followed by
return to balanced
budget in 2019;
-$500 million for the
provinces for skilled
trades training;
-increased federal
infrastructure
investment includes
dedicated funding to
provinces, territories
and municipalities
for public transit and
for social
infrastructure;
-will conduct a
review of all tax
expenditures to target
tax loopholes that
particularly benefit
Canada’s top one
percent;
-will establish the
-presented as
“Tom’s Plan”
to strengthen
the middle
class, grow the
economy and
protect the
economy;
-a balanced
budget in the
first year of an
NDP mandate;
-promise to
champion
manufacturing
jobs and
growth with
concrete action
to protect
Canada’s auto
and aerospace
industries;
-reduce small
business taxes
from 11% to
9%;
-invest in
infrastructure
and transit;
-opposition to
TPP free trade
deal;
manufacturing sector;
-create a $100 million
manufacturing technology fund;
-cut “red tape” for business from
legislation and policy in addition to
regulations;
-$200 million to expand high-speed
broadband Internet network across
remote and rural areas;
Canadian
Infrastructure Bank
to provide low-cost
funding for new
infrastructure
projects;
-lower federal
income tax rate to
20.5 percent on
incomes between
$44,700 and $89,401,
paying for it by
raising taxes on
wealthiest 1 per cent;
Social-
Justice
-legislation to ensure that criminals
sentenced to life are not eligible for
parole;
-announced the establishment of
“snitch” lines for Canadians to
report “barbaric cultural practices”;
-opposition to wearing of niqabs at
citizenship ceremonies;
-$2000 tax credit for single seniors
to help with pension income;
-raise government contribution
when low and middle-income
families invest in education savings
plans;
-launch a Canada
Child Benefit which
would repackage and
expand existing
programs;
-add $515 million per
year to funding for
First Nations
education;
-will restore fair and
balanced laws that
acknowledge the
important role of
unions in Canada;
-sweeping changes to
the immigration
system, by making
family reunification
at the core of its
immigration policy;
-no two-tier
Canadian citizenship,
by repealing the
Conservative
government-passed
law that allows dual
-provide $2.6
billion over 4
years and work
with the
provinces to
establish
universal
prescription
drug coverage;
-create one
million child
care spaces
over eight
years, and cap
fees for
parents-no
more than $15
a day;
-strengthen the
Canada
Pension Plan
for the long
term by
working with,
not against the
provinces;
citizens convicted to
terrorism or treason
to have their
Canadian citizenship
revoked;
-$300 million a year
to reform veteran’s
benefits and delivery
of services to
veterans;
-spend $250
million over 4
years to recruit
2500 new
police officers;
-$454 million
over 4 years to
provide
treatment for
veterans
suffering from
effects of post-
traumatic
stress disorder;
Foreign and
Defence
-continue to participate in the broad
international coalition against ISIS;
-support persecuted religious
minorities around the world;
Defend Canada’s northern
sovereignty;
-continue to make the immigration
system faster, flexible and more
responsive to the needs of Canada’s
economy;
-continue to be a world leader in
refugee protection;
-increase the intake of applications
for the parents and grandparents
sponsorship program, as the
backlog and processing times
continue to decrease;
-initial promise to bring in 10,000
additional refugees from Syria and
Iraq;
-slow later response to Syrian
refugee crisis, which also brought
out rigidities of Canadian refugee
system;
-Conservative focus on Isis,
-will expand intake
of Syrian refugee by
25,000;
-scrap the long
delayed Conservative
purchase of the F-35
fighter jet and
replace with cheaper
planes to replace the
aging CF-18s, based
on a competitive-bid
process.
-will restore
Canadian leadership
in the world,
including renewed
commitment to
peacekeeping
operations
-strong support
for greater and
more humane
response to
Syrian refugee
crisis.
terrorism threat and national
security
Environment -support an approach to climate
change that benefits both the
environment and the economy. The
solution to climate change must
come from innovation, not
deprivation-through technology and
Canadian ingenuity, not by closing
down our vital natural resources
industries or imposing job-killing
carbon taxes;
-continuing policies regarding
“responsible resource
development”;
-continue to support Sustainable
Development Technology Canada’s
work to finance the development
and demonstration of new clean
technologies;
-allocate $5 million annually for
programs to sustain habitat that
support bird, moose and turkey
populations, starting in 2017;
- provide national
leadership and join
with the provinces
and territories to take
action on climate
change; put a price
on carbon, and
reduce carbon
pollution;
-will make
environmental
assessments credible
again;
-will restore lost
environmental
protections caused by
Harper changes to
the Fisheries Act and
his elimination of the
Navigable Waters
Protection Act;
-put a moratorium on
tanker traffic along
the northern coast of
British Columbia;
-increase protected
marine and coastal
areas to five percent
from 1.3 percent by
2017, and to 10
percent by 2020.
-national cap-
and- trade
system to fight
climate
change;
-listen to
climate science
and usher in an
era of fact-
based decision
making by
ending the
Harper era
muzzling of
government
scientists;
-protect
Canada’s lakes
and rivers;
Institutions
and
Democracy
-will introduce legislation
enshrining in law requiring any
future government to hold a
referendum on major electoral
reforms;
-will do nothing further to entrench
-ensure that 2015
will be the last
federal election
conducted under the
first-past-the-post
voting system;
-bring in
legislation to
make
Parliamentary
Budget Officer
(PBO) a fully
an unelected, unaccountable
Senate; instead it will impose a
moratorium on further Senate
appointments until real reform is
achieved;
-pass “tax lock” legislation to
prohibit tax increases in the next
four years;
-will continue to support the crucial
energy industry, and the many
Canadians who depend on it for
their
livelihoods. This means not
interfering in the independent
project review process, and making
final decisions on individual
projects based on the science and
recommendations of expert bodies;
-bring-in merit-based
appointment process
for the Senate;
-promise to make
government
information open by
default, increase the
information
watchdog’s powers,
and require a
mandatory five year
review of the Access
to Information Act;
-ensure that Access
to Information
applies to the Prime
Minister’s and
Ministers’ Offices;
-strengthen Statistics
Canada as an
independent agency
and also restore the
mandatory long-
form census to give
communities the
information they
need to best serve
Canadians;
independent
officer of
Parliament;
-would ensure
full reporting
of
departmental
spending,
including a
searchable
online database
for Canadians
to access;
-give
information
watchdog the
ability to
compel the
release of
documents;
The macro-economic domain agenda focusses on the above
mentioned infrastructure funding and deficits but also includes
personal tax measures to help the Canadian middle class. There is
also an interesting reference to a tax expenditure review, perhaps to
foster a less complex personal tax system. The Harper era practice of
providing boutique tax incentives to foster the Tory brand among
targeted voters (see chapter 8) may also be targeted in such a Liberal
review (perhaps as a way to get rid of some incentives or possibly to
add new Liberal boutique substitutes, or promote major tax reform).
The social-justice domain reveals Liberal plans for a re-jigged child
benefit program, more balanced and fair rules regarding unions (see
Harper era constraining public service union reforms, as analyzed in
chapter 5); and a reformed immigration system geared more to family
reunification and thus a move away from the Harper era immigrant
worker-focused policy.
In the foreign and defence policy domain, the Trudeau agenda
is geared explicitly to demonstrating changes in values and progress
such as a much greater intake of Syrian refugees (up to 25,000) and a
renewed commitment to Canada’s peacekeeping role in the
Pearsonian tradition. And it promises to fill a huge Tory defence
policy weakness by taking action via a competitive-bid process to
find effective replacements for Canada’s aging CF-18s. Regarding
environmental policy, climate change for the Liberals is still cautious
and is routed through federal-provincial arenas related to carbon
pricing. But it also seeks to remedy some Harper era green
weaknesses such as removing requirements for environmental
assessments and changes to fisheries legislation and navigable waters.
Last but hardly least given the focus of the election campaign
and the egregious contempt for Parliament and traditional checks and
balances displayed during the Harper era, the Liberals promise
reforms on institutions and democracy. These include: electoral
system reform to end the first-past-the post voting system; a merit-
based appointment process to anchor Senate reform; reform of access
to information laws and practices; and a strengthened Statistics
Canada including restoration of the mandatory long-form census,
abolished in the early Harper years.
There will of course be other new or changed policies on offer
by the Liberals once the Trudeau Cabinet gets to work and with new
ministers whom Trudeau stresses will be actual decision- makers
rather than just spokespeople of the policy fields as appeared to be the
case in the Harper era, when the Prime Minister alone made most
decisions, big and small, most of the time.
THE HARPER RECORD: FROM LEADER TO LONER TO
DEFEATED ONE-MAN GOVERNMENT
Stephen Harper was a central issue in the election campaign mainly
as a result of his own strategy and hubris. He had indeed been given
legitimate credit for uniting the political right in Canada and forging a
new Conservative Party that through his insistence ceased to be called
the Progressive Conservative Party. He also united political forces in
Western Canada and in 2006 won a minority government victory,
repeated it in 2008, and then secured a majority Conservative
government in 2011.
The Harper as leader versus loner dynamic built on long
developing views of him as a hyper- controlling prime minister both
vis a vis his government and cabinet but also regarding Parliament
and his backbenchers.9 He was in many ways the minister of
everything in his own government and had practiced the dubious arts
of continuous attack politics against the opposition parties and
interests such as environmental groups. His policy and governing
strategy was consistently to appeal to his core political voting base
rarely if ever reaching out to Canadians who disagreed with him.
The Harper as loner dynamic was further directly facilitated by
the 78 day election campaign that ultimately gave a trio of his senior
ministers, John Baird, Peter MacKay and James Moore, the time to
plan and announce their own departure on their own terms.10 If the
more normal snap election mode had been in operation it would tend
to “short-circuit the political retirement process”.11 Each senior
minister no doubt had his own personal reasons leaving but it was
also likely that they were all leaving because they saw a Harper defeat
or minority government as a likely election outcome. Harper was now
even more visibly the loner, a state of affairs further supported by the
death of his long term Finance Minister, James Flaherty, as well as by
the early departure of senior Tory minister Jim Prentice who became
the Conservative Premier of Alberta, but who then lost to the NDP in
the 2015 Alberta election, thus ending the five decade dominance by
the Alberta Progressive Conservative Party. Alberta of course is the
heartland of the Harper Conservatives as well.
The Senate scandal was also politically significant for several
reasons. First, it emerged as a direct threat to the Prime Minister’s
personal credibility over how much he knew about his then PMO
chief of staff Nigel Wright’s personal $90,000 payment to reimburse
Senator Mike Duffy for alleged illegal expenses. Harper was more
fully briefed on the Duffy “deal” than he subsequently led Parliament
and the media to believe during weeks of unrelenting questioning
from opposition parties. Far more of his inner circle of trusted and
senior advisors were also fully aware of the deals being made in an
effort to protect the Conservative brand from further damage than the
public and importantly Parliament had been (mis-)led to believe.
Second, it has exposed a serious lack of oversight and
entitlement that the Harper government said it had been elected to
“clean up” in 2006. After almost a decade in power little has been
done to reform the Senate as an elected body as the Conservative’s
promised to do. Indeed, since the Wright-Duffy payment scandal
broke two years ago, Harper and his PMO loyalists have put “as
much distance as possible between the prime minister and a Senate
dominated by his hand-picked appointees”.12 Initially, Harper had
appointed 40 new Conservative senators even though he promised he
would appoint none, given his apparent goal of an elected Senate, in
order to deliver on a policy forged in Harper’s Reform Party days in
opposition. But in 2015 not a single Senate vacancy has been filled by
Harper. The Senate has become morally and ethically worse, not
better, than when Harper came to power. Moreover, the Supreme
Court has ruled that reform of the second chamber requires
constitutional change including therefore agreement by a majority of
the provinces to change or abolish it.
Third, the Senate scandal has raised questions about Harper’s
judgement as well as the political and policy advice he is receiving,
and may have further undermined his alleged status as a master
tactician and strategist. In particular, questions have been raised about
his choice of high profile Senators based in Ottawa to represent
regions far away from where they reside; appointments that led in
part to the subsequent abuse of residency rules and the misuse of
travel expenses as the line between their Senate duties and political
fundraising became increasingly blurred.13
Fourth, as the 2015 election drew near, the Senate’s
Conservative Harper appointees, including now senior leaders such as
the Speaker, now cast as the pawns of the PMO, played a major role
in gaining passage through Senate rule-breaking tactics of Bill C-377
whose purpose was to diminish the power of unions by requiring
unions to “publicly disclose any spending of more than $5000-
naming the payer and the payee—and the salaries of any members
earning more than $100,000, all to be publicly posted on a website”.14
Seven provinces opposed the law as an infringement of provincial
labour law.
Conservative MP Michael Chong’s backbench House of
Commons Reform Act intended to enhance democracy in the House
of Commons, was subject to some last minute PMO and Senate
efforts to delay and postpone the bill past the election period.15
Harper seemed to support Chong’s bill at an earlier time when Tory
MPs were openly criticizing Harper’s controlling practices. But it was
also the PMO that was trying to edge the bill out in the Senate. In the
final analysis Chong’s legislation had enough cross-party support in
the Senate to recognize and then defeat such manoeuvers.
In 2006, the Harper government’s first priority was its
Accountability Act which arose as a legitimate response to the Liberal
government’ sponsorship program scandal and the Gomery Inquiry.16
This legislation was cited again in the Harper 2015 election platform
as its main accountability credential. However, one-man Harper
government rule thereafter ensured that Harper became in many ways
by far Canada’s most unaccountable modern Prime Minister. By his
own personal design and insistence he: 1) avoided press conferences
and media questions except a very few scripted ones; 2) avoided
regular public meetings and discussions with provincial premiers in
the Canadian federation; 3) used massive omnibus legislative bills to
ram complex law and policy through Parliament and thus seriously
and deliberately weakened parliamentary legislative democracy; 4)
ran a scripted Cabinet where ministers were regularly told by his
junior PMO operatives exactly what to say and when to say it; and 5)
practiced the muzzling of environmental scientists thus further
reducing and harming evidence-based government; 6) ran a 2015
election campaign centered on his government’s alleged economic
competence by trumpeting balanced budgets when in fact he ran
deficits for 7 of the 9 years, and despite inheriting a $13 billion
surplus upon taking office in 2006, a surplus that had disappeared on
his watch before the 2008-2012 recession had barely begun; and 7)
devised and ran his 78 day long 2015 election strategy by which he
was resoundingly defeated by the Trudeau Liberals and the Canadian
electorate who had very different views about what democratic
accountability ought to be. In the aftermath of the election rout it
appears as though many Conservative MPs and cabinet ministers also
disapproved of Harper’s controlling, centralising and ultimately
alienating approach to leadership and campaigning.
CONTRIBUTING AUTHOR ANALYSES
While the editors necessarily focus in this chapter on the October 19th
2015 election result and campaign including some initial implications
as set out above, our contributing authors in chapters 2 to 10 provide
insightful and more in depth analysis of particular policy fields and
issues. These naturally tend to cover the Harper era but some also
cover developments extending back to the earlier Chretien-Martin
Liberal era and even the Mulroney Conservative era from 1984 to
1993. We preview here some of their conclusions and where
appropriate suggest related issues and challenges regarding them for
the newly elected Trudeau Liberal government.
The chapter 2 analysis of federal fiscal policy by Fanny
Demers, Michel Demers, and Alain Paquet is situated in the context
of federal finances in the short and medium term. The authors are
cautious about the merits, pitfalls and budgetary implications of a
national child care program, and health care costs, in that the medium
term does not leave much room for manoeuver. Regarding the
revenue side, the authors emphasize that a key consideration in
judging the impacts of taxes and transfers is how agents’ behaviour
and decisions are altered when the last dollar earned or spent is taxed
at a higher marginal rate.
Heather Whiteside’s assesses in chapter 3 Ottawa’s shifts
regarding private financing and the municipal infrastructure gap. The
former is centred on the greater use of the public-private partnership
(P3) model, and the latter on the continuing struggle to fund
continuing and often long-standing gaps in municipal infrastructure.
Whiteside argues that municipalities require greater federal support
but that progress will be hindered by the P3 model which is higher
priced and shifts control and decision-making away from democratic
channels. This will be an increasingly important policy debate as the
Trudeau government look to pursue and finance infrastructure
renewal during persistently sluggish economic times.
Old age security policy and funding is the focus in chapter 3 by
Allan Moscovitch, Nick Falvo, and David Macdonald. It covers past,
present and projected possible future federal policy on programs such
as Old Age Security (OAS) and the Guaranteed Income Supplement
(GIS). Their analysis shows that over four decades seniors’ poverty
has seen a major decrease. But they argue that the Harper
government’s increasing of the age of eligibility by two years will
almost certainly increase poverty among seniors who are under the
age of 67. This analysis will be timely given the Liberal plans to
reverse this policy and consider further options.
Public Service reforms in the Harper decade is the focus of Ian
Lee and Philip Cross’ research in chapter 5. They trace what they see
as a clear and broadened vision that included a smaller bureaucracy,
fundamentally lower public service compensation and a new balance
of power between the employer and public service unions. This
strategy, the authors argue, was delayed by the financial crisis but
then ultimately adopted, particularly regarding the changed
underlying collective bargaining system. Given the Liberal
commitment to renew the role of the public service and a
commitment to restore trust between politicians and public servants
this chapter provides valuable context for the direction and challenges
of future reform.
The Harper legacy regarding Canadian veterans and veterans
affairs is examined in chapter 6 by Michael Prince and Pamela Moss.
They trace the changing nature of veterans issues and Veteran’s
Affairs Canada. They argue that veterans are under siege because the
Harper government systematically relinquished its responsibility to
honour its special relationship to veterans and provide suitable
support to a group of citizens whose sole purpose is to serve the
interests of the state. This too became a key area of controversy
during the election and it will be interesting to see if lessons have
been learned and relations can be improved with the change in
government.
Ruby Dagher examines in chapter 7 whether Canada is doing
the right thing regarding the Islamic State (IS). She argues that
Canada’s contribution to the international offensive against IS is
inadequate if Canada wants to degrade, destabilize and weaken IS so
as to protect the vulnerable and innocent civilians of the region. She
argues that Canada should instead complement the coalition’s aerial
campaign by spending on development initiatives that avoid the trap
of defeating one group before others resurface. The Liberal pledge to
pull Canada out of the US-led bombing campaign could be seen in
this context as the first stage in a longer-term strategy.
In chapter 8 Jennifer Robson examines Harper era boutique tax
credits and how central they became to the Conservative political
brand. She shows how such smallish, hence boutique, but consistently
deployed credits and tax measures, have been aimed at individual tax
payers so as to recognize and deliver changes to everyday Canadians.
They are valuable as symbiotic communication with and finding
narrowly defined voter segments and also a direct to consumer
strategy. Such credits, moreover, come with little or no noticeable
marginal increase in overhead administrative requirements and
formed a key part of the ‘pocketbook’ politics that came to
characterize the final weeks of the campaign.
Balanced budget legislation is the focus of Genevieve Tellier’s
analysis in chapter 9. Though the Harper government promised such
legislation if elected, Tellier’s research focuses on the rich longer
term experience with provincial legislation and policies. While such
legislated rules are often regarded as effective tools that can force
budget decision makers to behave in a more fiscally disciplined
manner, she argues that evidence from the provinces does not support
this assertion. This is because Canadian provinces were able to
balance their budgets without being constrained by legislated rules
and they ran deficits despite the presence of such rules. Nevertheless,
Tellier concludes that the real benefits of balanced-budget laws lie in
their capacity to open up the budget process and to foster meaningful
public debates on important issues.
In chapter 10, Donna E. Wood examines Aboriginal
employment programming, with the focus in particular on the
Aboriginal Skills and Employment Training Strategy (ASETS). A 25
year story is told of this key field and Wood concludes over all that
such programs have made a significant difference in Aboriginal
labour market outcomes. But Wood also concludes that federal
commitment to expansion and growth along with supporting
Aboriginal control and empowerment evident in the late 1990s has
diminished significantly. There has also been greater fragmentation
between Aboriginal organizations delivering the programs.
In concluding this overview of the chapters we believe that
collectively they will provide an important link between some of the
key policies of the Harper government and the plans and priorities of
the newly minted Liberal government. In addition to providing a
record and analysis of some of the Harper government’s most recent
policy ideas and spending plans they will provide valuable feedback
and assessment for those entrusted with continuing, cancelling or
overhauling them in the new regime.
__________________________
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Chapter 2
FEDERAL FISCAL POLICY: PRIORITIES AND
CONSTRAINT IN THE CONTEXT OF THE 2015 ELECTION
AND BEYOND
Fanny Demers, Michel Demers, and Alain Paquet
INTRODUCTION
In the run up the fall 2015 election, the political arena is awash with
various policy proposals and promises from the different contenders,
while Canada’s economy is confronted with several significant and
potentially serious fiscal challenges. The economic outlook has
substantially changed during the past year, with an unexpectedly
strong and persistent decline in oil-prices, and weaker-than-
anticipated global growth partly due to the slower pace of the Chinese
economy and the uncertainty generated by the Greek debt crisis in the
Eurozone. The pace of the US recovery has also been somewhat
unsteady. As a result, projections for real GDP growth are now lower
than those in the April 2015 federal budget.
In this chapter, we analyze the economic challenges that a
newly elected government will face. We first present recent
developments in the economic outlook and their impact on federal
public finances. Secondly, we analyse the expenditure side of the
budget and assess key fiscal policy orientations advanced by the
Conservatives, the Liberals and the NDP. In the same vein, we then
analyze the alternative views on tax policy defended by the three
main political parties. We conclude with some thoughts about the
available policy options.
OVERVIEW OF THE 2015-16 ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT
Prior to the current oil shock, Canada’s economy was doing well,
with a reasonable 2.4% real GDP growth in 2014 and lower
unemployment rates than most OECD countries. Since June 2014, the
price of a barrel of crude oil fell from US$105 to about US$49 by
April 20151. After rebounding in May and June, it slid further to $48
towards the end of July as the US-Iran nuclear agreement is expected
to further flood the market in 6 to 8 months’ time. According to the
US Information Administration, this agreement could lower WTI
price predictions for 2015 by US$5 to US$15 per barrel.2 Hence,
there is a great deal of uncertainty with respect to the price of crude
oil for 2015 and 2016.3
As the fifth largest oil producer in the world, and with the
energy sector accounting for about 10% of GDP and 25% of exports,
Canada’s economy was bound to be affected by this shock. In fact,
Canadian real GDP growth was slightly negative for the first five
months. In July, the Bank of Canada revised its estimate for 2015 to
1.1%,4 a substantially lower figure than the federal budget prediction
of 2%. Predictions for world-wide growth have also been revised
downward from 3.5% to 3.3%.5 (IMF, 2015) While unemployment in
Canada has so far only increased from 6.6% (January) to 6.8%
(February) and has held steady so far, the job market remains fragile.6
An important observation is that oil prices remained fairly high
(above US$80) for a relatively sustained period between 2010 and
2014, shaping the long run expectations of oil producers and leading
to excess capacity. Oil production is based on long-term expectations
about future oil demand. In view of already-existing capacity,
producers have very little flexibility in adjusting output according to
market conditions in the short run. Moreover, storage is expensive
and its capacity is limited, permitting even less flexibility in
responding to price changes. Even in the longer run, changes in
production cannot be achieved easily and require long lags.
Oil production in troubled regions, mainly Libya and Iraq, has
been larger than expected. OPEC members and particularly Saudi
Arabia7, announced their decision to maintain their production at 30
million barrels per day in spite of the 0.8 million barrel per day of
excess supply in world oil.8 Last but not least, technological
improvements in the shale-oil and sand-oil industries have reduced
marginal costs, making extraction economically feasible under
favourable price conditions and leading to unprecedented increases in
the production of crude oil in Canada and the US since 2009, an
important contributing factor to the excess supply.9 While lower
demand resulting from the slow-down in the world economy and also
greater efficiency and environmental concerns have also contributed
to the fall in oil prices, supply-side factors have played a larger role.10
Lower oil prices are likely to persist for the next few years.
First, economic recovery and an increase in world economic growth
are not likely to bring back oil prices to their 2014 levels soon unless
there is also a supply-side adjustment. Some firms have already
reduced their investments in both Canada and the US, and have
closed about half of operating rigs11, but oil production is still
expected to increase in 2015 and 2016, resulting in large inventories
in all OECD countries.
Many projects in Canada may become economically unviable
with lower prices, especially as the average break-even price for
Canadian sands-oil production is at least US$60. Since capital
investment in the energy sector represents 25% of non-residential
private investment in Canada, a reduction in energy-related
investment will have a sizeable negative impact on business
investment. In fact, business gross fixed non-residential investment in
structures and machinery and equipment (M&E) has already
decreased by 4.1% in the first quarter of 2015.12 Beyond the oil
sector, the overall commodity price index fell by 24.5% since June
2014 with lower prices for base metals (especially copper), forest
products and agricultural products owing to sluggish growth in
emerging economies.
At the same time, weaker world demand for Canadian exports,
lower-than-expected growth in the US, and the short term worsening
of our terms-of-trade resulted in a substantial trade deficit during the
first half of 2015. Yet, lower commodity prices may have a positive
impact on the Canadian economy and provide a direct stimulus to
GDP through higher consumption demand and business investment in
the non-energy sector. Without being a panacea for long-term low
productivity, the substantial depreciation of the Canadian dollar (22
% since July 2014) will benefit Canadian exports. The large
manufacturing sectors in the US and in other trade partners stand to
gain from lower commodity prices. This impact should stimulate their
economies and have positive repercussions on Canadian exports.
However, there are some downside risks. The household sector
being heavily indebted (more than 160% of disposable income), the
real income gains from lower oil prices may be allocated to lowering
household debt. While this effect would improve the resilience of the
Canadian economy, it will reduce the short-run stimulus to demand
from lower commodity prices. In addition, an eventual correction in
housing prices, currently assessed to be 10-30% overvalued across
Canada13 could lower households’ wealth and hinder demand.
Furthermore, the deterioration in Canada’s terms of trade will
negatively impact consumer spending and private investment through
higher import prices. Finally, the increase in investment in the non-
energy sector may not suffice to compensate for the fall in investment
in the energy sector since the Canadian manufacturing sector has
shrunk considerably in recent years, while the services sector has
expanded.
IMPACT OF THE ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT ON FEDERAL
FINANCES
Canada will have to contend with lower oil prices and lower growth
for at least the next few years, a reality that will have important
repercussions on both federal and provincial budgets.14 A lower
nominal GDP implies a smaller tax base and lower oil prices lead to a
decline in corporate income tax revenues from the energy sector.
In Budget 2015, the federal government announced a $1.4
billion surplus for 2015, after using $2 billion out of the $3 billion
set-aside for contingencies (and after selling its shares of General
Motors worth $2.1 billion). In view of the subsequent changes to the
Canadian economic environment, the Parliamentary Budget Officer
(PBO) provided a budgetary update in July. The implications of the
new PBO estimates regarding the government’s budgetary balance
are summarized in Table 2.1.
TABLE 2.1
       Federal Budget Planning Assumptions (April 2015)   
 and revised assumptions (PBO July 2015)*   
  2015-16 2016-17 2017-
18
     
Budget 2015 real GDP growth (%) 1.9 2.3 2.3
 Revised PBO estimate** 1.0 2.7 2.4
 Impact on revenues ($ billions) -3.3 -2.3 -1.8
 Impact on expenses ($ billions) 0.7 0.5 0.3
 Net budgetary impact ($ billions) -3.9 -2.8 -2.1
     
Budget 2015 GDP inflation (%) 0.4 2.7 2.2
 Revised estimate (PBO)(%) 0.6 2.7 2.2
 Impact on revenues ($ billions) 0.7 0.6 0.6
 Impact on expenses ($ billions) 0.3 0.2 0.2
 Net budgetary impact ($ billions) 0.4 0.4 0.3
     
Budget 2015 interest rates    
 3-month treasury bill rate (%) 0.6 1.0 2.0
 10-year government bond rate (%) 3.0 3.5 4.1
     
 Revised estimate (PBO)    
 Percentage-point-change to all interest rates *** -0.25 -0.25 -0.25
 Impact on revenues ($ billions) -0.3 -0.4 -0.5
 Impact on expenses ($ billions) -0.4 -0.7 -0.8
 Net budgetary impact ($ billions) 0.1 0.3 0.4
     
Budgetary Balance ($ billions)    
 Budget 2015 planning assumptions 1.4 1.7 2.6
 Impact of total PBO revised estimates -3.4 -2.1 -1.4
 Updated budget balance (PBO) -2.0 -0.4 1.2
 After set aside for contingencies ($ 1 billion) -1.0 0.6 2.2
     
Notes: (some figures may not add up due to rounding-off)    
* The federal budget estimates have been adjusted for fiscal years (as opposed to calendar
years) by the PBO (Cameron and Matier, 2015).
** The estimates are from the Bank of Canada (July 2015) but adjusted for fiscal
years (Cameron and Matier, 2015).
 
*** Change resulting from the Bank of Canada's reduction of the overnight rate by
0.25 percentage points in July 2015.
 
Thus, the estimate for real GDP growth is revised downward
from 1.9% in Budget 2015 to 1%, while GDP-inflation is forecast to
be slightly higher (0.6% instead of 0.4% in the budget). In addition,
interest rates are adjusted downward by 0.25 percentage points in
accordance with the Bank of Canada’s July reduction of the overnight
rate.15 Assuming that the government would use the remaining $1
billion set-aside for contingencies, the overall impact of these revised
estimates lead the PBO to predict a deficit of $ 1.0 billion for 2015-26
and a surplus of $0.6 billion for 2016-17.
Yet, there are some risks which may cause the government’s
budget balances to be lower than these projections. First, these new
PBO estimates do not take into account that the price of crude oil in
both 2015 and 2016 may turn out to be lower than assumed in Budget
2015. Second, while interest rates are currently low, a possible 1-
percentage-point rise in the medium term would increase public debt
charges for the government. Using the Budget 2015 (p.378)
sensitivity analysis, a one-time one-percentage-point increase in
interest rates would reduce the budget balance by $0.5 billion in the
first year, by $1.2 billion in the second year, and by $2 billion in the
fifth year after the increase. This is in the realm of possibilities as the
Federal Reserve is expected to raise US interest rate this fall, with
possibly sustained incremental increases thereafter.
The current economic outlook also has additional risks for the
provinces. Equalization payments, calculated from a weighted
average formula of the past three fiscal years, do not yet reflect the
impact of the oil shock. If its effects were to persist, equalization
payments to provinces will decrease.
Another angle of public finance in the Canadian federation also
deserves some attention, especially over a somewhat longer horizon.
According to the PBO’s Fiscal Sustainability Report the federal
government has a negative fiscal gap16 of -1.4% of GDP.17 That is, it
has fiscal room to increase expenditures or reduce taxes, while still
maintaining its debt-to-GDP ratio on a sustainable path. By contrast,
the subnational governments (provinces, territories and
municipalities) are following an unsustainable debt-to-GDP path,
with a positive fiscal gap of 1.4% of GDP. The PBO report estimates
that they would need to increase their primary balance by 1.4% of
Canadian GDP in 2015, and annually thereafter, to become
sustainable over a 75-year horizon. Such a change would require a
combination of increases in revenues, reductions in expenditures
and/or higher transfers from the federal government.18
The PBO’s current prediction of a small deficit has greater
political than economic significance.19 The federal government has
relatively healthy public finances. However, the Canadian economy
suffers from relatively low productivity, high private sector debt, low
private investment levels, as well as large provincial fiscal
imbalances. From an economic perspective, the challenge facing the
government is to pursue growth-promoting policies while maintaining
a sustainable debt-to-GDP ratio. Different mixes of spending, taxes
and transfers, provided they are appropriately and judiciously
calibrated, and efficiency and welfare enhancing, can permit
Canadians to have cost-effective public services that respond to their
needs, without undermining long-term sustainability objectives.
ADDRESSING FEDERAL SPENDING NEEDS AND ASSESSING
SOME RELATED POLICY OPTIONS
In this section, we analyse specific questions pertaining to the recent
and prospective evolution of government spending. We focus on
direct program spending and federal transfers to other levels of
government, and especially on the Canadian Health Transfer since it
is at the heart of the federal-provincial imbalance. We also discuss the
NDP’s proposal for $15-a-day daycare. Finally we discuss
infrastructure spending which has received much attention in the
recent economic literature as an engine for growth.
TABLE 2.2
The Evolution of Federal Expenses
The federal government’s total program expenses consist of transfers
to persons20, transfers to other levels of government21, and direct
program spending. (Table 2.2)
Transfers to persons are projected to grow by 8.3% in 2015-16, but on
average, by 4% annually for the next five years, at approximately the
rate of nominal GDP.Transfers to other levels of government as a
whole will also grow at the rate of GDP. However the growth rate of
its individual components vary. In particular, the CST which supports
social services, early childhood and post-secondary education by
providing per capita cash transfers increased at about 3.30% over the
past fiscal year and is projected to grow at only 3% on average for the
next five years. Thus, the CST is projected to grow at a slower rate
than GDP, increasing the financial burden of the provinces and
contributing to the federal-provincial fiscal imbalance.
As can be seen in Figures 1 and 2, since 2005-2006, when the
Conservatives took power, the federal government total program
expenses have been on average between 13% and 14% of GDP
(except for the recession years 2009-2010 and 2010-2011 when they
rose to 15.8% and 14.6% respectively), while revenues have declined
from about 16.2% to 14.1% of GDP in 2014-15.
Despite falling revenues and relatively stable expenditures, the
government posted surpluses during its first three years in office, and
gradually declining deficits following the 2009-10 stimulus
spending.22 In fact, the Conservatives were able to finance expenses,
at first by using the surplus from the previous Liberal government,
and then by taking advantage of lower interest payments on debt
which fell from 2.4% of GDP in 2005-2006 to 1.4% in 2014-15.23
Direct program expenses were $116 billion or 5.9% of GDP for
2014-15, remaining relatively stable as a percentage of GDP and
comparable to previous Liberal governments until now. However,
according to Budget 2015, to achieve the projected surpluses for the
next five years, direct program spending will grow more slowly than
GDP and will fall from its current 5.9% of GDP to 5.5% in 2019-20.
This lower growth of direct program spending is likely to affect some
services or programs. Consequently, some thought needs to be given
to the government’s options on spending, especially as it faces lower
oil prices and potentially higher debt services in the medium run.
Thus, important questions will need to be addressed by all political
parties with respect to the role of the federal government’s spending
and transfers, considering not only the implications for fiscal balance,
but also the welfare impact on Canadians.
We now turn to three representative topics that are going to be
front and center in policy debates beyond the 2015 election.
Contemplating Subsidized National Daycare
Families occupy a central place in politics and in the formulation of
policies. While the Conservatives and the Liberals have proposed
alternative personal-income tax-and-transfer packages, which we
discuss later in this chapter, on the expenditure side, the NDP favours
the financing of childcare spaces in the spirit of the program put in
place in Quebec in 1997.
The rationale behind a public day-care program is two-fold.
First, it can be considered as a way to increase indirectly a family’s
disposable income and to alleviate the burden of balancing work and
family responsibilities for a single parent or two working parents.
Second, it has also been put forward as a means of facilitating
children’s development and socioeconomic integration. However,
from an economic and a public policy viewpoint, many questions
dealing with cost-effectiveness, accessibility, equity, as well as
freedom-of-choice must be addressed.
The proposal put forward by the NDP consists in a new per-capita
federal transfer that would cover up to 60% of the cost of new spaces,
capping the amount disbursed by families to $15–a-day per child. The
initial plan, first announced in October 2014, proposed to finance
370,000 childcare spaces over 8 years from 2015 to 2023. This would
amount to approximately a $2-billion annual cost for the federal
government.24 In July 2015, the NDP seems to have raised their
proposal to “creating one million new high-quality childcare spaces at
a cost of no more than $15 a day.”25 Hence, the annual cost would be
around $5.5 billion, creating a very substantial dent in the federal
budget.
In a recent article, Haeck, Lefebvre and Merrigan provide an
econometric assessment of the Quebec program more than 10 years
after its implementation.26 On the positive side, the Quebec
experience is seen to have increased the labour market participation
of women. However, in practice, low-income families are not
necessarily the main beneficiaries of the program as children of
women with higher education (who often belong to higher income
groups) have occupied a larger proportion of the subsidized spaces.
Moreover, the evidence does not support the notion that the program
has increased school-readiness. The measured impact on children
from low-income families having attended subsidized daycare was
even negative.
Finally, it is also worth noting that, since it was introduced, the
costs of the Quebec program have been significantly rising, due to
requests for additional spaces and increases in its operating costs.
Finding alternative means of pursuing the intended desirable policy
goals might be preferable.
The Canadian Health Transfer
Amounting to $32.1 billion, or about 50% of total federal
intergovernmental transfers in 2014-15, the Canadian Health Transfer
(CHT) is the largest transfer program. The CHT is paid to provinces
and territories conditionally on satisfying five criteria set in the
Canada Health Act, namely comprehensiveness, universality,
accessibility, portability and public administration. In order to assess
the appropriateness of federal financing, that is, of the growth rate of
the CHT, we need to examine the factors driving the evolution of
public health spending, notably population aging, relative price
effects, technological developments and income growth. These cost
drivers are mostly outside of political control.
The percentage of the population over the age of 65 is
increasing rapidly. Aging raises health spending since a greater
number of individuals find themselves at the end of their lives when
health expenditures are at their highest due to ill health.27 However,
as longevity rises, the number of years in good health also increases,
exerting a moderating influence on rising health costs.28 All in all,
aging will have an important impact that is likely to rise future
provincial health costs (especially in Quebec and in the Atlantic
provinces whose populations are older).
Medical technology (whether equipment, procedures or drugs)
profoundly affects the delivery and cost of medicine today.29
Technological advances may explain more than 50% of total health
spending growth.30 Since technological change originates mainly in
the US, Canada does not have control over this major cause of cost
increases in health spending. New, highly-valued, health-improving
technologies often replace old ones in medical treatments. Some
technologies reduce treatment-costs per patient, such as angioplasty
compared to heart-by-pass surgery. Yet, when these technologies
become accessible to a greater number of patients, this treatment-
expansion effect contributes to the rise of medical costs. Nonetheless,
unduly limiting access to new technologies is neither desirable, nor
necessarily a means of curbing growing costs. Inadequate (or lack of
adequate and timely) treatment of someone’s illness may not only be
detrimental to that person’s well-being, but even impose an even
greater cost on the health system over time. Finally, income growth is
conducive to increased health spending since individuals value
longevity and quality of life.
In December 2011, the Conservative government extended the
2004 Health Accord and announced that the CHT would keep
growing at an annual rate of 6% until 2016-17. Thereafter, its growth
will be determined by a moving-average of the previous three-year
growth in GDP, with a guaranteed minimum of 3%.31 An important
policy question is whether the planned growth in the CHT is in line
with projected trend growth in health expenditures that is estimated to
be between 5.1% and 7%.32 Moreover, on average, 37.7% of
provincial governments' total program expenditures are devoted to
health spending.33
While the CHT will amount to financing 22% of total health
spending in 2016, thereafter, in the likelihood that the rate of increase
in health spending will be greater than that of GDP, this share will
gradually decrease. Consequently, the planned reduction in CHT
growth would place an increased burden on provincial finances
beyond 2017. This will aggravate the federal-provincial fiscal
imbalance.
Alternatively, the federal government could allow the CHT to
rise at the rate of increase of provincial and territorial health
spending. Assuming an annual health-expenditure growth rate of
5.1%, the CHT would rise by $400 million in 2017-18, $900 million
in 2018-19 and $1.4 billion in 2019-20.34 In ten years, the additional
federal contribution (over and above the CHT effective 2017-18)
would amount to $5.5 billion.
Both the Liberal Party and the NDP have asserted that they
would increase financing of health care. The NDP proposed a
continued increase in the CHT at the rate of 6% per year. The
additional cost would be $1.6 billion in 2018-19. According to this
proposal, in ten years, the federal government would be injecting an
additional $10 billion (over and above the CHT effective 2017-18).
If the federal government is to pursue its role in financing the
Canadian medical care system and in ensuring its long-term viability,
its financial commitment must be reviewed.35 However, a new
Accord with the provinces should leave some room for innovation.
For example, while guaranteeing portability, the provinces could be
allowed to experiment with potentially more efficient ways of
providing medical services, while still being required to abide by the
spirit of the remaining 4 criteria in the Canada Health Act. The
various pressures on costs, discussed earlier, highlight the necessity to
make the Canadian health system more efficient by introducing cost-
saving incentives on both the supply and demand side, and by
improving the provision of health services. The compensation and
remuneration system of physicians could be reviewed. Greater
emphasis on prevention is needed. Greater cooperation among
provinces could increase their bargaining power and lower the
purchase costs of drugs and medical equipment.
Finally, agreed targeted and concerted initiatives could be
financed by CHT funding above 5.1% to address specific needs in a
given timeframe (e.g. to reduce further waiting times for surgeries, to
fight specific illnesses which underlie health-cost increases such as
cancer and Alzheimer’s disease and related disorders).
Improving Infrastructure
Public infrastructure projects36 promote greater productivity, growth
and welfare. For example, the quality of roads and bridges affects the
competitiveness of firms that rely on an efficient just-in-time
inventory management system. Infrastructure investments are large
capital-intensive projects that increase aggregate demand in the short-
run, and potential output in the long-run, through efficiency and
productivity enhancing effects.
Provided they are judiciously chosen and efficiently
implemented, the impact of public investment tends to be larger when
there is economic slack, when monetary policy is accommodative
(two conditions currently met by Canada) and when it is financed by
debt. Under these conditions, public investment may have large
output effects, potentially reducing the debt-to-GDP ratio.37 In
addition, the import-leakage of such projects are low, with mostly
domestic inputs being utilized, an important consideration given the
depreciation of the Canadian dollar. Resorting to tax-financing would
greatly reduce the employment and output impact and the multiplier
effect.38
In its analysis of federal infrastructure from 2009-2011,
Finance Canada’s estimates of a 1.6 multiplier is in line with US
data.39 The Federation of Canadian Municipalities estimates that $172
billion are needed to repair roads, waste-water, and drinking-water
and storm-water systems.40 Such repairs may be especially important
in view of extreme weather patterns such as heavy precipitations and
intense cold, resulting from climate change. Moreover, this figure
does not take into account the massive investment in public transit
systems required to reduce congestion in metropolitan areas, nor the
provincial and federal infrastructure needs. There may also be other
worthwhile initiatives such as building deep-sea harbors or roads to
the North to facilitate the development of the territories, the
transportation of resources and access to markets.
In 2007, the Conservative government established a $33 billion
infrastructure plan that was followed by a 10-year 53-billion New
Building Canada Plan (NBCP) for provincial/territorial and municipal
infrastructure in 2014. The NBCP is supported by several funds: the
$32-billion Community Improvement Fund for municipal projects
such as roads and public transit (pooling funds from the indexed Gas
Tax Fund (GTF) and the Goods and Services Tax Rebate for
Municipalities); a $14-billion New Building Canada Fund (NBCF),
(consisting of a $4-billion National Infrastructure Component (NIC)
and a $10-billion Provincial-Territorial Infrastructure Component
(PTIC); a $1.25 billion for the Public-Private Partnerships Canada
Fund; and $6 billion in funding from continuing infrastructure
programs. In principle, this plan will raise productivity, if efficient,
productivity-growth-enhancing projects are selected and
implemented.
To benefit from federal funding, provinces and municipalities
have to provide substantial co-financing. Furthermore, as Stoney and
Krawchenko argue, infrastructure project selection has been much
more centralized in Canada than in the US and Australia.41 As the
NBCP is implemented there will be a need for better
intergovernmental cooperation and a careful evaluation of economic
benefits.
In view of the huge Canadian infrastructure deficit, the funding
from the NBCP will not suffice. There is a need to diversify sources
of funding. Harnessing pension and other investment funds may be a
promising avenue worth exploring, as long as there is a rigorous and
untainted selection process for worthy projects. Thus, in January
2015, the Quebec government announced that a public institution, the
Caisse de Dépôt, will be funding two public transportation projects
for an amount of $5 billion. Another possibility is to create an
independent Canadian Infrastructure Investment Bank.42 The federal
and some provincial-territorial or municipal governments, pension
funds and investment funds could be shareholders who would provide
equity capital. With the backing of these shareholders the Bank could
borrow additional funds. Such a critical mass of funds and expertise
could permit an efficient selection of projects.
In the same vein, the Liberal party would expand infrastructure
funding by persuading large pension funds as well as the Canada
Pension Plan to invest in Canadian infrastructure projects, possibly
through the creation of an investment bank. The NDP on the other
hand, is proposing to allocate an additional $1.5 billion to the GTF
and to invest $1.3 billion annually in a dedicated public transit fund.
Public infrastructure investment has become the most important
policy tool to promote growth, innovation and sustainable
development of a society. In view of tight public finances, innovative
ways of financing need to be considered to respond to existing needs.
Assessing the Canadian Tax Policy Debate
Inescapably, tax revenues need to be collected to finance government
programs and transfers. An ideal tax system should be equitable,
efficient, growth promoting, transparent and easy to implement.
Achieving all these goals often involves trade-offs. Despite some
changes, the Canadian tax system remains rooted in the 1966 Carter
report’s ability-to-pay principle with more concerns for fairness than
inefficiency costs. Over the years, more or less important
modifications made to the federal tax system were not all guided by
economic principles.
We first review some principles and recent advances in the economics
of taxation to put in perspective the competing policy orientations of
the main federal political parties and to evaluate key aspects of their
platforms (to the extent they are currently known) with respect to
consumption, personal and corporate income tax. We then analyse
their impact on the economy and the well-being of Canadians.
Economic principles of taxation and practical issues
Taxes are distortionary and are not equivalent in their effects on
economic agents’ decisions to work, invest, consume or save.
Moreover, equity issues are multi-faceted and their implications for
economic growth need to be pondered.
A key consideration in judging the efficiency-impact of taxes is how
agents’ behaviour and decisions are altered when the last dollar
earned or spent is taxed at a higher marginal tax rate (MTR).
Accordingly, a reduced after-tax wage creates a disincentive for
workers to supply additional labour. A higher MTR on consumption
hinders consumption. A higher MTR on capital investments lowers
the after-tax return and depresses private investments in physical
capital, human capital and innovation, thereby adversely affecting
economic growth. In addition, frequent and unpredictable variations
in tax rates are detrimental to both efficiency and economic growth.
Fairness of the tax system also matters. According to horizontal
equity, people in identical socio-economic situations should be
subjected to the same tax treatment. According to vertical equity,
people with a higher ability to pay should face a higher tax burden.
Yet, should equity apply to individuals or households? Which of
revenue or wealth is the appropriate measure of ability-to-pay? These
are open issues for political debates.
It is generally established that taxes on the capital stock, and
taxes on capital income are the most damaging for efficiency and
welfare, followed by taxes on labour income, while the least harmful
is a consumption tax.43 Hence shifting the tax-mix away from
corporate and personal income taxes towards a consumption-based
tax can generate smaller economic costs to raise the same level of
government revenues. While the consumption tax tends to be
regressive, appropriate compensations and tax-credits to lower-
income households can address these concerns for vertical equity.
Hence, there are often ways to improve efficiency without necessarily
sacrificing on equity.
Finally, individual responses following a rise in the MTR on
labour income can take different forms. A lower after-tax real wage
may prompt individuals to supply less work, either by simply
reducing hours worked or by altogether exiting the labour market.44
Moreover, for the aggregate economy, higher MTRs have a strong
negative impact on participation in the labour market, especially for
younger workers with lower levels of education, parents with young
children, and older workers approaching retirement.45 Thus, small
changes in high MTRs potentially cause important welfare losses and
substantial fluctuations in aggregate employment.46 In addition, high
MTRs might induce individuals to engage in tax evasion schemes or
opt for tax-favoured modes of compensation (such as fringe benefits,
dividends, capital gains) to lower their tax-bill, leading to
distortions.47
The federal Canadian tax schedule is progressive, with three
income brackets and corresponding official marginal tax rates.
However, for an increasing income that remains in the same tax
bracket, even low and low-middle income individuals often lose
several tax credits in proportion to the increment of revenue, once
some thresholds are crossed. High clawback (or reduction) rates
create implicit marginal effective tax rates (METR) much higher than
official tax rates.
Both federal and provincial programs contribute to this effect.
At the federal level, the impact on METRs arises from the interaction
of the Canada Child Tax Benefit (CTB), the Universal Child Care
Benefit (UCCB) and the Working Income Tax Benefit (WITB), along
with the computation of the GST tax credit, and the federal Income-
tested Benefits (including Old Age Security and the Guaranteed
Income Supplement). The METR faced by individuals depends also
on the province of residence, the household’s composition (including
the number of children, the number of income-earners), and the level
of earnings. As shown in Table 2.3, the combined federal and
provincial METRs can be quite high and punitive, and the primary
earner in a family with two children may have more than 90¢ clawed
back out of the last dollar earned (an METR of 90,1%).48
We now discuss some key aspects of the tax policies adopted
by the incumbent Conservative government or proposed by the
Liberal party and the NDP to the extent that these are known at the
time of writing. They are summarized in Table 2.4.
TABLE 2.3
Table 3: Examples of implicit effective marginal tax rates in Canada (Ontario) 2013
  1-adult household
Wage level  67% 100% 167% 67%
(% of the Canadian average wage)
Number of children  0 0 0 2
Household’s gross wage earnings ($)      
$
32,052
$
48,078
$
80,129
$
32,052
Earner’s effective marginal tax rate  33.80% 63.70% 35.40% 55.80%
  2-adult household
Wage level  100% /
0%
100% /
33%
100% /
67%
100% /
33%(% of Canadian average wage: for
primary/secondary earner)
Number of children  2 2 2 0
Household’s gross wage earnings ($)  $
48,078
$
64,103
$
80,129
$
64,103
Earner’s effective marginal tax rate Primary 90.90% 67.30% 67.30% 63.70%
 Secondary 40.30% 41.50% 37.30% 37.90%
Source: OECD (2014)      
Table 2.4
Some key orientations proposed and advocated by the main aspiring parties to
government in Canada on tax policy*
Conservatives NDP Liberals
Consumption taxes  
2006 and 2008: GST decreased
from 7% to 5%
-- --
 
2008; Introduction of tax-free-
savings-account (TFSA) with
maximum annual contribution
initially set to $5,000, $5,500 in
2012, and $10,000 in 2015
-- --
Personal income taxes  
2006: Introduction of the
UCCB: $100 monthly payments
for each child under the age of 6
To rescind Family income
tax splitting
To create a $22 billion
integrated income- tested
CCB to replace the
existing taxable UCCB,
the not-taxable, but
income-tested CCTB and
NCBS programs.
2015: On July 20th, retroactive
to January 2015, the monthly
allowance raised to $ 160 for
children under 6 and a new $60
monthly allowance for children
aged 6 to 17
To close the preferential tax
treatment associated with
some CEOs earnings from
stock options (only half
being taxable) and to use the
proceeds to increase the
Working Income Tax Benefit
& the National Child Benefit
Supplement
To rescind Family income
tax splitting
  To allocate an additional
$2 billion to CCB
Introduction of Family income
tax splitting for families with
children under 18: non-
refundable tax-credit by
transferring up to $50,000 of
taxable income from the primary
 To lower the MTR from
22% to 20.5% for taxable
income between $44,701
and $89,401 financed by
the introduction of a new
tax bracket with a 33%
earner to a spouse facing a lower
tax bracket Maximum tax-
savings: $2,000 per family
MTR (instead of 2 9%) on
taxable income exceeding
$200,000
Corporate income taxes  
Between 2006 and 2012:
Reduction of the general federal
corporate income tax rate from
21% to 15%
To raise the general tax rate
in the 18-19% range (to
bring it more in line with the
average rate in G-7
countries)
To maintain the current
corporate tax rates or to
reduce it if the US reduces
its rates to remain
competitive
2008: Reduction of small
business tax rate to 11%
To lower the small business
tax rate to 10%, then to 9%
 
Increase in the annual income
eligibility from $300,000 to
$500,000 for a business to
qualify as small
  
Accelerated capital consumption
allowance (CCA) of 50 per cent
on a declining-balance basis for
qualifying M&E purchased
between 2015 and 2026.
  
Note: *UCCB: Universal Child Care Benefit; CCB: Canada Child Benefit; CCTB: Canada
Child Tax Benefit; NCBS: National Child Benefit Supplement; MTR: marginal tax rate
Source: Department of Finance Canada: various Budgets, the political parties' Web sites,
Liberal Party of Canada (2015), NDP (2015), Curry (2015), McLeod (2015), Wingrove
(2015).
Consumption taxes
In the early 1990s, in line with efficiency and equity considerations, a
Progressive-Conservative government replaced the 68-years-old ill-
conceived manufacturers' sales tax with a broad-based form of the
value-added tax: the GST. For equity considerations, a tax credit was
also introduced for low-income households. Despite some
differences, the GST is close to a theoretically sound value-added tax.
Over the years, the GST has been formally or informally harmonized
with provincial sales taxes in most provinces, improving overall
efficiency.
In its first term in office, the Conservative government cut the
GST from 7% to 5% depriving the federal government of crucial
revenues, a decision unsubstantiated by any economic rationale.
Lowering the burden of personal and/or corporate income taxes
would have been preferable on the grounds of both efficiency and
fairness. However, the introduction of tax-free-savings-account
(TFSA) in Budget 2008 added a complement to existing registered
retirement and education saving plans (RRSP and RESP) by
sheltering some current savings from income taxation. Allowing
individuals to shield the returns on part of their savings from income
tax brought the tax system closer to a consumption-tax regime, and
improved its efficiency.
Yet, since higher-income individuals have a greater ability to
save, the government could have set a ceiling on total lifetime savings
exempt from tax to address vertical equity concerns and also to
mitigate the significant reduction in federal revenues estimated to be
$1.1 billion between 2015 and 2019. With this policy choice, the
government may have missed the political opportunity to proceed
with more pressing changes to the Canadian tax system. At this point,
the three political parties have given no indication of favouring
further changes to the GST (except for some recently additional
exclusion of hygienic products supported by all).
Personal income taxes and transfers
As we argued above, the interaction of tax rates, credits and transfers
needs to be taken into account to assess how federal parties’
proposals differ with respect to the net effect on after-tax personal
income and the economy. At the outset of the 2015 election
campaign, as shown earlier in Table 2.2, the clearest divide among
parties is to be seen in this policy area.
Effective 2015, the Conservative government increased the
UCCB monthly allowance for each child under age 6 to $160. It also
made the UCCB available to families with children aged 6 to 17 at a
lower monthly rate of $60. Though the UCCB is taxable, this policy
raises families’ disposable income to a degree. In addition, the
Conservatives have introduced Family income tax splitting, which
may be viewed as a step towards greater horizontal equity. However,
since the federal government foregoes $2.2 billion in receipts to
benefit only 15% of Canadian families, many of them affluent
households with one high-paid working spouse, this represents a
setback on vertical equity.49
Furthermore, there is a downside on efficiency grounds. While
this policy lowers some households’ average tax rate and decreases
the MTR of the primary family earner, it increases that of the
secondary earner. To the extent that the labour supply elasticity with
respect to net-of-tax wages is higher for secondary earners, the
number of hours worked may decrease, while the participation rate of
the secondary earner may also fall. The overall response is likely to
be a net decrease in labour supply.50
The NDP proposes an increase in the Working Income Tax
Benefit and the National Child Benefit Supplement financed by
removing the special treatment of stock option earnings (estimated by
Finance Canada to cost $750 million). Public statements made so far
reveal that the NDP does not intend to raise individual taxes,51 but
plans to rescind Family income tax splitting. While the NDP
criticized the increase in TFSA contributions, no changes have yet
been proposed. It thus seems that the NDP aims at addressing vertical
equity concerns without aggravating existing inefficiency costs.
Meanwhile, the Liberals propose a revamped CCB program
more generous for families with children and with incomes between
$26,000 and $44,999. This is a simplification of the tax regime as it
better integrates tax and transfer programs for families with children.
It is advisable on efficiency grounds as well since it lowers METRs
for this income group, and provides a greater incentive to work and to
invest in human capital.52 However, while reducing clawback rates
and thus the METR for some income groups compared to existing
programs, higher clawback rates worsen the METR for families
whose income exceeds $45,000, and even more so for 3-children
households. (See Table 2.5).
Actually, the three federal parties could take a broader view on
the issues pertaining to the efficiency and equity impact of METRS.
Recently, the 2015-2016 Quebec provincial budget announced that, as
of January 2016, a “tax shield” will be implemented to offset some
loss of transfers for individuals whose income increases.53 In the
interest of inducing greater work-effort, it may be worth adapting and
extending the idea underlying the Quebec tax-shield to the federal tax
system. A portion of a (possibly capped) increase in an individual’s
income could be exempted from personal income tax or be subjected
to a lower marginal tax rate for that year. It would be economically
sensible that the combined impacts of income-tax rates and clawback
rates in transfer programs be set not to exceed a “reasonable”
proportion of an additional dollar of earned income (e.g. 50%).
Table 2.5
Finally, with the intent of improving vertical equity for the
middle class, the Liberals also plan to decrease the tax rate from 22%
to 20.5% on income between $44,701and $89,401. However, they
would make up the lost revenues with a new 33% tax rate on income
over $200 000. This 4-percentage-point higher federal top-tax bracket
is reckoned to affect less than 1% of tax-filers. On the other hand, the
combined federal-provincial top marginal tax rates would now be
higher than 48% in 8 provinces and 1 territory, exceed 50% in 6
provinces, and 53.5% in 4 provinces. This would not be a favourable
signal to foreign investors. While the adverse effect on labour supply
may not be quantitatively large, empirical evidence suggests that
government receipts could be lower than expected due to tax
avoidance.
Corporate taxes
In the aftermath of the last financial crisis there have been calls for
increases in business taxes in the interest of better income
distribution. It is important to remember that, while it is paid by
business firms, the corporate tax is ultimately borne by consumers
(through higher product prices), by workers (through lower salaries
and pension benefits) and by the owners of the firm (the
shareholders). Notably, many middle income individuals are also
shareholders through their pension funds.
Since the late 1990s, the federal corporate income tax base has
been gradually broadened, differential tax treatment across capital
assets and sectors alleviated and its tax rate reduced. Following the
general corporate tax rate reduction from 28% to 21% between 2000
and 2004 under Liberal governments, the Conservatives further
lowered it from 21% in 2007 to 15% in 2012. The applicable rate to
small businesses was also cut back to 11% in 2008 and the income
threshold to qualify as a small business was raised from $300,000 to
$500,000. Budget 2015 also extended the accelerated Capital Cost
Allowance (CCA) for qualifying machinery and equipment (M&E)
acquisitions between 2015 and 2026, to decrease their after-tax
purchase price and stimulate investment.54
The Liberals seem inclined to follow a policy similar to that of
the Conservatives regarding corporate taxes, and have declared that
corporate tax rates should remain at their current level, unless the US
lowers levies on corporations. However, the NDP is proposing to
raise the general corporate tax rate from 15% up to 18%, or even
19%, while diminishing the small business tax rate to 9%. First, from
an economic perspective, increasing the gap between the large and
small business tax rate by as much as 9% is questionable as it creates
a strong disincentive for a firm to grow.
Second, a corporate tax hike could be significantly detrimental
to investment, growth and job creation especially so at a time when
the Canadian economy is showing signs of weakness. In a globalized
economy, the corporate tax plays a significant role with respect to the
worldwide allocation of corporate investment and a country’s
competitiveness. In fact, the US may soon lower its corporate tax rate
as part of its upcoming tax-reform55, and the UK has already
announced plans to lower its corporate tax rate to 18% (from its
current 20%) by 2020.
Furthermore, having a low combined federal-provincial
corporate tax rate of 26.3%, actually has increased tax revenues.56 A
comparison with the US reveals that, since 2000, corporate tax
revenue has averaged 3.3% of GDP in Canada, compared to 2.3% in
the US where the corporate tax rate (39% for the combined federal-
state rate) is the highest in the OECD. This suggests that Canada’s
lower tax rate and a relatively simpler tax system may be attractive to
multinationals. Increasing corporate tax rates at this time would
clearly go against economic logic and international tendencies.
CONCLUSIONS
At the outset of the 2015 federal election, the large drop in oil prices,
depressed world markets for resources, and weak growth in Canada
and abroad, have significantly altered the economic playing field for
policymakers and contenders for government.
This chapter has provided an assessment and overview of the
current economic outlook and its implications for the federal finances
in the short and medium term. The actual growth trend in spending,
along with the economic outlook, raise questions about the federal
government’s financial framework, no matter which political party
forms the government.
After reviewing the recent evolution of the federal
government’s spending programs and their likely trend path, we have
examined three key political areas of expenditure: the merits, pitfalls,
and budgetary implications of a national child care program; health
spending, including the causes of rising health care costs and the
impact on provincial budgets of the lower growth in the Canadian
Health Transfer announced for 2017-18 and argue that financing at a
higher rate and a new Federal-Provincial-Territorial Accord are called
for. In view of the huge infrastructure deficit and of the estimated
economic benefits, we have also discussed various approaches to
financing infrastructure projects.
Finally, we focussed on the revenue side firts by reviewing
some principles of taxation, namely equity (both horizontal and
vertical), efficiency and growth promotion. We emphasize that a key
consideration in judging the efficiency-impact of taxes and transfers
is how agents’ behaviour and decisions are altered when the last
dollar earned or spent is taxed at a higher marginal tax rate. We
compare different types of taxes, namely consumption, income and
corporate taxes and their impact on individuals’ incentives to work, to
consume, or to invest. We analyze the Conservative government’s
recent changes to taxation and personal transfers as well as the
alternative policies proposed by the other two main parties. We then
turn to corporate taxes and contrast the different parties’ positions
arguing that maintaining Canada’s competitive corporate tax rates is
critical to growth.
The likely persistence of the current economic conditions in the
medium term does not leave much room to maneuver to maintain a
balanced budget (a commitment initially made by all three main
federal parties, though the Liberals later declared support for a
deficit) and to implement new initiatives on spending, transfers and
taxes. Without sufficient economic growth generating enough new
receipts from the existing tax structure, the government budget
constraint requires that new programs be funded either by new
sources of tax revenues or by cuts in previously existing government
programs. Even without new programs, the most likely projected path
of healthcare spending as well as the maintenance of existing
infrastructures will exert pressures on federal and/or provincial public
finances. The resolution of the resulting fiscal imbalance will require
not only goodwill, but especially sound economic evaluation and
innovative solutions.
Beyond an election campaign, the development and
implementation of good policies should be based on judicious and
rigorous analysis. The impact of each policy in terms of efficiency,
equity and growth must be assessed, and its opportunity costs
determined to ensure judicious choices. We can only hope that
informed debates take place and guide choices about public services
that are fair, cost-effective and viable, while responding to
Canadians’ needs. These are essential conditions for improving
Canadians’ welfare without living beyond our means.
__________________________
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Chapter 3
HOW OTTAWA SHIFTS SPENDING: PRIVATE FINANCING
AND THE MUNICIPAL INFRASTRUCTURE GAP
Heather Whiteside
INTRODUCTION
All sectors in Canada are experiencing a growing infrastructure
gap – a significant discrepancy between the amount being spent by
government and what is actually needed for upgrading, maintaining,
and developing public infrastructure. Municipal projects face
additional hurdles as these jurisdictions often have limited avenues
for generating revenue, and in 2013 the Federation of Canadian
Municipalities identified the need for infrastructure spending and
federal cost sharing for public works as being at the top of their
agenda. The long run worsening of the municipal infrastructure gap
can be attributed to a number of factors, namely the decades-long
withdrawal of the federal government from public capital investment
and the ownership of public capital stock.
More recently, federal spending and procurement initiatives to
address infrastructure needs carve out a central role for the public-
private partnership (P3) model to privately design, build, operate and
finance public infrastructure at all levels of government. This includes
Infrastructure Canada’s requirement that applications to access its 10-
year, $14 billion New Building Canada Fund first consider the P3
option if a project’s capital costs exceed $100 million, and that
municipalities adopt P3s in exchange for support from the $1.25
billion P3 Canada Fund.
This chapter examines changes in Canadian infrastructure
spending, the federal government’s role in producing the
infrastructure gap, and the push for the P3 solution. It argues that the
infrastructure spending onus has increasingly shifted from federal to
municipal governments and from traditional budgeting and tax-based
schemes to private debt market financing and user fee or availability
payment-based infrastructure developed via P3s. The characteristics
and long run implications of this twofold shift will be analyzed in
terms of their impact on the features of Canadian infrastructure
projects and spending, and new governance arrangements for
infrastructure developed across the country.
CANADA’S INFRASTRUCTURE GAP
There is no great mystery as to what must be done to govern
Canada. The federal government must facilitate the creation
of wealth; redistribute it regionally and among income
groups to achieve greater equality and fairness; and do both
while maintaining or enhancing national unity and Canadian
independence.1
The above, written by G. Bruce Doern in the third annual
volume of How Ottawa Spends (when the title came with the more
provocative, though appropriate, tail Your Tax Dollars), harkens back
to a day when governments, particularly federal governments, were
prepared to both row and steer, and hold a firm grip on governance
processes across the country. Doern goes on to write that “The
balanced achievement of these tasks, however, requires political skills
of a high order”.2 Indeed, this certainly remains true today. Gaining
consensus, however, on what balance ought to be struck, who (and
which order of government) possesses those skills, let alone
agreement on any of the items that make up the governance ‘to do’
list, would likely be a far more difficult task after decades of (real and
rhetorical) New Public Management inspired privatization,
marketization, liberalization, and deregulation, and myriad other ways
in which the role of the Canadian state has changed since the early
1980s. Yet at the same time, capital accumulation and its distribution,
national unity and independence nonetheless remain key
considerations in this country. One policy area linking each of these
goals, both in the past and present, is public infrastructure planning
and spending.
Like other forms of state involvement in the economy to guide
development, public infrastructure serves diverse roles and its
importance in Canada historically relates to contingent yet recurrent
political concerns including: a lack of internal economic linkages and
the need to integrate distinct colonial (now regional) economies into a
national economy as a way of forging (now maintaining) a national
identity, and directing economic development and foreign
investment.3 For public policy, physical infrastructure is often the
vehicle of social service provision (such as hospitals for health care,
schools for education, water treatment facilities for sanitation, and
public transit for mass transportation); and procurement practices can
create jobs, act as stimulus during downturns, and promote
green/sustainable development.4 Public infrastructure has also been
linked to macroeconomic performance, with one study crediting
public infrastructure investment with a 9 percent growth in labour
productivity from 1962 to 2006.5
Aside from direct government spending of taxpayer dollars
through budgetary allocations to departments and line ministries,
economic infrastructure which facilitates the production of goods and
services has often been provided through the activities of arm’s length
Crown corporations, reflecting similar considerations of economic
development, redistribution, unity, and independence.6 Taylor sums
this up when he writes that Crown corporations were a means by
which government could intervene in the economy “to bind the nation
(together), to develop and market its resources, and to retain some
measure of the profits and rents”.7 Notable Crown corporations
established to provide economic infrastructure (or infrastructure-like
services) in previous eras include the federal Canadian National
Railways (1917), Air Canada (1937, named Trans-Canada Air Lines
until 1965), and Petro-Canada (1975), along with a host of provincial
hydro power and telephone system providers. With few exceptions,
these entities and activities were commercialized and privatized in the
1980s and 1990s.
More basic forms of public infrastructure, often labeled as
‘public goods’ in the economic sense (as non-rival and non-
excludable) – like bridges, highways, roads, water and wastewater
treatment facilities, schools, and correctional facilities – have been
largely left as public sector responsibilities either because they are too
politically sensitive to privatize outright, or because they are
potentially unprofitable. Where public sector responsibilities remain,
two significant shifts can be identified over the past few decades: the
federal government has effectively transferred key burdens and
responsibilities downward onto municipal governments and laterally
into the private sector. These changes have emerged within, and been
produced by, a significant and growing infrastructure gap in Canada.
The 1950s and 1960s were the highpoint in Canadian
investment in public capital stock, and thus the age of the country’s
infrastructure was lowest in the 1970s (Figure 1). Aging infrastructure
is therefore the face of the infrastructure spending gap in Canada. By
2004, TD Bank estimated the deficiency in the addition, maintenance
and replacement of Canadian public infrastructure stock to be as high
as $125 billion, or 6-10 times current annual investment8; and others
warn it could reach $400 billion by 2020.9 Not only does aging and
inadequate infrastructure make it difficult to meet the social policy
obligations of government along with creating problems for
individuals and communities (e.g., traffic gridlock, a lack of
affordable housing, poor air quality), it is also an economic drain.
Figure 1. Age of Canadian Public Infrastructure
M. Gagnon, V. Gaudreault, and D. Overton, Age of Public
Infrastructure: A Provincial Perspective. Statistics Canada. 2008
Congestion and shipment delays in the Greater Toronto Area
alone lead to an estimated loss of $2 billion annually (TD Economics
2004).10 In other words, Canada’s “infrastructural pre-conditions for
urban growth” have become increasingly reliant upon spending
inherited from earlier decades, leaving aged and stressed
infrastructure by the mid-2000s – a phenomenon not too unlike what
is witnessed in other countries as well.11
The gap did not happen overnight, it is the result of decades of
public sector spending restraint. The majority of current Canadian
public infrastructure was built during the postwar era12 but because
infrastructure is a long run investment, the effects of cuts in any one
year to capital expenditures are far less obvious than with more
politicized social program spending. Thus when governments are
looking to balance the books, it ought to be no surprise that
infrastructure would hold a lower priority in a lean year. However,
that this area of spending would suffer for so long – decades on end –
is what makes addressing the infrastructure gap today particularly
vexing. For nearly half a century, from the 1960s to early 2000s,
investment in public infrastructure as a proportion of GDP has
declined, but the 1980s and 1990s experienced the lowest levels by
far.13 This is in line with the onset of austerity more generally in
Canada by the 1980s.14
The types of infrastructure that are now the oldest vary by
province (Figure 2), but tend to be bridges and overpasses,
wastewater treatment, and sewer systems. Without exception, these
public works are now over ten years old on average. Bridges and
overpasses are the oldest, at around 25 years, and water supply
systems are an average of 20 years old.
SHIFT # 1: FROM FEDERAL TO MUNICIPAL
Not all levels of government have equal resources or capacity
to fund public infrastructure, nor do they have equal responsibilities.
Municipalities are doubly burdened in these respects: with
widespread (and constitutionally unforeseen) urbanization and urban
sprawl occurring in the second half of the 20th century, municipal
jurisdiction came to control now vital infrastructure like public transit
and ports, landfills and recycling facilities, water and sewage, roads
and bridges; yet municipalities receive only 8 percent of tax revenue
in Canada.15 From 1961 to 2005, responsibility for all categories of
infrastructure asset indicated in Figure 3 have been on the rise for
municipalities, and simultaneously on the decline federally.
Municipal infrastructure, despite being of such importance
socially, culturally, and economically to most Canadians, faces a
particularly chronic and growing backlog and in 2013 the Federation
of Canadian Municipalities identified the need for infrastructure
spending and federal cost sharing for public works as being at the top
of their agenda. Roughly 25 percent of the municipal infrastructure
gap comes from the need to renew or improve water and wastewater
infrastructure, nearly 35 percent relates to transportation and transit
infrastructure, and approximately 8 percent to waste management.16
The type of infrastructure in need of renewal matters – not only do
water, waste management, and transit constitute core municipal
responsibilities of central concern to city residents, they have long
lifecycles and large capital requirements. These latter two features
make passing costs off to successors through deferred renewal both
easy and tempting in the short run but a difficult-to-resolve
conundrum in the long run given the imposition of balanced budget
legislation by cash-strapped provinces subject to their own spending
limits as well.
Figure2. Average age of public infrastructure by province and type of infrastructure,
2007
Source: M. Gagnon, V. Gaudreault, and Overton, D. 2008. Age of Public
Infrastructure: A Provincial Perspective. Ottawa: Statistics Canada. 2008
Stringent provincial regulations applied to municipal budgeting
and expenditures, along with an inability to secure triple A credit
ratings (given that municipal tax revenue is limited mainly to property
taxes), effectively thwarts bond use for public works at the municipal
level. Provincial rules either impose borrowing restrictions based on
particular debt-discouraging formulae or require that provincial
approval be first sought17; and provincial rules simultaneously require
that cities and towns in Canada balance their operating budgets each
year.
Figure 3. Average annual growth of government infrastructure capital by level of
government and type of asset, 1961 to 2005
Source: F. Roy, From Roads to Rinks: Government Spending on
Infrastructure in Canada, 1961 to 2005. Ottawa: Statistics Canada. 2011
Because of this, in 2012 municipal government debt made up
only 2 percent of the domestic bond supply; in that same year, the
federal government issued $93 billion of long-term bond debt,
provincial governments issued a total of $55 billion, and municipals
issued $6 billion (Stewart 2013).18 Some provincial effort has been
put into finding ways to broaden city revenue sources beyond
relatively inelastic municipal property tax. For example, BC (through
its Community Charter Act, 2003) and Ontario (via the Municipal Act,
2006) have granted municipalities in their jurisdiction greater
flexibility and autonomy to enact user fees (such as tolls) and create
new taxes (like entertainment and hotel taxes) but the appetite for
such measures remains lacking in Canada. For practical as well as
competitive reasons, their uptake may prove to be limited to only the
largest cities.
Municipal revenue and finance rigidities together with
instances of poor asset management, municipal tax cuts amid an
already-thin tax base, and price inflation for raw materials,
construction, and technology costs, form one side of the infrastructure
gap.19 Of greater significance, however, as illustrated in Figure 3, is
the withdrawal of the federal government from public capital
investment and the ownership of public capital stock. As Mackenzie20
shows, in 1955 the federal government owned 44 percent of the
Canadian public capital stock, the provinces owned 34 percent and
local governments owned 22 percent; by 2011 this federal-municipal
relationship had reversed: the federal government’s share dropped to
13 percent, municipalities owned 52 percent and the provincial
ownership portion was at 35 percent (Figure 4).
Thus a long run (and relatively covert) shift in the Canadian
public infrastructure spending burden from federal to municipal
governments has been an important component of Ottawa’s fiscal
austerity agenda over time. This is not to say that the federal
government has completely withdrawn, rather what has occurred is a
reduction or circumscription of funding through programs that
involve temporary and targeted federal infrastructure spending (which
may or may not match actual need and desire locally) and the
implementation of programs that require matching funds from
municipalities (which may or may not be practical given local
constraints).21 The Federation of Canadian Municipalities (2013, 25)
argues that the proclivity for short-term funding (which they liken to
a “funding lottery”) with limited scope and program duration has
discouraged long term capital planning and is at odds with municipal
planning frameworks and needs.22
Figure 4. Ownership of Canadian Public Capital Stock
Source: H. Mackenzie, Canada’s Infrastructure Gap: where it came from
and why it will cost so much to close. Ottawa: Canadian Centre for
Policy Alternatives. January. 2013. 7-8.
In the 1990s, the Canada Infrastructure Works Program (1994
to 1999) was the main form of federal support, though it allocated
only $3 billion (approximately) and required $4 billion from
provinces and municipalities. Federal support increased and
diversified in the 2000s, the main examples being the Infrastructure
Canada program (2000 to 2010; $2 billion), the Municipal Rural
Infrastructure Fund (2004 to 2014; $1.2 billion), the Canadian
Strategic Infrastructure Fund (2003 to 2013; $4.3 billion), and the
Building Canada Fund (2007 to 2014; $8.8 billion). The Building
Canada Fund is cost shared: for city infrastructure, all levels of
government jointly fund each project. Public transit initiatives also
include the Public Transit Fund (2005 to 2006; $400 million), and
Public Transit Capital Trust (2006 and 2008; $900 million and $500
million). Public transit has traditionally been a municipal
responsibility but with the Infrastructure Canada program, it has
become a category eligible for federal funding. Another prominent
program is the Gas Tax Fund (providing $11.8 billion between 2007
and 2014), and as of 2014 this has become permanent with the federal
government agreeing to contribute $2 billion per year.
In 2007 Ottawa introduced its $33 billion Building Canada
Plan, later the New Building Canada Plan, to which by 2014 it has
committed $75 billion toward provincial and municipal public
infrastructure over the coming decade. In contrast to previous
programs, the federal government touts the New Building Canada
Plan as flexible, predictable, and the largest and longest in Canadian
history.23 There are several nested components to it. It includes
revenue measures like the $32 billion Community Improvement Fund
(involving the Gas Tax Fund and a GST Rebate for Municipalities),
$14 billion in expenditures on the New Building Canada Fund, $6
billion in existing programs, and an additional $1.25 billion in
funding for the P3 Canada Fund (more on this item below). The
Infrastructure Stimulus Fund was allocated $9 billion in the 2009
federal budget, for infrastructure built by March 31, 2011. Federal
support was restricted to half (50 percent or less) of the capital costs.
Taken together, there has been a clear increase in federal
infrastructure spending since 2006 (particularly in the years
immediately following the 2008 global financial crisis when
temporary stimulus measures were enacted in 2010-11) (Figure 5).
There can be no doubt that recent federal infrastructure
spending initiatives represent an improvement over previous years but
several concerns remain. First, the plan is not quite as ‘flexible’ as
suggested given that provinces and cities must still come up with
iterative or piecemeal proposals by applying for federal funding on a
project-by-project basis. This discourages integrated long run
planning and ensures Ottawa’s commitment remains sufficiently
vague as to what exactly will be funded, when, and to what degree.24
Second, though it is a 300 percent increase in federal spending on
infrastructure since 2006, the current plan will not actually close the
infrastructure gap – which says as much about current spending as it
does about the decades of underfunding. Even with the recent
increases, federal spending amounts to only 0.5 percent of GDP,
whereas provincial and territorial leaders say 2 percent is required.25
For their part, provinces are currently spending approximately 2
percent of GDP, leading all Premiers to agree on the “need for an
overall increase in federal infrastructure investments” at the 55th
Annual Premiers’ Conference.26
Figure 5. Annual Federal Infrastructure Spending
Source: J. Dupuis and D. Ruffilli, Government of Canada Investments in
Public Infrastructure. Ottawa: Library of Parliament. 2011
Given the chronic shortfall in public money for infrastructure,
and the concomitant return of fiscal austerity more generally since
2010, this challenge has created an opportunity for privatization
enthusiasts to argue that the public-private partnership (P3) model
offers a readymade solution. TD Economics, Deloitte, and the
Canadian Chamber of Commerce, just to name a few, recommend
greater use of the P3 model since it is uniquely able to leverage
private financing for the delivery of public infrastructure and services.
For their part, the federal government has been eager and acquiescent
on the P3 front, with a significant role now carved out for privately
financed P3s in recent infrastructure spending schemes, namely
through the New Building Canada Fund operated by Infrastructure
Canada and the P3 Canada Fund overseen by PPP Canada.27
However, as the next section documents, the shift from government to
private financing of public infrastructure is far from innocuous,
making it a troubled long run strategy.
SHIFT #2: FROM PUBLIC TO PRIVATE
Distinguishing features of the P3 model include lengthy (multi-
decade) lease-based bundled contracts and complex risk sharing
arrangements.28 They can be used in all areas of public infrastructure
and service provision (e.g., hospitals, schools, water and sewage
facilities, bridges and highways). Infrastructure P3s involve the
private sector in a variety of ways, the most common form being the
design-build-finance-operate/maintain (DBFO or DBFOM) model
which features contracts running upwards of 30 years. Depending on
the type of project, the operational component will privatize support
services such as security, help desk, food, laundry, and housekeeping;
maintenance includes physical plant upkeep, grounds keeping, and
repairs. P3s therefore introduce, to varying degrees, profit-making
and private partner control and decision-making into the heart of
public policy.
Greater market dependence for the public sector is promoted
largely through New Public Management ideals that aim to transform
the government and its agencies into the procurer of services rather
than the provider.29 P3s are a unique form of public/private
collaboration and privatization, setting them apart from, although
located within the same family as, full-scale asset divestiture,
contracting out, and joint ventures. With P3s in particular there is an
assumption (rooted in the public choice school of thought and
neoclassical economics) that partnering with the private sector will
avoid the problems associated with an inherently inefficient public
administration.
A P3, it is argued, can more effectively deliver services and
infrastructure when compared with traditional public methods, as it
uniquely harnesses the efficiencies, innovative capacities, and
(financial) resources of the private sector.30 Project efficiencies and
innovation are to be generated when private for-profit partners
compete for contracts that transfer a wide range of risks and
responsibilities, and when private partner performance is linked with
expected revenue and profit making.1
These arguments suggest benefits for the public sector through
reduced costs and better value for money than traditional public
procurement, however, as Grimsey and Lewis summarize, “in risk
allocation, nothing is free.”31 Prospective private partners build risk
premiums into their bids as a form of “self-insurance”. Private
partners are therefore compensated for accepting certain project risks
whether they arise or not, and indeed this is a major source of private
partner profit making with P3s. This model tends to be more
expensive than traditional projects in other ways as well. Increased
costs typically relate to the higher interest rates paid by the private
sector, but can also result from higher than bid construction costs, as
well as the administrative and legal fees that accompany P3s. Vining
and Boardman have labeled additional hidden costs associated with
P3s as ‘transaction costs’, which include: contracting and negotiation
costs, and formal contract agreement costs such as monitoring,
renegotiation, and termination.32
In the UK, where these types of partnerships first began as the
Private Finance Initiative (PFI) and where P3 markets remain the
most sophisticated of any, recent reports analyzing decades of P3
policy foreshadow worrisome implications for Canada’s increasingly
widespread use. Graham Winch of Manchester Business School
reports that “the value-for-money case for PPP in the public sector
has yet to be proven. The benefits gained from the availability of
‘extra’ finance, the transfer of risk from public to private sector, and
improvements in decision-making processes are too nebulous to
provide any certainty that they outweigh all the known problems”.33
Problems include, for example, that PFI private financing costs are on
average 2 to 3.75 percent higher than direct public funding and that
the average private finance contract took nearly twice as long to
negotiate than large conventional projects.34
In Canada, case study evidence points to similar results. For
example, in 2012 Siemiatycki found that for 28 P3 projects developed
in Ontario over the past decade the average cost was 16 percent
higher than it would have been with traditional public tendering.35
Boardman and Vining summarize the Canadian experience as one
where “evidence that P3s meet the public interest is scarce.”36 In
Ontario, the province most eager to use P3s for its public
infrastructure, there has yet to be any systematic analysis of the track
record of risk and performance associated with traditional public
procurement. Despite these drawbacks, there is a growing
normalization of P3 use in Canada at all levels of government, with
some 200 infrastructure projects having been developed over the past
two decades.37
Private financing through the P3 model must either be paid
back by the state through availability payments or the public directly
through user fees. In that sense, it is a mechanism of infrastructure
financing, not funding – funds for public infrastructure ultimately
come from taxpayers or service users one way or another. As
Boardman and Vining say, P3 in Canada represents ‘rented’ money.38
This money could be raised in many ways, and different financing
arrangements hold unique implications for service users, taxpayers,
and government.
The total capital cost of a P3 project may not be drawn entirely
from financial markets. In fact it has been noted that a distinctive
feature of the ‘Canadian model’ is the use of large amounts of public
money upfront.39 With the $2.1 billion Canada Line in Vancouver,
for example, only one third of the capital costs were covered
privately. For P3s generally, private financing is typically split
between debt and equity. An equity stake involves fundamental
ownership rights over the P3’s private partner (a firm, consortium, or
special project vehicle), entitling asset holders to revenue after costs
are met and debt obligations paid.40
Debt during the construction phase of a project is often secured
through private commercial banks, with bond financing used for the
operational phase. Stakeholder investors (equity holders) are typically
engineering, procurement, construction, operations, and maintenance
firms; project investors (debt holders) are usually pension funds,
sovereign wealth funds, infrastructure funds, and banks (public
investment banks and private commercial banks).41 Wall Street
infrastructure funds in particular have grown substantially since the
global financial crisis, as public infrastructure becomes increasingly
seen as an asset waiting to be tapped by private investors.
Ever-more sophisticated, the reorganization of debt through
‘financial engineering’ can significantly reduce private investors’
costs and improve revenue earnings for private partners. Providing an
avenue for profit making of (potentially) greater significance than
operational efficiencies, design enhancements, and project cost
control are the typical elements used to justify P3 infrastructure.42
Mechanisms like debt swaps and sweeps that switch from short term
to longer term liability, change the nature of interest rate payments,
restructure dividend payouts and debt repayment schedules, allow for
new dimensions of profit making beyond revenue earned from the
infrastructure itself (e.g., tolls, user fees).43
Not only does financialization turn infrastructure into less of a
public good than a financial asset, the involvement of private debt and
equity owners alters the governance of public infrastructure as well.
O’Neill summarizes the three principal implications of P3
infrastructure: services must be commercialized in order to generate
competitive returns for private investors (displacing other concerns);
infrastructure design must conform to the characteristics of a financial
instrument (e.g., ownership, management, regulatory environment,
and material performance); and risks must be controlled in a manner
consistent with private property rights and commercial/investor
interests.44
Further, as explained by Torrance, through private partner
entitlements, the governance of P3 infrastructure becomes splintered
or unbundled from other municipal infrastructure with the former
controlled by global investors and the latter controlled by local
decision makers.45 Shrybman raises a similar concern with P3
hospitals, only in this case he warns of the potential for a parallel
private-for-profit regime to be established within the public system
given that the private partner is granted control over many support
services critical to care within Canadian hospitals.46
In light of the complexities involved with P3 schemes, and the
degree of specialized knowledge required, new forms of institutional
support through the creation of P3 units (sometimes called P3
agencies) are now considered an important step in the
institutionalization of P3 use. As Jooste and Scott put it: “The move
toward private participation in infrastructure does not simply
substitute private sector capacity for public sector capacity, it requires
new forms of public sector capacity to be developed to overcome [P3]
challenges” (emphasis added).47 P3 units promote and evaluate these
projects and act as repositories of knowledge which facilitates policy
learning by building government expertise surrounding the complex
bidding, negotiation, and operational phase of P3 projects.48 The
policy promotion attribute of P3 units has in some cases raised
concerns over the neutrality of their project evaluation activities.49
With several P3 units already in existence at the provincial
level in Canada (e.g., Partnerships BC and Infrastructure Ontario),
other orders of government were left without this promotion and
support until 2007 when the federal government created PPP Canada
to ‘develop the Canadian market for public-private partnerships’ at
the municipal level in particular, but also within First Nations
communities, federal departments, and to support provinces that lack
their own P3 unit.50 More than a technical advisor, PPP Canada also
received substantial funding commitments from the federal
government of $2.8 billion per annum for 2011-2013.51 The P3
Canada Fund was guaranteed again in Budget 2013 with a $1.25
billion commitment “to continue supporting innovative ways to build
infrastructure projects faster and provide better value for Canadian
taxpayers through public-private partnerships” (described in chapter
3.3 The New Building Canada Plan).
Budget 2014 renewed the federal commitment to the P3
Canada Fund once more. As the name implies, PPP Canada
exclusively supports P3 projects, thus municipalities and other
jurisdictions are able only to access technical and financial assistance
if a project uses the P3 model. The P3 Canada Fund and
Infrastructure Canada’s New Building Canada Fund are thus
significant sources public money spent on co-lending, underwriting,
and other public financing guarantees offered for privately financed
P3s in Canada. PPP Canada also spends a great deal of public money
on fees to private sector consultants hired to assess P3 projects on
behalf of PPP Canada, raising the issue of whether this endeavour is
of value for money for the public and the question of whether the
public sector truly gains any retainable expertise given the degree of
reliance on private consultants.
As of January 2015, as indicted in Table 3.1, twenty-three
projects have received funding commitments of various sizes from
the P3 Canada Fund and PPP Canada. Nearly all are municipal
projects and spread across the country. All are broad spectrum P3s,
involving the for-profit sector in a range of roles, DBFOM (where the
private partner designs, builds, finances, operates, and maintains the
infrastructure) being the most common by far. Approximately one
third are public transit projects and another third are wastewater and
solid waste projects, both particularly germane to municipal-level
governance. These are sorely needed elements of infrastructure
renewal in Canada, and thus the P3 Canada Fund targets some of the
principal areas of municipal need.
If P3s were problem-free, this would be a wholly appropriate
and beneficial arrangement. Given that there are many drawbacks and
much public resistance to privatization in sensitive areas like
municipal water systems, cities like Saint John now feel they have ‘no
choice’ but to go with a P3 given the preference for this option by the
current federal government. Not only is private financing shifting
infrastructure governance into the private sector, but P3-tethered
federal funding all but forces municipalities to choose this route
whether desirable or not.2
Table 3.1: Canadian P3s with support from the P3 Canada Fund
and PPP Canada
Project Type Project Name Location Federal
Funding
PPP
Type
Green Energy
Infrastructure
Kokish River Hydroelectric Project `Namgis
First
Nation, BC
$12.94mn DBFOM
Regional and
Local Airport
Infrastructure
Iqaluit International Airport
Improvement Project
Iqaluit, NU $77.30mn DBFOM
Public Transit
Infrastructure
The City of Calgary Stoney CNG
Bus Storage & Transit Facility
Calgary,
AB
$48.40mn DBFM
 Edmonton Light Rail Transit
System
Edmonton,
AB
$250.00mn DBFOM
 Saskatoon Civic Operations Project Saskatoon,
SK
$42.90mn DBFM
 GO Transit East Rail Maintenance
Facility
Whitby,
ON
$94.80mn DBFM
 Lincoln Station Project Coquitlam,
BC
$7.00mn DBF
 Barrie Transit Facility Project Barrie, ON $5.80mn DBFOM
 Lachine Train Maintenance Centre Montreal,
QC
$25.00mn DBF
Brownfield
Redevelopment
Infrastructure
Downtown Eastside Housing
Renewal Project
Vancouver,
BC
$29.10mn DBFM
Wastewater
Infrastructure
Hamilton Biosolids Project Hamilton,
ON
$22.91mn DBFOM
 Regina Wastewater Treatment
Plant
Regina, SK $58.50mn DBFOM
 Biosolids Energy Centre Greater
Victoria,
BC
$83.40mn DBFOM
 Biosolids Management Facility Greater $11.00mn DBFOM
Sudbury,
ON
 Evan Thomas Water and
Wastewater Plan
Kananaskis
Country,
AB
$9.95mn DBFOM
 Lac La Biche Biological Nutrient
Removal (BNR) Wastewater
Treatment Facility
Lac La
Biche
County,
AB
$3.80mn DBOM
Solid Waste
Management
Sorting and Waste Treatment
Centre for the Regional County
Municipality of Haute-Yamaska
Granby,
QC
$12.00mn DBFOM
 Organics Biofuels Facility Project Surrey, BC $16.90mn DBFOM
Local Road
Infrastructure
Saskatoon North Commuter
Parkway and Traffic Bridge
Replacement
Saskatoon,
SK
$66.00mn DBFOM
 North Saskatchewan Bridge Edmonton,
AB
$36.80mn DBFOM
 Chief Peguis Trail Extension Winnipeg,
MB
$25.00mn DBFM
Water
Infrastructure
Saint John Safe Clean Drinking
Water
Saint John,
NB
$57.30mn DBFOM
National
Highway System
Infrastructure
Regina Bypass Project Regina, SK $200.00mn DBFOM
Source: PPP Canada 2015.
CONCLUSIONS
Infrastructure procurement policies contain inherent ambitions.
Job creation and aggregate demand stimulation were reflected in
employment- and growth-oriented public works programs initiated
during the postwar era, for example. Crown corporations have
historically featured social mandates which favour local suppliers or
community-building through their purchasing and sales operations.
Alternative service delivery like P3s and privatization seeks to
transform the government from a provider of public services into a
purchaser of private commodities. Private financing in the Canadian
context is being used to close an infrastructure gap produced by
decades of chronic underfunding by the federal government, the result
of which has been to shift the burden of much-needed but expensive
and aging infrastructure onto the shoulders of already cash-strapped
municipalities. Privately financed P3 infrastructure creates an
additional shift in society by redistributing payment burdens into the
future: from today’s users, taxpayers, and governments, to
tomorrow’s. Given that P3s are more expensive in the long run, and
inhibit public sector control and decision-making throughout their
contract lifespan, an indefensible asymmetry of enjoyment and
responsibility is being established today with the P3 schemes of
tomorrow.
Addressing the need for greater public infrastructure
investment without resorting to privately financed P3 deals requires
innovative public options to counter the easy (but misleading) appeal
of the ‘build now, pay later’ P3 approach. CUPE suggests two
solutions to the funding dilemma: new forms of federal support for
the costs of public infrastructure such as the creation of a federal
Public Asset Fund (proposed by the Canadian Centre for Policy
Alternatives and echoing similar demands by the Canadian
Healthcare Association and Association of Canadian Academic
Healthcare Organizations), and the use of bond markets to finance
municipal infrastructure. Greater municipal use of bond markets
would first require changes to balanced budget legislation imposed
provincially and even then would bring its own unique challenges,
including, but not limited to, the issue of whether bond financing
would be prohibitively expensive given municipalities’ poorer credit
ratings and relatively narrow revenue base. Issuing federal bonds to
pay for municipal infrastructure would be a more viable option.
Whatever the solution, it is clear that municipalities require
greater federal support and that all Canadians stand to benefit from a
renewal of public capital stock. Effective public stewardship of this
investment in the future can only be hindered by higher price,
privately financed P3 deals which shift control and decision-making
away from democratic channels for decades to come.
__________________________
Footnotes
1 Types of risk commonly transferred through a P3 include: site risks (site conditions, site
preparation), technical risks (design), construction risks (cost overruns, delays in completion,
failure to meet performance criteria), operating risks (cost overruns, delays or interruption in
operation, shortfall in service quality), financial risks (interest rates, inflation), project default
risks, asset risks. See D. Grimsey and M.K. Lewis, M.K. Public Private Partnerships.
Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar 2004, 180-182.
2 Provincial support for public infrastructure is equally tied to P3 use in several jurisdictions,
most prominently BC and Ontario where P3s are now the de facto standard way in which
provincial-level infrastructure like hospitals and highways is delivered. Furthermore,
provincial imposition of tight borrowing restrictions on municipalities and local agencies
does not extend to P3 use which both tacitly and explicitly encourages private financing
given that it is often accounted for as a lease/service payment rather than a long run debt
obligation. Of course not all provinces are P3 enthusiasts, but where such a proclivity exists
(most notably BC, Alberta, and Ontario), this combines with federal P3-tethered aid to all but
ensure that municipalities are compelled to explore the P3 option for their large-scale
infrastructure renewal.
__________________________
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Chapter 4
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND OLD AGE SECURITY:
THEN, NOW AND THE FUTURE
Allan Moscovitch, Nick Falvo and David Macdonald
INTRODUCTION
In How Ottawa Spends 2013-2014, Michael Prince took up
the Harper Conservatives’ agenda on seniors and social policy,
arguing that there has been a change in the way that the government
now looks at seniors.1 In this chapter we revisit the major changes
which the Conservatives have introduced, such as the extension of the
age of eligibility from 65 to 67 years old, and the voluntary delay of
Old Age Security (OAS) from 65 up to the age of 70. We start with a
brief examination of the origins of the old age security in 1952. We
also look at the origins of the Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS).
What does history tell us about the core principles of these programs?
Do the changes brought in by the Conservatives result in changes to
the core principles of these programs?
Prince effectively outlines the range of changes which have
taken place during the Conservative years and provides estimates of
the total cost. Here we examine in more detail the impact of the
changes on the incomes of seniors. We analyze whether more people
will be put into poverty as a result of the extension of the age of
eligibility of the OAS to 67. This is particularly important given the
reduction in the poverty of seniors attributed to the Canadian public
pension system. We will also look at who might take advantage of the
option to defer OAS receipt.2
We then take a close look at several other possible changes that
the Conservatives might have considered, despite the lack of evidence
that OAS or GIS expenditures were going to cause structural deficits
at all. There are many choices. Since, as we will see, the OAS was
originally a funded program, and funding is a key issue, they could
have considered establishing a social security fund. As presently
organized, the OAS has a taxback component which begins at higher
income levels. In order to economize on the use of funds, the
government could have considered: lowering the income band where
the OAS tax backapplies; reducing the value of the OAS by making
the GIS benefit produce more income for lower income seniors; and
combining the OAS and the GIS into one program, since both are
now effectively means tested.
Lastly, in the 2015 Budget, the Harper government offered
several changes to the Tax Free Savings Accounts (TFSA) on the
grounds that this tax reduction is a way in which it is providing more
income to seniors. In effect the TFSA is a complement to the OAS
since it is putting more income into the hands of seniors, especially
those with lower incomes.3 Here is what the government says about
the TFSA
“The TFSA provides greater savings incentives for low- and
modest-income individuals because, in addition to the tax
savings, neither the income earned in a TFSA nor
withdrawals from it affect eligibility for federal income-
tested benefits and credits, such as the Canada Child Tax
Benefit, the Goods and Services Tax/Harmonized Sales Tax
Credit, the Age Credit, and Old Age Security and
Guaranteed Income Supplement benefits.4
We take a look at the claim that the TFSA is an important
complementary benefit to the OAS and GIS for seniors.
ORIGINS
In 1927, the Old Age Pensions Actwas passed, authorizing the
federal government to enter into agreements to reimburse
participating provinces for 50 percent of the cost of introducing a
means-tested pension plan for people aged 70 or older, with income
under $365 a year ($5,120 in 2015 dollars). The maximum pension
was set at $20 a month, or $240 per year($3,370 in 2015 dollars).
Applicants had to have lived in Canada for 20 years and in the
province of application for five years.5
Bryden, in Old Age Pensions and Policy Making in Canada,
notes that a 1929 report on the original 1927 scheme described it as a
“non contributory, deserving poor type of legislation.” The report
went on to describe the original OAS as a “comparative failure”
where it had been tried previously because “it put a premium on
thriftlessness and fraud.”6 During the 1930s there was discussion
about the growing costs of the original means-tested and non-
contributory program. A federal finance department brief to the
Rowell Sirois Commission in 1938 expressed concern about the lack
of control over costs, and the long-term implications of the old age
pension program. The brief stated that “any non contributory
scheme…eventually may reach the point where it may actually
endanger the finances of the nation.”7
These early concerns about universality and affordability are
themes which recur throughout the history of the program; they have
also recurred in contemporary discussions about the appropriate
direction for old age pensions.
The current OAS program has its origins in theaftermath of
World War II. A 1950 report of a joint House of Commons and
Senate Committee recommended the establishment of a federal,
universal flat rate pension of $40 a month for all Canadians over the
age of 70, and a supplementary plan for low-income persons between
the ages of 65 and 69 ($640 a month in today’s dollars). The report
supported the contributory principle for this universal pension “both
as a means of raising funds and of establishing an association
between an individual’s contribution to the program’s cost and the
future benefits, although the relationship would not be direct.”8
In other words, the report recommended that those receiving
benefits in future feel a connection to the receipt of the payments.
They would feel that it was reasonable for them to receive the
benefits since they had paid for them, at least in part. The Old Age
Security Act and the Old Age Assistance Act were both passed in
1951, providing the legislative basis for the new pension program
which came into being on 1January 1952. The program required
residence in Canada for the 20 years prior to an application for
benefits. Absence during the 20-year period “could be offset by prior
residence of at least twice the total length of absence.”9 First Nations,
explicitly excluded from the original 1927 legislation, were eligible
for this new program.
A key feature of this new program was the “special levy, called
the ‘old age security tax’, (which) was imposed to cover costs”10 of
the new program. It was a combination of three taxes: a two percent
federal sales tax, a two percent federal income tax and a two percent
federal corporation tax. It was referred to as the 2-2-2 formula by the
Minister of Finance. The funds raised from these three revenue
sources were paid into a special Old Age Security Fund, which was
made a separate account in the government’s consolidated revenues,
and used to cover the benefits which were to be paid out. Any
shortfall between the total of benefits paid out and the revenues raised
would be loaned to the fund from government revenues; but it was
expected that the cost of the universal pension would be covered by
the revenuewhich it generated.11
The second part of the pension program was a variation on the
previously existing federally cost-shared provincial pension, now
restricted to people in the 65-69 age group. The federal government
would pay 50 percent of the costs. Following changes instituted in
1947, the provinces were free to establish rates and qualifying income
conditions; but the federal government would only share in the costs
related to the conditions which they set out—$720 a year for a single
person, and $1200 for those who were married ($9,200 and $15,300
respectively in today’s dollars).12
In 1959, “the 2-2-2 formula was changed to a 3-3-3 formula, so
that the tax rate on each of the three components was increased, on a
staggered basis, to three percent from two percent. As well, the
maximum for the personal income tax component was increased to
$90 from $60 annually. The personal income tax component was
again increased effective 1 October 1963, with a four percent rate
applied up to $120 per year.”13
In 1966 new legislation was introduced to modify the OAS,
which would now be available to everyone who met the qualifying
conditions and was over the age of 65. In addition, the GIS was
introduced so that seniors would have additional support until the
Canada Pension Plan (CPP) would become available to them.
Between 1970 and 1973 there were several changes which
froze the OAS benefit levels at $80 a month ($440 in today’s dollars),
made it more difficult for people to qualify for the OAS, and
increased the benefits from the GIS consistent with government
philosophy at time of moving away from the universal program
towards more income tested benefits for people 65 and over. By
1973, the OAS was raised to $100 ($550 in today’s dollars).14
On 1 January 1972, the taxes in support of the OAS were
folded into general taxation as part of a revision of the tax system in
Canada, instituted in the Income Tax Act of 1971. The fund itself was
not abolished until 1975; the federal government was required to
transfer credits to the fund in lieu of the revenues generated by
taxation. However, in June 1975, an amendment to the Old Age
Security Act abolished the Old Age Security Fund. Since 1975, both
the OAS and the GIS have been paid out of general government
revenues. Over the period from 1952 to 1972, the fund collected a
surplus of $1.6 billion after OAS payments were made.15 In 1989, the
OAS taxback was introduced which fundamentally altered the design
of the OAS by taking back a portion of the OAS, making it an
income-tested program above a threshold level of income.
In sum, while the OAS in the postwar period was initially
intended for people over 70, it was made available to all those 65 and
over in 1966. While Canada does not have an official age of
retirement either federally or provincially, the availability of the OAS
at 65 has had the effect of setting the standard for retirement. The
change introduced by the Conservative government in 2013 to
increase the age of OAS (and GIS) benefits to 67 holds the
implication that in the near future, the effective age of retirement will
be increased. Furthermore, while the OAS started as a universally
available program, this was done on the basis that the supplement to it
would be means tested. In the 1960s, the same principle was
effectively maintained with the replacement of Old Age Assistance
by the GIS. In the 1980s, the universality of the OAS was only
maintained up to a threshold, changing the design of the base
retirement income plan. Lastly, when it was first introduced, the OAS
was paid out of a fund established with revenues from a series of
earmarked taxes. The fund was terminated in the 1970s at a time
when the federal government was receiving increased tax revenues as
a result of the rapid growth of the Canadian economy.
TODAY’S OAS AND GIS16
Today, the following characteristics apply to Canada’s income
support system for seniors:
The full OAS is available to all eligible Canadians with incomes
below$71,592.17
The full OAS payment as of May 2015 is $563.74 per month or
$6764.88 per year
January 2015 there were 5,530,420 OAS beneficiaries. Service
Canada projects an annual expenditure of $34.921 billion for the
2015-16 fiscal year.
Everyone who qualifies for the OAS may apply for the GIS as
long as their individual or combined other income (couple) does
not exceed the allowable maximum.18 The GIS is taxed back at
the rate of 50 cents for every dollar of income received by the
applicant.
Income from employment, pensions, RRSP withdrawals,
investment, capital gains, rent, C/QPP, and other benefit
programs is counted in determining the total income of the
applicant.
Income from TFSA accounts is not counted in determining
eligibilityfor the OAS or the GIS.19
The maximum GIS payment is $765.93 per month or $9191.16
per year for a single person. A partner of a spouse who is
receiving the OAS is eligible for a maximum GIS payment of
$507.87 a monthor $6094.44 per year.20
In January 2015 there were 1,754,757 GIS beneficiaries. Service
Canada projects a total GIS expenditure of $10.606 billion for
fiscal 2015-16.21
Combined projected expenditures are $46.072 billion including
small amounts for the survivor benefit and the spouse’s
allowance.
Both the OAS and the GIS are paid out from general tax
revenues. No taxes are identified as a specific source of revenue
and no fund exists on which the federal government can draw to
pay out benefits for either program.
SENIORS AND POVERTY
There are several ways to look at poverty statistically. Statistics
Canada has long used the Low Income Cut Off (LICO), which
suggests that individuals and families have low incomes if they have
to spend more than 20 percentage points more than the average on
food, clothing and shelter. However, these data have not been
adjusted since 1992. Given the importance of transfers and tax-related
social programs, data are most often adjusted for the impact of
transfers and taxes on incomes. Data drawn from Statistics Canada’s
Cansim22 (see Table 4.1 below) suggest that the percentage of
persons in low-income elderly families has declined consistently over
time from 17.7% in 1976 to 4.4% in 2012. The change has been
particularly pronounced for elderly individuals, most of whom were
non-earners. The percentage of elderly males in poverty has dropped
from 55.9% to 11.0% while for elderly females the percentage has
dropped from 68.1% to 13.2%.
Table 4.1. Low income line: Low income cut-offs after tax, 1992 base
Percentage of elderly persons in low income
% %
1976 2012
All elderly persons in couples or families 29.0 4.4
Unattached elderly males 55.9 11.0
Unattached elderly females 68.1 13.2
Source: Cansim 206-0003 and 202-0802
The after-tax Low Income Measure (LIM), used by the OECD
and more widely in Europe, shows a similar pronounced decline in
poverty among the elderly over time; but it also shows that the
percentage of elderly people in poverty has been growing in the 21st
century with the growth of income and wealth inequality in Canada.
Using the LIM measure, an individual or household is in poverty if
their adjusted income is less than 50 percent of the median adjusted
income. In 1976, according to the LIM, 22.6% of those in elderly
families were poor; but by 1996, this number had declined to a mere
3%. Since 2003, the percentage of elderly Canadiansin poverty has
risen back up to 9.9%. Since the third standard measure of poverty,
the Market Basket Measure, has only been calculated by Statistics
Canada since the year 2000, it does not provide a measure over a long
enough period to be included here.
While there could be several reasons for this observed decline
in the poverty of elderly people, the existence of social benefits (Old
Age Security, Guaranteed Income Supplement, Canada Pension Plan)
for people of retirement age is likely to be amongst the most
important. While OAS and GIS are the principal sources of income,
recent research suggests that for individual seniors in the crucial third
decile, it appears that CPP/QPP benefits may be playing an
increasingly important role.23
THE CONSERVATIVES AND OLD AGE PENSIONS: A SECOND
LOOK
The Harper government announced in 2012 that it would be
extending the age of eligibility of the OAS and GIS from 65 to 67.24
As a result, it is almost certain thatpoverty willrise for those aged 66
and 67, if and whenthese changes are implemented. Information
provided in Tables 4.2 and 4.3 makes it clear that once Canadians
reach the age of 65 and receivethe OAS and GIS, their poverty rate
drops dramatically. It can be inferred from this that OAS and GIShas
likely had a very strong impact in reducing poverty among seniors;
delaying the age of OAS and GIS receipt by two years therefore
delays the age at which poverty is reduced among seniors households.
One likely consequence of the change will be a substantial
increase in the number of people who will either continue to rely on
social assistance or will begin to rely on social assistance for the two
years from 65 to 67. It is likely that social assistance caseloads will
rise after the age change, probably by about 30,000 seniors across the
country. For example, it is clear from figures presented in Table 4.4
that, as soon as seniors reach the age of 65 (and begin receiving OAS
and GIS), the percentage receiving social assistance drops
significantly. Delaying the ‘age of transition’ to OASby two years
would prolong dependency on social assistance. Since access to GIS
is through the OAS, then those seniors receiving social assistance will
be receiving substantially less income. For example at current rates, a
single senior with no other income would have access to $17,088; but
as a single welfare recipient, the same person would likely have
access to between $7,000 and $11,000 per year depending on the
province, and between $6,000 and $16,000 in the territories25. In
other words, on social assistance, they would most likely be living on
a substantially lower income. Not only will a large number of people
be likely thrown into poverty, but they will be deeply in poverty.
While changing the age of access to the OAS/GIS will reduce federal
expenditures, it will increase provincial expenditures since it is the
provinces which will be picking up the additional costs. Further, since
social assistance costs are partly supported by federal payments under
the Canada Social Transfer, the provinces and territories may be
asking for transfer payment increases to help cover their increased
costs. It will result in another case of shifting responsibilities between
one level of government and another.
Table 4.2
Poverty Rate by Age, Gender and Family Status, Seniors 61-69,
2005-2009
    
 Family Single-Female Single-Male
61 9% 36% 27%
62 8% 44% 23%
63 9% 38% 32%
64 10% 37% 22%
65 2% 21% 15%
66 1% 15% 13%
67 2% 13% 12%
68 2% 15% 7%
69 1% 16% 5%
Source: Special Tabulations using the Survey of Labour Income
Dynamics, 2005-2009
Special Tabulations prepared by Richard
Shillington, Tristat Resources, 2015
Table 4.3
Senior Households with a Member aged 66-67, by Poverty Status,
with and without OAS/GIS Income, 2005-2009
 Poor Households Poverty Rate
 
With
OAS/GIS
Without
OAS/GIS
With
OAS/GIS
Without
OAS/GIS
Total 33,000 124,000 7% 25%
Senior -
Couple
14,000 76,000 4% 19%
Single -
Female
11,000 31,000 17% 48%
Single -
Male
8,000 18,000 21% 46%
Source: Special Tabulations using the Survey of Labour Income
Dynamics, 2005-2009
Special tabulations prepared by Richard Shillington, Tristat
Resources, 2015
 
Table 4.4. Count and Percentage of Canadian Individuals
Receiving Social Assistance by Age 2010
   
 Count on social assistance % of that age on social assistance
 No Yes No Yes
60 372483 28868 93% 7%
61 355898 20719 94% 6%
62 358041 31746 92% 8%
63 392411 27042 94% 6%
64 398743 29507 93% 7%
65 278573 28217 91% 9%
66 271454 11219 96% 4%
67 292091 11585 96% 4%
68 255164 9128 97% 3%
69 263803 17618 94% 6%
70 226752 7061 97% 3%
Source: 2010 Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics
PUMF
Note: The data in Tables 4 above and 5 below are
based on the 2010 Survey of Labour and Income
Dynamics (SLID) Public Use Microdata File
(PUMF), the most recent available at the time of
publication. The switch over from the SLID to the
Canadian Income Survey in 2012 has delayed
delivery of PUMFs for 2011 and updated income
data. The paper assumes that the structure of
seniors OAS/GIS receipt and social assistance
receipt will be distributed similarly to how it was
distributed in 2010.
Age
Table 4.5: Canadians Receiving Any OAS/GIS
No Yes
Mean Income Count % Mean Income Count %
55 $ 53,720 490,390 100%  . - 0%
56 $ 47,002 451,875 100%  . - 0%
57 $ 45,490 429,646 100%  . - 0%
58 $ 43,569 446,437 100%  . - 0%
59 $ 41,842 432,168 100%  . - 0%
60 $ 38,883 390,364 97% $ 15,457 10,987 3%
61 $ 40,360 352,349 94% $ 15,379 24,269 6%
62 $ 38,362 351,656 90% $ 12,712 38,130 10%
63 $ 39,769 398,313 95% $ 14,202 21,139 5%
64 $ 40,702 380,360 89% $ 12,626 47,891 11%
65 $ 61,128 32,237 11% $ 28,145 274,553 89%
66 $ 58,408 29,089 10% $ 33,032 253,584 90%
67 $ 148,281 13,402 4% $ 29,314 290,274 96%
68 $ 94,573 8,432 3% $ 28,456 255,861 97%
69 $ 32,562 11,466 4% $ 31,229 269,954 96%
70 $ 57,035 4,218 2% $ 30,141 229,595 98%
71 $ 86,946 8,049 4% $ 28,814 219,557 96%
72 $ 63,516 7,953 4% $ 31,124 189,109 96%
73 $ 109,245 4,541 2% $ 29,727 206,041 98%
74 $ 130,364 2,766 1% $ 26,973 232,132 99%
75 $ 182,406 6,627 3% $ 29,807 207,177 97%
76 $ 88,626 4,721 2% $ 26,434 190,974 98%
77 $ 54,865 2,373 1% $ 24,589 200,144 99%
78 $ 133,621 4,505 3% $ 28,654 168,999 97%
79 $ 76,283 3,641 2% $ 28,222 152,328 98%
80 $ 137,950 36,148 3% $ 27,942 1,081,948 97%
Source: 2010 Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics PUMF
The 2012 Budget also made it possible for some individuals to
take advantage of the option to increase their OAS benefit levels by
delaying take up. However, it is difficult to tell if seniors are delaying
as a strategy, or whether they are delaying because their incomes are
too high. Incomes of those deferring are indeed higher, which is
illustrated in Table 4.5.
ALTERNATIVES
When the change from 65 to 67 was presented by the Harper
government, it was presented as a part of what was necessary “to
ensure the sustainability of the Old Age Security program, which is
the largest spending program of the federal government.”26 However,
it was not clear to many observers that the OAS and GIS were not
sustainable as they were. For example, according to a July 2012
actuarial report commissioned by the federal government: “Prior to
the increase to the age of eligibility, projected total Program
expenditures are respectively $32 million and $102 million lower in
2013 and 2022 than under the [previous actuarial report of December
2009].”27 This does not suggest a system in crisis; to the contrary, this
suggests a sustainable program. Further, the Parliamentary Budget
Officer similarly argues that the proposed eligibility age change was
not required to maintain a structural surplus.28
However, even assuming that some changes to the program
were necessary to ensure sustainability, it is worthwhile to ask: was
the increase in the age of eligibility the best alternative? Here we
explore several other possible changes to the OAS/GIS program
design to see whether there were other reforms that the federal
government might usefully have considered instead of one that will
almost certainly result in increased poverty amongst those between
the ages of 65 and 67.
First we consider the expenditure savings from an increase in
the age of eligibility. What would the government actually save from
increasing the age of eligibility of the OAS/GIS to 67 from 65 in the
2015 tax year? Assuming that the provinces adjust their OAS/GIS
programs to 67 (and OAS survivor benefit to 62) to match the federal
age change, the federalgovernment (after taxes) would save roughly
$5.5 billion annually (based on 2015 figures). This includes both the
increase in OAS benefits and GIS and spousal allowance benefits not
paid to poor 65 and 66 year olds. Results are presented in Table 4.6.
Table 4.6: Effect of Age 67 Eligibility for OAS/GIS vs Age 651
Selected Ages and Measures, 2015
Age
Person
Count
(000)
Change in
GIS and
Spouse's
Allowance
(millions)
Change in
GIS
Provincial
Top-Up
(millions)
Change
in OAS
Benefits
(millions)
Change in
Social
Assistance
(or
Replacement
Change in
Total
Income
(line 150)
(millions)
Change in
After Tax,
Disposable
Income
(millions)
60 450.9 -127.7 0 0 0 -130.9 -117.4
61 431 -102.8 0.2 0 0 -121.9 -90.3
62 434.9 -5.8 -0.1 0 0 -64.2 15.6
63 466.8 -5.4 0 0 0 -77.4 41.7
64 482.5 -76.5 0 0 0 -138.3 -54.7
65 400.1 -392.1 -32 -2437 156.7 -2,665.3 -2,307.2
66 377.7 -324.7 -26 -2,235.6 16 -2,492 -2,212.6
All
ages
35,582.3 -983.5 -44 -4,561.4 172.7 -5,602.7 -4,422.1
It is useful to consider the potential savings to the federal
treasury from lowering the income level from $70,954 where the
OAS recovery tax rate applies while keeping the taxback rate at 15
percent.29 Decreasing the income level to $60,000 at the lower end
would have resulted in a saving of $370 million in 2015 (compared to
status quo, after-tax).2 Lowering it to $50,000 at the lower end would
have resulted in a saving of $830 million in 2015 (compared to status
quo, after-tax). Finally, lowering it to $40,000 at the lower end would
have resulted in a saving of $1.64 billion in 2015 (compared to status
quo, after-tax). In other words, the savings are relatively small from
lowering the income level where the taxback would apply.
What follows is an extract from the 12th Actuarial Report on
the OAS, published in 2014. It is important to note how few people
are actually paying the recovery tax in general and how few are
paying it in full.
The OAS Recovery Tax, which applies to high-income
pensioners, effectively reduces recipient rates, since very
high-income pensioners may have their benefit completely
reduced. It is estimated that 6.4% (or 337,000) of all OAS
pensioners in 2013 were affected by the Recovery Tax. Of
this group, 124,000 or 2.4% of all OAS pensioners that year
had their pensions completely reduced. In 2050, those
affected by the Recovery Tax are projected to represent 6.8%
(718,000) of all OAS pensioners, while those fully affected
are projected to represent 2.3% (246,000) of pensioners.
Section IV of Appendix B presents more detailed
information on the projected impact of the OAS Recovery
Tax (accounting for TFSAs and pension income splitting) on
the number of OAS basic pension beneficiaries and total
amounts payable.30
In other words, despite the institution of the recovery tax, the OAS is
currently being paid in full to 93.6 percent of all those who are in the
eligible age group, while an additional 4.0 percent receive a partial
payment. The question here is:what would be saved by applying the
recovery tax from $60,000, $50,000 or $40,000 of income but at
higher taxback rates? As an exercise, we ask what the savings would
be from increasing the recovery tax rate from 15 percentto 20 percent,
and also from 20 percent to 25 percent.3 In Table 4.7 we present the
results. The combination of lowering the income level where the tax
back applies and increasing the taxback rate to 25 percent still have
together a very small impact. Together these two changes would only
result in a saving of $1.23 billion. What the results imply is that the
incomes of most people who are receiving the OAS are relatively low
such that a substantially lower level at which the taxback applies and
a relatively higher taxback rate still do not produce much in the way
of reduced OAS expenditures.
Table 4.7: Savings in Various Scenarios vs Status Quo for OAS,
20154
Income at Lower Level
(OAS)
.15 (OAS reduction
rate)
.20 (OAS reduction
rate)
.25 (OAS reduction
rate)
$72,809 $0 (status quo) $80 million $140 million
$60,000 $370 million $510 million $610 million
$50,000 $830 million $1.06 billion $1.23 billion
What would happen if, instead of increasing the age of
eligibility of the OAS to 67, the federal government reduced the OAS
but ensured that the same amount was added to the GIS. This way the
income-tested portion of the basic level of the transfer would be
protected for those with low incomes. Here we asked what would
happen if the OAS were reduced by a sum of $50 per month, and the
GIS increased by the same amount. Similarly, what would happen if
the sum of $100 or $200 were shifted from the OAS to the GIS? In
each of these three cases, what would be the savings in OAS
expenditures? The results are presented in Table 4.8. Here we see that
the expedient of transferring $100 a month ($1,200 a year) to the GIS
from the OAS would result in a substantial saving to the federal
government, of a sum of $2.63 billion. The expedient of moving $200
per month ($2,400 a year) would bring a saving of $5.24 billion.
Clearly this approach holds considerable promise to a government
interested in an expenditure reduction while protecting the incomes of
the most vulnerable.
Table 4.8: Savings from Increasing GIS and Decreasing OAS by
Equal Amounts, 20155
Amount Moved from
OAS to GIS (annual)
New
OAS
New Max GIS
Single (annual)
New Max GIS Couple
(.66 of single) (Annual)
Savings to
Federal
(annual) Government
$0 $6,820 $8,609 $5,685 $0
$600 $6,220 $9,209 $6,078 $1.37 billion
$1,200 $5,620 $9,890 $6,474 $2.63 billion
$2,400 $4,420 $11,009 $7,265 $5.24 billion
Another possible approach would be to establish an OAS fund
and use the fund to produce benefits. What contributions would be
required to compensate for the savings generated by increasing the
age of eligibility of the OAS and consequently for the GIS?The tax
sources for the OAS fund were a 2% federal sales tax, a 2% federal
income tax and a 2% federal corporation tax. Together they
constituted the old age security tax.
These three tax increases would generate the following (in
2015): a 2% increase in the GST would generate approximately $13
billion a year, a 2% increase in fed income tax would generate
approximately $2.9 billion a yearand a 2% increase in the corporate
tax would generate approximately $5 billion per year for a total of
$20.9 billion. These tax slices would create a substantial Old Age
Security Fund which would have more than enough in it to add the
approximately $4.4 billion saving from increasing the age of
eligibility to 67. Invested for return, the remaining funds ($16.5
billion) would likely be sufficient to generate returns which would
compensate for the savings. It would bea start towards the creation of
an Old Age Security fund which would eventually become
responsible for paying out the OAS and GIS.
WILL INVESTING IN A TFSA HAVE AN IMPACT ON THE OAS
AND THE GIS?
The 2015 Budget says the following:
One low-tax measure we are particularly proud of is the Tax-
Free Savings Account. When we introduced TFSAs in
Budget 2008, it was the most significant boost to Canadians’
ability to save for their future since the creation of the RRSP.
Since then, close to 11 million Canadians – mostly low and
middle-income Canadians – have opened a TFSA.
The additions to the TFSA are being presented as the federal
government’s attempt to assist people with low and moderate income
in retirement. How? The answer is that investment income that is
sheltered in a TFSA is not counted in considering eligibility for the
GIS. The question is: how many people with full OAS and at least
some or full GIS eligibility would derive significant income from
funds that have been placed in a TFSA?
The Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) website states the
following:
No Impact on Income-Tested Benefits
Neither income earned in a TFSA nor withdrawals from a
TFSA will affect your eligibility for federal income-tested
benefits and credits, such as the Guaranteed Income
Supplement and the Canada Child Tax Benefit. This will
improve incentives for people with low and modest incomes
to save.
Benefits for Low- and Modest-Income Canadians
Alexandre and Patricia, a modest-income couple, expect to
receive the Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS) in addition
to Old Age Security and Canada Pension Plan benefits when
they retire. They have saved for a number of years in their
TFSAs and now earn $2,000 a year in interest income from
their TFSA savings. Neither this income, nor any TFSA
withdrawals, will affect the GIS benefits (or any other
federal income-tested benefits and credits) they expect to
receive. If this $2,000 were earned on an unregistered basis,
it would reduce their GIS benefits by $1,000.
http://www.tfsa.gc.ca/tfsapamphlet-eng.html
Of course, if TFSA access remains cumulative, then some time
in the future (after perhaps 25 years) an individual could sell a house
and then deposit $250,000 into a TFSA. If it is a principal residence,
it is not subject to capital gains tax; and the returns to the proceeds
that can be put into the TFSA would also not be subject to tax, being
sheltered in a TFSA. At this point, the maximum that can be put into
a TFSA is $41,000, including the increase announced in the 2015
federal budget.
A 2012 Finance Canada report sheds some light on what is
occurring. Are there significant numbers of individuals with a TFSA
who are eligible for the GIS? According to the report:
Low-income seniors have also been taking advantage of the
TFSA. In 2011, Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS)
recipients represented about 6% of TFSA holders, and their
TFSA participation rate was 23%—3 percentage points
higher than that of low-income individuals in general.31
In 2011, approximately 30 percent of adult income earners held
a TFSA, with the average value of a TFSA holding at $7,525. While
contributions per year stood on average at $3,727, withdrawals were
at $986. Further, on balance, TFSA accounts had a net investment
loss in 2011. So how are low-income seniors taking advantage of the
TFSA? Is it a substitute savings account, or a vehicle for sheltering
sufficient capital to have significant positive returns?
Seniors are apparently the age group with the highest
participation rate in the TFSA.
Overall, seniors[6] have been the largest users of TFSAs, with
a take-up rate of 40% in 2011. Although many seniors are on
a fixed income with a limited capacity to save on an ongoing
basis, they have had more time to accumulate wealth and are
generally well-placed to redirect their stock of existing
savings to tax-assisted accounts such as the TFSA.[7]
It is not surprising to find that participation rates vary by
income. Individuals with incomes below $20,000 have the lowest
participation rate at 20 percent, rising to just above 30 percent for
those with incomes between $20,000 and $40,000. TFSA
maximization rates are very low in the bottom half of the population
at only 4% on average in 2013.32 What these data suggest is that most
people with low incomes sheltered whatever savings they initially
had; moreover, they may have been putting much of their savings into
the TFSA. The federal government created a strong incentive for
seniors to put whatever savings they have in a TFSA by discounting
the income for the purposes of calculating eligibility for the GIS. But
how much income is being sheltered in this way? It is an important
question to answer if in fact the TFSA is having an impact on senior
incomes—especially since the data suggest that at least 25 percent of
those with accounts suffered a net loss on their TFSA in 2011.
According to the data available in the same Finance Canada report,
approximately 440,000 GIS recipients had a total of $4.3 billion in
TFSA accounts, or an average of $9,772.72 per person in 2011.
INVESTING IN THE TFSA AND THE OAS
There is a further wrinkle. For the purposes of calculating OAS
eligibility, investment income from TFSAs is not counted. This
means that the income of moderate income earners who still have
some eligibility of the OAS is enhanced if they put their savings into
a TFSA rather than an unregistered account. To take an example,
consider an individual who is 65 years of age or older with OAS and
GIS eligibility—let us assume that they also have $10,000 in a TFSA
generating at 5 percent, $500 a year. If this income counted against
GIS benefits, it would represent a loss of $20 a monthor $240 a year
those benefit payments. At the other end of the spectrum, someone
with a high income, above the maximum income for OAS
eligibility,and interest income of $500 could save a similar amount
through putting their interest bearing assets in a TFSA.
Let us consider a second example. A person with a substantial
pension income of $80,000 might also have substantial earnings from
holding capital in a savings or equity account. At this point in 2015,
and with the additions to the TFSA taken into account, that person
could contribute $41,000 to a TFSA and shelter subsequent returns
from this principal. If returns are assumed to be 5 percent, then
$2,050 dollars can be sheltered through a TFSA. In addition to the
loss of taxation on the additional income, this person would have an
additional $307.50 of eligibility for the OAS ($2,050 times 15
percent). Similarly, anyone with an income in the recovery tax band
(which is currently from $70,954 to $114,815) is subject to a loss of
eligibility of 15 percent of the extent to which their income exceeds
the minimum of the band.33
Using data drawn from the Office of the Superintendent of
Financial Institutions Canada (OSFI) in 2012 for the impact of the
TFSA on both OAS and GIS, a recent Broadbent Institute report
prepared by Rhys Kesselmanstates the following:
the OSFI 12th actuarial report on the OAS program offers
long-range forecasts of these impacts. It projects the
proportion of the cohort attaining age 67 in 2050 receiving
full or partial GIS benefits at 30.9 percent—five percentage
points higher than without TFSAs (2014, p. 78). A
background document to the OSFI 12th actuarial report
projects that the TFSA will boost GIS expenditures in 2050
by $2.8 billion to $35.6 billion, an increase of 8.6 percent
relative to the absence of TFSAs, but its “high- cost” variant
indicates an annual impact as high as $8.8 billion. The 12th
actuarial report also forecasts that TFSAs will reduce the
amount of OAS recovery tax collected in 2050 by $1.2
billion to $5.4 billion (2014, p. 77). Based on these figures,
the projected future annual fiscal cost of the TFSA with
respect to the total OAS program could exceed $4 billion and
perhaps substantially more.34
In other words, while the final numbers are not clear, it appears
that through the institution of the TFSA the federal government has
done more than simply create a substantial tax loss; indeed, through
its decision to ensure that income from the TFSA would not be
counted against eligibility for the OAS or the GIS, it has created a
substantial increased expenditure. There is no doubt that this will be a
benefit to those people who have significant funds in a TFSA so that
they can retain eligibility for the GIS, and to a lesser degree to OAS.
Of course, over time, people with more funds (likely with higher
incomes and assets) to put into a TFSA will benefit much more.
What we do not know is what will happen when people 65 and
67 are not able to access OAS and GIS. If they have low incomes,
they will apply for welfare. Welfare officials will tell them that they
must live off of their TFSA until they reduce it to the asset ceiling for
welfare, an amount that varies from $300 to $4,000 for an individual
depending on which province or territory they are applying in. So
forcing them off OAS/GIS will also likely mean that they will no
longer have much of the TFSA funds they saved in order to
supplement their retirement income.
THE RRSP, THE OAS AND GIS
Another wrinkle is the ongoing effort by the Harper government to
complicatethe tax and transfer system to the point where it becomes
very difficult to figure out what is happening. It is also based on the
principle of not increasing substantially either the first (OAS/GIS) or
the second tier(CPP/QPP) of retirement income. Instead, their focus
has been on the so-called third tier, on ensuring that people with
private incomes in retirement can keep more of it.
If someone has a substantial RRSP and little other income
(there are not many people in this category) then they could reduce
their withdrawals from theirRegistered Retirement Income Fund
(RRIF)at age 71 from 7.38 percent to 5.28 percent in order to retain
greater eligibility for OAS and GIS. That is, with $100,000 in an
RRIF and a 5.28 percent withdrawal, then the person must take out
$5,280 instead of $7,380 —a difference of $2,100. That person’s
OAS/GIS would drop to $1,055 per month; but with the full amount
of the RRIF withdrawal, it would drop to $968.33, a difference of $87
per month or $1,044 for the year. Instead of spending the money, this
person could put it into a TFSA and generate greater tax free income
which does not count towards OAS/GIS eligibility. It is hard to
imagine many people in this situation. A more likely scenario would
be an individual without eligibility for the GIS who still has some
eligibility for the OAS. They would gain 15 percent of the $2,100
difference or $315 a year—although they would not have the
additional $2,100 to spend. If this person put the RRSP redemption
into a TFSA, then their future income would be sheltered and not
reduce their OAS eligibility (although they would not have the funds
to spend).
CONCLUSIONS
Over the course of four decades, seniors’ poverty in Canada has seen
a major decrease. While many factors have likely contributed to this,
there is little denying that the OAS (and the GIS) has been one of
them. Increasing the age of eligibility by two years, in spite of the fact
that the status quo isfinancially sustainable to the public treasury, will
almost certainly increase poverty among seniors who are under the
age of 67.
What is more, the change will also result in considerably more
persons aged 65 and 66 relying on social assistance, which will
represent a substantial transfer of spending from the federal
government to provincial and territorial governments. While ‘have
provinces’ may have little difficulty absorbing these new costs, many
provinces and territories will struggle with the change.
We estimate that the saving from increasing the age of
eligibility for the OAS is likely approximately $4.4 billion dollars per
year. Were it imperative that OAS/GIS expenditures be reduced,
these funds could be found by lowering the ceiling for full eligibility
for the OAS and increasing the tax back rate, or by creating an Old
Age Security fund by using something like the 2/2/2 tax formula
which was put in place when the Old Age Security was first
instituted. It could also be found by shifting some pension funds from
the OAS to the GIS, making a greater amount subject to income
testing and less availability universally. Any of these alternatives
could have been used by the Federal government to ensure that very
few seniors fall into poverty. The federal government’s decision to
raise the age of eligibility for the OAS was a clear decision to
increase senior poverty.
The Federal Government’s decision to institute the TFSA with
the condition that the income shelter would not towards OAS/GIS
eligibility has likely been a source of additional spending on these
two programs especially for those who have greater assets and
therefore higher investment income. While many seniors have opened
TFSA accounts, these accounts are likely not a significant source of
additional income for people who have eligibility for the GIS. They
will not keep low income seniors who are 65 and 66 out of poverty.
In the long term, like many other tax related measures, the TFSA will
likely be a significant form of tax shelter for people with greater
financial wealth and therefore higher incomes from investments.
__________________________
Footnotes
1 Simulations are based on Statistics Cnaada's Social Policy Simulation Database and Model
22.0. The assumptions and calculations underlying the simulation results were prepared by
David Macdonald and the responsibility for the use and interpretation of these data is entirely
that of the authors.
2 Simulations is based on Statistics Canada's Social Policy Simulation Database and Model
22.0. The assumptions and calculations underlying the simulation results were prepared by
David Macdonald and the responsibility for the use and interpretation of these data is entirely
that of the authors.
3 Simulations is based on Statistics Cnaada's Social Policy Simulation Database and Model
22.0. The assumptions and calculations underlying the simulation results were prepared by
David Macdonald and the responsibility for the use and interpretation of these data is entirely
that of the authors.
4 Simulations are based on Statistics Cnaada's Social Policy Simulation Database and Model
22.0. The assumptions and calculations underlying the simulation results were prepared by
David Macdonald and the responsibility for the use and interpretation of these data is entirely
that of the authors.
5 Simulations are based on Statistics Cnaada's Social Policy Simulation Database and Model
22.0. The assumptions and calculations underlying the simulation results were prepared by
David Macdonald and the responsibility for the use and interpretation of these data is entirely
that of the authors.
__________________________
Endnotes
1 Michael J. Prince, “Blue Rinse: Harper's Treatment of Old Age
Security and Other Elderly Benefits”, in How Ottawa Spends 2013-
2014: The Harper Government-Mid-Term Blues and Long Term
Plans. 64-75. Edited by Christopher Stoney and G. Bruce Doern.
McGill-Queen's University Press, 2013.
2 Applicants for the Old Age Security now have the option to defer
receipt for up to 60 months.
http://www.servicecanada.gc.ca/eng/services/pensions/oas/pension/index.shtml
3 Ministry of Finance, Budget, 2015, Budget Speech, Support for
Canadian Families, http://www.budget.gc.ca/2015/docs/speech-
discours/2015-04-21-eng.html. May 2015.
4 Ministry of Finance, Budget 2015, Helping Families Make Ends
Meet, http://www.budget.gc.ca/2015/docs/download-
telecharger/index-eng.html May 2015, 2.
5 K. Bryden, Old Age Pensions and Policy-Making in Canada,
Montreal. McGill-Queen's University Press, 1974, 61-63.
6 K. Bryden, Old Age Pensions and Policy-Making in Canada,66.
7 K. Bryden, Old Age Pensions and Policy-Making in Canada,107.
8 June Dewetering, The Old Age Security Fund, Library of
Parliament, Economics Division, , March 14,1990, 2-3.
9 K. Bryden, Old Age Pensions and Policy-Making in Canada,104.
10 K. Bryden, Old Age Pensions and Policy-Making in Canada,105.
11 K. Bryden, Old Age Pensions and Policy-Making in Canada,105.
12 K. Bryden,Old Age Pensions and Policy-Making in Canada,105.
13 June Dewetering, The Old Age Security Fund,2-3.
14 K. Bryden, 178-182;
15 Authors' calculations based on data in Dewetering, 6.
16 Information available from Service Canada at:
http://www.servicecanada.gc.ca/eng/services/pensions/oas/pension/index.shtml
http://www.servicecanada.gc.ca/eng/services/pensions/oas/gis/index.shtml
17 Service Canada, The Old Age Security Pension Recovery Tax,
http://www.servicecanada.gc.ca/eng/services/pensions/oas/pension/recovery-
tax.shtml, July 2015 - June 2015, Downloaded, May 2015.
18 Service Canada, Maximum allowable income can be calculated on
the following website:
http://www.servicecanada.gc.ca/eng/services/pensions/oas/payments/index.shtml
May 2015
19 Canada Revenue Agency, Opening a TFSA, http://www.cra-
arc.gc.ca/tx/ndvdls/tpcs/tfsa-celi/pnng/menu-eng.html. May 2015
20 As of July 2015. See Service Canada, Old Age Security Payment
Amounts,
http://www.servicecanada.gc.ca/eng/services/pensions/oas/payments/index.shtml
21 Service Canada, CPP/OAS Quarterly Report,
http://www.servicecanada.gc.ca/eng/services/pensions/infocard/index.shtml
22 Statistics Canada (CANSIM table 202-0804 and table 206-0003,
last updated on: 2012-04-23; coverage: 1976 to 2010)
http://www5.statcan.gc.ca/access_acces/alternative_alternatif.action?
l=eng&loc=t/804.ivt
23 Richard Shillington, Tristat Resources, private communication,
2015.
24 Minister of Finance, Budget 2012, Chapter 4, Sustainable Social
Programs and a Secure Retirement,
http://www.budget.gc.ca/2012/plan/chap4-eng.html#a6 May 2015.
25 Anne Tweddle, Ken Battle and Sherri Torjman, Welfare in Canada
2013. Caledon Institute of Social Policy, November 2014. See tables
of provincial benefits, 75-87.
26 Minister of Finance, Economic Action Plan, The Budget Speech,
March 29, 2012, http://www.budget.gc.ca/2012/rd-dc/speech-
discours-eng.html
27 Canada. Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions.
Office of the Chief Actuary.ActuarialReport (11th) Supplementing
the Actuarial Report on the Old Age Security Program As at 31
December 2009. [Ottawa], 2012. http://www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/eng/oca-
bac/ar-ra/oas-psv/pages/oas11.aspx#Toc-Ia, 8.
28 Chris Matier, Federal Fiscal Sustainability and Elderly Benefits,
Office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer, February 2012.
29 ServiceCanada,
http://www.servicecanada.gc.ca/eng/services/pensions/oas/pension/recovery-
tax.shtml
30 Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions, 12th
Actuarial Report on the OAS, 2014, Section B, Number of
Beneficiaries, http://www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/eng/oca-bac/ar-ra/oas-
psv/pages/oas12.aspx
31 Minister of Finance, Part 2—Tax Evaluations and Research
Reports, Tax-Free Savings Accounts: A Profile of Account Holders,
Retrieved at http://www.fin.gc.ca/taxexp-depfisc/2012/taxexp1202-
eng.asp#ftn13
32 David Macdonald, The Number Games: are the TFSA odds ever in
your favour? Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, May 2015
33 See
http://www.servicecanada.gc.ca/eng/services/pensions/oas/pension/recovery-
tax.shtml
34 Jonathan Rhys Kessleman, Double Trouble: The Case Against
Expanding Tax-Free Savings Accounts, Broadbent Institute, 2015, 14.
Chapter 5
REFORMS TO THE FEDERAL PUBLIC SERVICE IN THE
HARPER YEARS, 2006-2015
Ian Lee and Philip Cross
Canadians said loudly and clearly that they wanted an open,
honest and accountable government. They want their
taxpayer dollars spent wisely and well…The federal
accountability act is about moving from a culture of
entitlement to a culture of accountability.
John Baird, President of the Treasury Board, introducing Bill
C-2 to the House of Commons, April 11, 2006
INTRODUCTION
It is no exaggeration to characterize life in the Canadian federal
public service during the last 8 years as tumultuous. This led the
largest federal public sector union, PSAC, to hand out buttons to its
members in 2013 that said, “Harper Hates Me.” Indeed, some union
leaders have suggested the various reforms adopted by the Harper
Government would destroy the federal public service. One can
question why they say this about the Harper government, since almost
everything they criticize, from cuts to staffing levels and benefits to
cancelling portions of the Census, was attempted by previous
governments in the 1980s and 1990s. This is particularly true of the
austerity package enacted by the Chretien government in 1994. What
seems to be different this time is that the changes proposed or enacted
are designed to be long-lasting.
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a comprehensive
empirical summary of what the Harper Government actually did
concerning the federal public service and then provide an analysis of
these reforms. The chapter will demonstrate that the changes - while
conservative in nature – addressed fundamental structural issues that
cried out for reform. Indeed, one can readily discern a strategic vision
in the totality of the reforms of the public service architecture that had
not undergone a major structural reform since the introduction of
collective bargaining by the Pearson Liberal Government in 1967.
While there were major reforms of the public service during the
past 40 years, including most importantly the Public Service
Modernization Act of 2003, these various changes dealt more with
process than root and branch structural reform to the collective
bargaining regime, the underlying system determining compensation
and benefits or the transparency of government procurement. The
result was a fundamental misalignment of public versus private sector
compensation and the corruption of government procurement as
revealed by the Sponsorship scandal. Our analysis will be organized
under four categories:
1. Accountability, including the relationship between the
bureaucracy and Parliament, media and the public;
2. Compensation and benefits of federal public servants
including reforms to their pensions, the age of retirement, the
percentage of premiums paid, and sick leave;
3. Downsizing the federal government relative to the
economy, and;
4. Collective bargaining reform.
The government’s reform of civil service operations and spending has
not always proceeded in a uniform manner. Reforms in the areas of
collective bargaining and the size of the government have been more
extensive than changes in compensation and accountability. Indeed,
structural changes to collective bargaining had to be implemented
before several changes could be made to compensation and benefits.
The government’s minority position in Parliament before 2011 and
the increase in spending in response to the 2008-2009 recession
diverted its priorities. However, with the passing of the economic
crisis and winning a majority mandate in 2011, the government has
more confidently and clearly adopted a coherent vision of how it
would manage the public service.
ACCOUNTABILITY
The accountability of the federal government has been diminishing
for decades. As far back as 1976, the Auditor General said
“Parliament—and indeed the Government--has lost, or is close to
losing, effective control of the public purse.” The Harper government
has made increased accountability, the centre piece of its first
legislative act. The Federal Accountability Act of 2006, Bill C-2, and
related legislation mapped out its approach to improving
accountability by reform of the financing of political parties,
toughening the regulation of lobbyists, offering whistleblower
protection and widening the scope of the Auditor General. At the very
moment it announced Bill C-2, the Harper government also
announced its intention to reduce taxes and streamline government
services, which has remained the underlying motivation of its fiscal
policy outside of the 2008-2009 recession.
Bill C-2 achieved its goal of making government procurement
transparent and preventing a rogue civil servant’s ability to divert
public funds for political (or personal) purposes, as occurred during
the Sponsorship scandal during the Chretien years. That this was
accomplished by having senior management oversee trivial but
potentially embarrassing expenses, such as travel or food provided at
receptions, was seen as a price worth paying. Many of the most
fundamental changes in the Accountability Act and related legislation
have become so ingrained in our political culture that their
significance has been forgotten. The Accountability Act reformed the
financing of political parties by banning contributions from
corporations and trade unions as well as all cash contributions, and
limiting individual donations to a maximum of $1,000. The Lobbyists
Registration Act tightened controls and accountability of lobbyists by
instituting a 5-year moratorium before senior officials leaving
government could become lobbyists, although the so-called 20% rule
allows lobbying before 5 years if it consumes less than 20% of the
person’s time. The government also extended the oversight of the
Auditor General to all government finances, including foundations,
and extended the coverage of the Access to Information Act to Crown
Corporations.
The government soon kept its promise of increased
accountability to Parliament by creating a Parliamentary Budget
Officer, although it took over a year to find someone to fill the
position. Despite the acrimonious relationship that developed between
Kevin Page, the first PBO, and the Harper government, it is important
that the PBO was created. It continues to evolve under Page’s
successor into a function more in line with the Congressional Budget
Office.1
One of the motivations in creating the PBO was to restore
“truth in budgeting” and prevent the substantial under-estimation of
budget surpluses that were a recurring feature of the previous Liberal
government. Irrespective of the PBO, the emphasis on better budget
forecasting is clearly evident in the track record of the Department of
Finance. There has been a marked improvement in the budget
forecasting of the federal government, with or without input from the
PBO. Since 2004/2005, the average error in the federal government’s
annual forecast of its spending has been 0.3%, while the average error
for its revenue forecast has been 0.6%. These include the unforeseen
impact of the recession in 2008-2009.
The importance the Harper government has attached to
increased transparency in its finances has been recognized by experts
outside of government. The C.D. Howe Institute in its latest annual
evaluation of the quality of financial reporting by governments in
Canada gave the federal government a grade of A- (the only blotch on
its record was the government’s use of cash-based rather than accrual
accounting, a move resisted by Treasury Board officials who argue it
is harder for parliamentarians to understand).2
The importance of the creation of the Commissioner of
Lobbying is often over-looked. This independent officer maintains a
registry of lobbyists, which departments they are lobbying and on
what subject matter, and investigates that public office holders do not
engage in lobbying for five years after leaving office. The
government also banned any payment to lobbyists contingent on their
achieving a specific outcome, a clear understanding of how incentives
can lead to corrupt behaviours.
Whistleblower protection was the motivation behind the
creation of the Office of the Public Sector Integrity Commissioner
eight years ago. The results have been mostly symbolic, as is often
the case in the public sector, with the number of cases remaining
below 100 a year.
After the initial high-profile moves to strengthen accountability, other
changes resulted in less accountability. One of the reasons is the
growing power of political advisors to the Harper cabinet ministers,
especially in the Prime Minister’s Office. While difficult to quantify
or document, this continues a trend that began in the Pearson years.3
The power of political aides was increased by a sharp decline in
polling done by government departments. The number of public
opinion research projects contracted by the federal government
declined steadily from 148 in 2009-2010 to 72 in 2012-2013, before a
slight rebound to 81 in 2013-2014.4 No longer able to point to
independent sources of public approval, the civil service has no
answer when told by aides to Cabinet that they uniquely represent
public opinion.
Some proposals to increase accountability through more
transparency had little impact. These include salary disclosure for
political aides and access to information requests. Protecting the
anonymity of the salaries paid to political aides is one reason that the
limit for public disclosure of salaries was set at such a high level that
it largely defeated its purpose (Bill C-461 was amended to raise the
level at which salaries are disclosed from $188,000 to $444,661).
Another reason this bill was essentially gutted is the evident failure of
disclosure policies to slow the number of civil servants earning high
salaries, and may even have accelerated it, such as occurred in
Ontario.5
Measures to enhance accountability are working against long-
term forces reducing accountability, notably the drying up of
documentation in the civil service in reaction to the enactment of
Access to Information in the 1980s, the classification of more civil
service communication as confidential, and the centralizing of
decision-making in political aides and the Prime Minister’s Office.
The introduction of Access to Information laws starting in 1983
has had a chilling effect on written communication in the federal
government. This has led to what Hubbard and Paquet, quoting a
former Information Commissioner, call an attitude to information
management that asks “Why write it, when you can speak it? Why
speak it when you can nod? Why nod, when you can wink?”6 The
bare bones presentation of the minutes of meetings is one
manifestation. This is the response of a civil service pursuing its own
self-interest rather than risking controversy by serving the public
interest. Second, an increasing number of documents are classified as
confidential as the senior civil service limits the distribution of its
most interesting and possibly controversial analysis. This is reflected
in the rising number of complaints about Access to Information
requests to the Office of the Information Commissioner, an
independent officer reporting to Parliament.7 This Office can make
recommendations about whether documents should be made public,
but cannot enforce its rulings. The overall result of these two forces
that inhibit transparency is that documents that are made public
increasingly are ‘content free’ (a good example is the thorough and
thoughtful review of the 1986 Census published by Statistics Canada
compared with its superficial overview of the 2011 National
Household Survey). This hampers government accountability, since
the justifications and goals of public programs are not made clear.
Another ongoing weakness in the overall approach to
accountability that pre-dates the Harper administration is inter-
generational equity; the responsibility that future taxpayers are not
being asked to unfairly shoulder the burden for spending today. A
prime example is the unfunded portion of the federal government’s
pension plan for its employees. The Auditor General found that
responsibility for ensuring the sustainability of these plans was
diffused across many departments, and that there was no clear
directive that “assigned responsibilities for assessing the
sustainability of the plans.” Similarly, the Auditor General concluded
that Finance Canada did not systematically review the long-term
fiscal sustainability for most programs beyond five years, leaving it to
the discretion of officials to evaluate long-term issues (which it found
was done reasonably well).8
Some specific Harper government policies have reduced
accountability in areas unrelated to finance and budgeting. Most
notably, it requires journalists to submit in advance the questions they
want to ask at news conferences. While following similar trends in
the US and the UK, it reduces government accountability in the name
of message control. Proroguing the House of Commons in 2008
opened the door for any government to suspend Parliament when a
vote of no confidence was imminent, a tactic soon adopted by the
McGuinty government in Ontario to avoid answering questions about
a scandal.
Other developments that have reduced accountability are not all
under the government’s control. In particular, the activism of the
Supreme Court of Canada in designing and implementing laws (such
as those related to prostitution or euthanasia) reduces accountability,
since the Court is accountable to no one.
A common complaint about the Harper government approach
to accountability is that it has reduced communication between
government scientists and their peers and the public. Again, it is not
clear this is a trend unique to the Harper government or that it only
applies to scientists. The trend for more centralized control of all
government communications has been evident long before 2006.
Requiring scientists to get permission from management before
talking to the media is at least consistent with the practice to establish
more managerial control over communications that has been ongoing
for decades before the Harper government took power, as noted by
former PCO clerk Mel Cappe.9
The idea that the government was waging a ‘War on Science”
was imported wholesale based on accusations levelled against the
Bush Administration and Republicans in Congress.10 In the US, the
issues centred on creationism, stem cells, acid rain, the impact of
smoking and abortion on health. These issues are not contentious in
Canada’s public debate, which is why US-style rhetoric about a
government ‘War on Science’ does not resonate here with the public.
While statistics are not science per se, the government’s
replacement of the mandatory long form portion of the Census with
the voluntary National Household Survey in 2011 often is cited as
undermining the facts that can be used to verify claims the
government makes about the basis and the impact of its
policies.These accusations overlook that this was the second time a
Conservative government cancelled a Census. The Mulroney
government announced in November 1984 that the 1986 Census
would be cut entirely, not even replaced with a voluntary survey(no
one accused Mulroney of being anti-science).11 Eventually, the
Census was re-instated in 1986 but not government funding. Statistics
Canada was told to find the $100 million cost of the Census “within
existing budgetary allocations over the next five years.”12 This forced
Statistics Canada to adopt a combination of program cuts and a wide
range of user fees (this was when it began to charge for Cansim data,
among other things).
The 1986 Census was the first full quinquennial (mid-decade)
Census; before that, only the decennial Censuses covered the full
range of subjects, while Statistics Canada referred to the quinquennial
as “mini censuses.”13 Statistics Canada justified the need for a full
Census in 1986 “because of significant socio-economic changes
brought about by a recession since the decennial 1981 Census.”14 Of
course, once the precedent of a full quinquennial Census was
established, it continued indefinitely without reference to whether
“significant socio-economic changes” justified. This same process of
finding a rationale in short-term circumstances to start a permanent
spending program helps explain the vast expansion of government
outlays over the long-term.
COMPENSATION
Every federal majority government from Mulroney to Chretien to
Harper has tried to rein in the compensation of the federal civil
service. However, previous governments have succeeded for only
brief periods, before a resumption of the strong upward trend of both
employment and average compensation. The Harper government
learned that the challenge of slowing the growth of public sector
compensation in all its forms (and not just wages) required
fundamental reform if it was to succeed in the long-term. Meanwhile,
the prospect of rising demand for pension and health care costs as
Canada’s population ages (the dependency ratio will fall from 7
workers for every retiree to 2 by 2030) underscores the need to free
up government spending from compensating its own workers to
meeting the growing needs of the elderly.
After receiving its majority mandate in 2011, the Harper
government felt confident to undertake the structural reform of public
service compensation that has eluded governments of all stripes since
the 1980s. Its much-publicized cuts to government payrolls begun in
2012 are insignificant compared with the changes it is instituting to
increase the contribution of civil servants to their pension benefits,
raise the retirement age and reform sick leave benefits. It is easy to
see how job cuts can be easily reversed; it is much harder to imagine
any future government rescinding these changes to pension and
medical benefits, partly because they begin to close an unsustainable
gap between remuneration practices in the private and the public
sectors.
The need to curb the compensation of federal public servants
was clear. From 1997 to 2013, total labour income in the federal
public service rose 238%, the fourth fastest of the 15 major industry
groups for which Statistics Canada publishes data (behind only
mining, construction and professional, scientific and technical
services).15 By 2013, average weekly earnings in the federal public
administration were $1,444, the pinnacle in the public sector
(including health and education, where average wages were about
$1,000 a week) and the third highest of any industry, behind only
mining and utilities.16 None of these measures of compensation
include non-wage benefits such as the health care plan and the
unfunded portion of future pension benefits.
The long-term rise in the pay of federal public servants cannot
be attributed to an upgrading of its skills. A study of public service
pay that accounted for the different skill mix found that the public
sector still paid a premium of 12%, without accounting for superior
non-wage benefits (notably pensions).17 As well, the fact that federal
pay increases were concentrated in short time frames after a period of
austerity also confirms that changes in skill were not driving the
increase; if the skill mix was being upgraded, then total public sector
compensation would have increased even in periods when the pay
levels of individual occupations were frozen.
There are several reasons why it is preferable to look at the
total compensation the federal government pays its employees, rather
than more limited measures such as negotiated wage settlements.
Statistics Canada’s total labour income in its System of National
Accounts captures the effect of the numerous adjustments to wages
and salaries that are not negotiated. These include annual increments
that are embedded within the pay scale for every level of an
occupational classification, promotions, the employer-paid portion of
pension benefits, health and dental care benefits (all paid entirely by
the government), the bilingual bonus, ‘cashing out’ unused vacation
benefits and even irregular benefits such as pay equity compensation
and overtime. Average compensation also reflects long-run changes
in the composition and age of the federal government’s labour force,
such as the trend to fewer support staff and more professionals (who
of course must perform some of the functions formerly provided by
support staff).18
Lahey calculates that the total compensation of a federal civil
servant averaged $92,000 in 2009-2010.19 This does not include all
benefits, notably unfunded pension benefits. Part of the difficulty in
controlling total labour costs is that different parts of government are
responsible for the various types of compensation, with no entity
responsible for the size of the overall package. For example, unions
negotiate wage rates with Treasury Board; health and dental benefits
are set government-wide by the National Joint Council; and pension
benefits are set by statute.
The Conservative government under Brian Mulroney vainly
tried to rein in its labour costs in the 1980s by focusing only on
negotiated wage increases, while ignoring other avenues by which the
public service was able to thwart the nominal push for austerity (such
as reclassification to a higher pay level and annual increments within
each of these levels). As a result, wages and salaries paid to federal
public servants jumped 49.7% between 1983 and 1991. With
employment up only 4.5%, this implies a sharp increase of 6.2% in
the annual average compensation paid to civil servants. By
comparison, negotiated wage settlements in the federal government
averaged 3.8% over this period.20 The gap between the increase in
total compensation and negotiated wage increases shows the
importance of other avenues to raise incomes, such as promotions and
non-wage benefits.
The Liberal government’s major push for austerity in the mid-
1990s finally reined-in the overall wage bill, if only for a short period,
by targeting total pay. Wages and salaries paid by the federal
government to its employees fell 15.0% between 1992 and 1997, with
over three-quarters of the cut occurring after 1994. The drop reflected
both reducing employment by a total of 19.7%, and a marked
slowdown in the rise of average compensation to just 4.7% over five
years (or less than 1% a year).21 Data on negotiated wage settlements
for the federal government show five consecutive years of no increase
between 1992 and 1996.22 These negotiations covered over 100,000
workers in 1993 and 1994 alone. Unlike in the 1980s, however,
restraint at the negotiating table was carried over into all other forms
of compensating public servants for their labour services, as the gap
between total compensation and negotiated wage settlements was
squeezed to below 1% a year. Despite the much greater restraint on
total income paid to employees imposed by the Chretien government
than during the Harper years, there were few accusations that the
federal government was permanently impairing the ability of the civil
service to do its job. Public sector unions did not hand out buttons
saying “Chretien Hates Me” in 1995.
A major problem in controlling incomes in the federal public
service is that temporary periods of restraint usually are followed by
rapid growth as employees make up the foregone pay increases. For
example, the 15.0% drop in total employee compensation between
1992 and 1997 was followed by a surge of 76.2% in the decade after
1997.
The end result is that wage restraint is not sustained over longer
periods, with their impact usually vanishing within a decade. Despite
the marked slowdown during the austere period from 1994 to 1997,
average compensation per employee rose 36.3% for the decade
between 1994 and 2004, not materially different from the 43.5%
increase in the decade between 1984 and 1994.23 Adjusting for lower
inflation after 1994,24 real incomes in the federal civil service actually
accelerated. Therefore, one of the challenges for the current
government is to rein in employee compensation in a manner where
the savings from restraint are sustained into future decades.
During the minority terms of the Harper government, a nominal
move to restraint at the negotiating table did not carry over into actual
pay. From 2006 to 2011, negotiated wage settlements average
increases of only 1.2%, with government citing the need for restraint
in view of the record budget deficit resulting from the recession.
Nevertheless, there was a continuation of rapid increases in both
employment and average compensation. Between 2006 and 2011 the
number of federal employees increased by 10.6%. Meanwhile, total
compensation rose 26.4% between 2006 and 2011, with average
compensation per employee up 15.8%. The gap between actual pay
and negotiated wage settlements repeats what happened under the
Mulroney government, which may reflect the inexperience of both
governments in handling the levers of the federal government. It may
also reflect an unwillingness of a minority government to risk the
controversy of alienating either the opposition in Parliament or the
bureaucracy.
After receiving a majority mandate, the Harper government
shifted its priority from negotiated wage rates to reducing non-wage
benefits. The proposed reduction of sick leave benefits and the
implementation of higher employee contributions to their pension
plan are a modest but important start to restraining public sector pay.
Their importance is two-fold. First, they emphasize compensation
over long periods, not the quick cosmetic of a temporary wage freeze
or restraint period which is soon offset by gains once the restraint
period ends. Second, it recognizes that there are important benefits
beyond simple wage rates, and it is these non-wage benefits that have
become most out of line with private sector compensation.25 The
negotiated settlement with PSAC that traded-off future severance pay
for some current benefits is another sign the government recognizes
the need to rein-in long-term commitments to compensation. While
negotiated wage settlements rose slightly after 2011, total
compensation levelled off as the government tightened control over
all pay and benefits.
In this regard, the incremental changes being made to public
service pension plans establish an important precedent of gradually
but more equitably sharing their cost with employees over the long-
term. A number of changes have been made to public service
pensions since 2006. Initially, some benefitted employees. In 2006
the Public Service Superannuation Act was amended to lower the
factor used in the CPP or QPP coordination formula, with the result
of increased public service pension benefits for people 65 years and
over starting in 2008. In 2010, the Public Service Superannuation
Regulations were amended to allow members aged 70 or 71 years to
buy back up to two years of pensionable service, increasing their
pension in retirement. This is consistent with the generosity in overall
pay during the minority government years.
After receiving its majority mandate, the government
introduced changes that began to shift the cost of pensions from
taxpayers to future retirees from the federal government (it is
noteworthy that pension benefits are governed by statute and
therefore are not covered by collective bargaining). The Public
Service Superannuation Act was amended in 2012 to gradually
increase the employee share of pension costs to 50:50 with the
employer. In addition, the age of eligibility for unreduced pension
benefits was increased from age 60 to age 65 for new employees who
joined starting in January 1, 2013.26 The latter two changes addressed
long-standing critiques comparing the generosity of these benefits
with the private sector, led by the C.D. Howe Institute. All of these
changes were done in a gradual manner, allowing civil servants
decades to adjust their financial planning.
At the same time, the federal government began addressing its
growing unfunded liability for its employee pensions. Until 2000,
federal employee pension plans were unfunded and therefore were
paid out of government tax revenues or more borrowing. Since then,
some assets have been set aside for these funds, but nowhere near
enough to meet future liabilities. As of March 31, 2013, the
Government of Canada acknowledged an unfunded liability of $151.7
billion for its employee pension plans.27 However, Robson and
Laurin note that this assumes a real rate of return on pension assets of
3.9%, unusually high in today’s investment environment. If the actual
real rate of return were to be only slightly lower at 2.6%, the
unfunded liability of government pensions would jump from $151.7
billion to $271.6 billion.28 Government funding for the actuarial
shortfall for pensions was increased from $39.2 million to $435
million in 2013. Given these inadequate increases in funding, further
reforms to pensions will be necessary, such as possibly extending the
calculation of the earnings base for pensions from the highest five
years of salary to a much longer period, reducing the free benefit
given to surviving spouses or reducing the indexation of pensions for
inflation.29
REDUCING THE FOOTPRINT OF THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT IN THE ECONOMY
For most of the last 20 years, the Public Service of Canada has been
subject to program review, hiring freezes, strategic review and
austerity. However, these were interspersed with periods of growth in
the later Chretien years after Program Review and even more so
under the Harper Conservatives from 2006 to 2011. (See Table 5.1 on
federal public service population below).
Subsequent to the election of the Mulroney Conservative
Government in 1984, austerity, restraint and downsizing has become
part of the national political vocabulary. There was a logic to this
because commencing in the 1970’s, the Government of Canada
started to generate large deficits due mainly to significant increases in
social programs and transfers that grew with the passage of time,
especially during the 1981-1982 recession. The Mulroney
Government attempted to address the deficit, in part, by adopting an
aggressive privatization program that sold off most of Canada’s
commercial crown corporations such as Petro Canada, Air Canada,
and Canadian National Railway.
However the reduction in the Government’s footprint was not
sustained. As the Parliamentary Budget Office demonstrated, there
have been significant variations in the number of core federal public
servants throughout the last 20 years. Between 1990-91 and 1998-99,
federal employment reached a low, dropping to approximately
288,500 in 1998. By the late 2000s, employment had rebounded fully
and continued to grow…In effect, federal employees lost over 70,000
jobs by the late 1990s and subsequently regained them by adding over
90,000 in the decade that followed.30 When Stephen Harper formed
his first minority government in 2006, the Government was quick to
act on accountability and transparency in government but also set out
their long-term agenda of a smaller, leaner Government. As will be
evidenced below, the Harper legacy is mixed for while Government
of Canada spending as a percentage of GDP did decline to the lowest
level since the 1950s, nonetheless, the population of the federal public
service increased over time. In their first Federal Budget, it
announced that:
The Government will restrain the rate of spending growth.
The Government will introduce a new approach to managing
overall spending to ensure that government programs focus
on results and value for money, and are consistent with
government priorities and responsibilities. The President of
the Treasury Board will identify savings of $1 billion in
2006–07 and 2007–08.31
More specifically, the Government was committing to a
launch of its Expenditure Management System (EMS) which
is “…the framework for developing and implementing the
government's spending plans...”.32
So, what did this mean to federal departments and agencies? They
were now required to “… review 100 per cent of their programs with
a view to better focus programs and services, streamline internal
operations and transform the way they do business and achieve better
results for Canadians.”33 As part of these Strategic Reviews, all
Departments and agencies were then required to: “identify
reallocation options totaling 5 per cent from their lowest-priority and
lowest-performing program spending.”34 At the end of the 4-year
cycle announced by the Government, 98% of direct program spending
was to have been reviewed.
After the surge in spending due to the 2008-2009 recession, a
renewed focus on reduction appeared in the 2010 budget where
Finance Minister Flaherty announced that “...we will take specific
measures to restrain the growth of program spending…we will launch
a comprehensive review of administrative spending.”35 In 2011, in
which the Conservatives won a majority government, Minister
Flaherty reminded Canadians that Budget 2010:
…included a Strategic and Operating Review designed to
realize substantial savings through greater efficiency and
effectiveness. Now, with the backing we received from
Canadians to guide us, we will launch that review so that,
once it’s completed, we will achieve $4 billion in annual
savings.36
The Budget Plan 2011 highlighted the completion of the first four-
year cycle of the strategic review exercise and its success in achieving
targets.
Together with measures to restrain the growth in National
Defence spending, the first cycle of strategic reviews has
resulted in $11 billion of savings over seven years and more
than $2.8 billion in ongoing savings. As part of the
Government’s plan to return to balanced budgets over the
medium term and in order to restrain the growth in spending,
the Government will undertake a one-time Strategic and
Operating Review to be conducted across all of government
in 2011–12.37
In its study, the PBO found that:
Approximately 4,000 FTEs have already been eliminated per
Budgets 2010 and 2011. As a result of announcements made
in Budget 2012, the PBO expects that the workforce will be
further reduced in the coming three years by 19,200 FTEs.
This decline in employment represents a cumulative
reduction of approximately 7.0 per cent of the workforce
between 2011-12 and 2014-15 or a reduction of 8.0 per cent
from the employment peak in 2010-11.38
In March, 2012, the federal budget announced that a downsizing of
the federal public service would occur over the 3 next years and result
in a net, permanent savings of $5.2 billion and a loss of
approximately 19,200 jobs.
The graph below vividly demonstrates the cumulative effect of
strategic review, program and more generally austerity and
downsizing for the Harper Government during its time in office
reduced the revenues footprint of the Government of Canada from a
high of 18% of GDP in 1990 to around 14% by 2014. However, a
paradox is revealed in the following Table 5.1. While
Table 5.1: Population of the Federal Public Service, 2000-2014
(Selected Years)
Year Total Core Public Service Total Separate Agencies
2000 152,070 59,855
2002 170,779 66,472
2004 177,136 67,022
2006 189,280 60,652
2008 200,575 62,539
2010 216,596 66,384
2012 212,028 66,064
2014 195,330 61,808
Source: Treasury Board Secretariat. Population of the Federal Public Service by Department,
June 2015.
Federal spending as a share of Canada’s GDP declined, the
population of the federal core public service increased from 189,280
when the Harper Government was elected to over 2012,000 in 2012.
The data clearly reveals a mixed record concerning the Harper
Government’s legacy.
REFORM OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
Governments increased their spending too quickly … Too
much was asked and given at the wage bargaining table …
too little attention was paid to the long run efficiency of the
Canadian economy, and its ability to compete, Finance
Minister Chretien Budget Speech, April 10, 1978
The process is more streamlined and “rebalances” the
playing field because the “pendulum had swung too far” in
favour of unions at the expense of the public interest.
[the government] must rein in the pay, benefits and costs of
the public servants, which … are so out of whack with the
private sector that the public service has lost its “legitimacy
and credibility.”39
Treasury Board Minister Tony Clement, July 18, 2014,
Ottawa Citizen Government of Canada Revenues as a per
cent of GDP, 1990-201440
Government of Canada Revenues as a per cent of GDP, 1990-201441
Sources: Public Accounts of Canada and Statistics Canada.
The fourth – and arguably the most important and far reaching -
strand of structural reform of the federal public service undertaken
during the Harper year’s concerned collective bargaining which was
first introduced by the Pearson minority government in 1967. As the
quote from
Treasury Board Minister Tony Clement indicated at the outset, there
was an increasing sense that the government had only been dealing
with symptoms of the problem in strategic review and austerity, for
the DNA that drove government growth was built into the very
structure of collective bargaining. Restated, Minister Clement and the
Harper Government slowly realized they could:
1. cancel or downsize programs
2. adopt management practices to instill greater efficiency in
programs
3. reduce program inputs
Indeed, the Harper Government did adopt all three strategies. Yet, an
examination of the stats reviewed above concerning the size of
government, revealed how quickly governments can grow again even
after the austerity of the 1995-97 downsizing. After experiencing the
most recent round of Strategic and Operating Review, Minister
Clement slowly realized this was necessary but not sufficient to
institutionalize policies and structures to prevent future growth
exceeding the long run growth rate of Canadian GDP. This
recognition drove the minister and the government to finally address
the issue of structural reform of collective bargaining.
The government concluded there were structural factors that
had been incrementally added and embedded over the past 40 years in
the very framework of collective bargaining in the federal public
service since collective bargaining was introduced in 1967. These
changes cumulatively tilted the playing field in favour of unions. For
example, unions strategically used the dispute mechanism system that
allowed them to unilaterally designate strike vs arbitration to
maximize their interests. Moreover, the government believed that the
terms and conditions governing arbitrators were structured under the
current system in such a way that it benefited unions.
Another issue concerned the imbalance of communications
between government and unions. Whereas unions have detailed
websites with extensive communications, the government was not
allowed to provide websites with its position and logic because
government lawyers argued it could be used as evidence of bad faith
by communicating directly with union members, which is prohibited
under current law. Over a 45 year period, the pendulum had swung
slowly but decisively towards unions who can communicate
endlessly, upsetting the delicate balance of power between
government and unions.
The collective bargaining in the Government of Canada
typically works on 3 year cycles. However, the Expenditure Restraint
Act imposed in the 2008 round of negotiations (but tabled in 2009)
took bargaining issues off the table due to the financial crisis. In the
2011 round of collective bargaining, the government focused on
terminating severance pay. A settlement was reached whereby the
government promised to pay a lump sum to get them to agree. All the
public sector unions except the CRA union agreed.
In 2012, the Harper Government started to prepare for the 2014
round of bargaining. Prime Minister Harper decided the top priority
of his government in the collective bargaining round would be the
productivity of the public service, focusing on two issues:
1. requirement for mandatory, universal performance evaluations
2. reform of the design of the sick leave system due to the belief
it is abused by some long-term employees who built up a large
bank of unused sick days
However, in order to undertake these reforms, the government
realized it needed to reform the very structure and architecture of
collective bargaining itself in the federal public service. This brings
us directly to the 2013 omnibus budget Bill tabled Oct. 22, 2013,
which represented the most substantial change to the collective
bargaining regime since 1967.
Critics and supporters agreed it called for major structural
reforms to collective bargaining. Union supporters argued it “”aimed
at weakening the position of federal public sector unions and stacking
the deck in the Government’s favour”42 while Minister Clement
argued it was a rebalancing of power between government and unions
as the pendulum had swung too far in favour of the rights of unions
and union members against the interests of taxpayers and the greater
public good.
Specifically, according to the Treasury Board Secretariat, the
proposed amendments would modify the collective bargaining
process by43:
 allowing both parties to serve notice to bargain 12 months before
agreements expire;
 providing the employer with exclusive right to determine essential
services;
 establishing conciliation/strike as the default dispute resolution
mechanism. Arbitration will be the resolution mechanism only in
cases where bargaining units have 80 per cent or more of its positions
designated essential, or if both parties mutually consent to binding
arbitration;
 requiring public interest commissions and arbitration boards to give
greater consideration to recruitment and retention and Canada’s fiscal
circumstances over other factors, as well as considering all elements
of compensation, not just wages, when making awards or
recommendations;
 requiring public interest commissions and arbitration boards to set
out reasons when making awards and recommendations;
 requiring separate agencies to seek approval from the Treasury
Board President before consenting to binding arbitration; and
 eliminating the compensation analysis and research function of the
Public Service Labour Relations Board
Amendments have also been proposed to modernize and
streamline the recourse process in the federal public service by:
 handing allegations of employment-related discrimination
complaints only through the grievance process, rather than through
the Canadian Human Rights Commission;
 requiring bargaining agents and the employer to share expenses of
grievance adjudication;
 requiring employees to obtain bargaining agent support before
filing a grievance, except for grievances related to discrimination;
 streamlining the staffing complaints process;
 streamlining the policy grievances process;
 consolidating public service tribunals (Public Service Labour
Relations Board and the Public Service Staffing Tribunal)
These reforms surely can be characterized as root and branch
deconstruction and reconstruction. Most importantly of all these
major reforms involved the designation of essential services. By
resting control away from the requirement for joint agreement, the
employer asserted control of designation due to the government’s
singular accountability for Leviathan’s responsibility for the safety
and security of citizens (as Thomas Hobbes taught four centuries
ago).
The second most important reform was removing the
compensation, analysis and research function of the PSLRB, thereby
allowing the government to use outside research bodies such as
Mercer Consulting, Deliotte or McKinsey to ensure an independent
perspective from outside of government. The third important reform
was the requirement for public interest commissions and arbitration
boards to provide much greater weight to fiscal conditions of the day
and include all elements of compensation – not just wages – and
finally awards and judgments must be in writing with the rationale
provided. These three inter-related requirements for arbitration
awards represented a giant step forward in reining in boards that were
seen to make unjustifiable awards by ignoring economic conditions or
total compensation. The remainder of the changes were of importance
by, for example, eliminating jurisdiction shopping between the
Canadian Human Rights Commission and the PSLRB as well as
using grievances for purposes for which they were not intended.
When one steps back and examines these reforms in toto, it is
clear they represent a major departure from the past 45 years since
collective bargaining was introduced in 1967. More importantly, it
complements and supports the vision of the Harper government to
establish a smaller, more efficient, more accountable federal public
service.
CONCLUSIONS
This far too brief review reveals the Harper Government had a vision
of civil service reform from the moment it was elected. Indeed, the
very first bill it introduced was the Accountability Act that dealt with
conflict of interest, lobbying and of course the establishment of the
Parliamentary Budget Office. Over time, this vision has broadened to
include a smaller bureaucracy, fundamentally lower public service
compensation and a new balance of power between the employer and
public service unions. This could serve as a template as cash-strapped
provincial governments look to trim the compensation of their
employees.
While the strategic objective of the Harper government to
reduce the footprint of government was delayed by the financial crisis
that began in 2008-09, it was subsequently pursued aggressively not
only to eliminate the deficit brought about by the recession but to
adopt strategic and program review to reduce the share of government
in the economy. It was so successful it reduced it to the lowest level
since 1990.
However, the most important structural reforms introduced by
the Harper Government related to compensation and benefits and the
underlying collective bargaining system. By explicitly adopting
empirical comparability with private sector compensation and
benefits benchmarks, the government transformed Canadians’
understanding of public sector compensation. These reforms were
institutionalized by structural reforms to the entire federal collective
bargaining framework in an effort to rebalance the imbalance of
power that developed over the past 45 years in the federal public
service under successive liberal and conservative governments. In the
current climate of lower levels of economic growth, a rapidly aging
population and a dramatic reduction in the dependency ratio makes it
unlikely that any future government will reverse the reforms to the
federal collective bargaining regime.
While the Harper government put forward an aggressive reform
agenda in many policy areas since 2006, it is reasonable to argue that
the most important, long lasting and far reaching reforms of all were
the reforms to the federal public service in terms of accountability,
compensation and benefits, the footprint of the government relative to
the economy and structural reforms to federal collective bargaining.
__________________________
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Chapter 6
UNDER SIEGE: CANADIAN VETERANS, VETERANS
AFFAIRS AND THE HARPER LEGACY
Michael J. Prince and Pamela Moss
In future, when our servicemen and women leave our
military family, they can rest assured the Government will
help them and their families’ transition to civilian life. Our
troops’ commitment and service to Canada entitles them to
the very best treatment possible. This Charter is but a first
step towards according Canadian veterans the respect and
support they deserve.
- Prime Minister Stephen Harper, 20061
The recent decision by the Conservative government to
change the requirement for disabled veterans to prove their
injuries every three years instead of every year shows just
how badly the Conservatives are failing veterans and their
families.
- New Democratic Party Veterans Affairs critic Peter Stoffer, 20152
It’s ironic that the men and women who survive actual
combat must return home to suffer the death of a thousand
paper cuts, or slow strangulation by red tape, if you prefer.
- Elizabeth Renzetti, 20143
INTRODUCTION
In 2006, the New Veterans Charter (NVC) ushered in a new era as it
restructured the relationship between the state and its veterans.
Coming out from the umbrella of the Pension Act of 1919, the NVC
was intended to manage veterans’ transition to civilian life and
provide guidelines for providing services to, and compensation for,
injured and disabled veterans. Conceived, structured and drafted as a
living charter, the NVC was supposed to change as time and
experience revealed achievements and failures.
Yet discourses about support for veterans range from full state
support to bureaucratic stagnation. The official state line is, and has
always been, to provide veterans with the best support. Reports on
how veterans are faring indicate that access to services and benefits
has been either immobilized or deemed inadequate by governmental
offices, political pundits, veteran advocacy groups, and veterans
themselves.4 This juxtaposition between a ‘we take care of our own’
stance5 and the outcry from veterans,6 led us to examine the Harper
government’s record on the NVC and Canadian veterans.
The Prime Minister claims that the “vast majority” of veterans
do not take issue with his government’s policies on veterans support
and services.7 Yet there is substantial dissent among veterans,
evidenced by the general public awareness of the plight of Canadian
veterans and by the proliferation of veteran groups in social media
decrying government policy. The Prime Minister also maintains that
the traditional benefits afforded veterans are no longer needed for
new veterans coming home from Afghanistan.8 While he upholds the
NVC, he dismisses the fundamental covenant between veterans and
Canada in place for over a hundred years: veterans have served in
harm’s way at crucial points in their own lives and deserve the
nation’s support beyond what would be part of an employment
relationship.9 The rhetoric of a decrease in demand for some services
and a rapid increase for others frames government services as
commodities subject to the volatility of a market system operating
within the parameters of a bureaucracy. This rhetoric also treats
veterans as entities without (market) value and, having served their
purpose through service, as disposable.10
The Prime Minister, while avowing to address gaps in
programming, in keeping with the idea that the NVC is a living
charter, reduces the nation’s obligation to veterans to the
individualizing notion that “people are entitled to their views”.11 By
pursuing his own government’s practices of reducing government
support for marginalized groups of people and cutting costs in an
attempt to balance the budget, the Harper government is rejecting the
validity of existing and proposed programs for the support of
veterans.12 Time and again, his Minister of Veterans Affairs has been
called on publicly to justify cuts to programming, explain long wait
times for approval of benefits, and defend billion dollar clawbacks
when veterans do not have access to needed services or appropriate
programming.13
The Prime Minister’s mobilization of the discourse of Canada
as a militarist nation, through “support our troops” campaigns
alongside his own personal fascination with military history, runs
counter to what is happening on the ground. Many veterans feel
abandoned by the Government of Canada. They and their families are
at a loss as to what to do with the challenges they face financially,
physically, and emotionally. Living in a state of being forsaken, they
continually come under attack by bureaucrats, retired military
personnel, and Veteran Affairs Canada, for speaking out, seeking
financial assistance, and asking for help. Refused benefits for
treatment, rebuked for being angry, and insulted by government
officials, many veterans must endure obstructive tactics, in effect
closing off gateways to potential support and to restrict the
manoeuverability of veterans seeking help.
The 2014 closure of nine Veterans Affairs offices, primarily in
non-centralized metropolitan areas, shifted the terms of engagement
and prompted a flurry of negative reactions with many quarters
calling for the dismissal of Julian Fantino, Minister of Veteran Affairs
Canada. But the offensive continued and veterans struggled, often in
isolation, especially for those seeking mental health services.
Masculine norms of the military directed service personnel to respect
one’s place in the hierarchy and psychiatric and medical views placed
blame for emotional breakdown outside military service on either
previous trauma or on weak, individual constitutions.14 Reflection on
the years of the Harper government’s policy on veterans shows that
the perception that veterans are under attack seems true; on the
ground, Canadian veterans are under siege.
In order to examine the troubled relationship between Canadian
veterans and the federal government over the Harper prime
ministerial years, we first describe the context within which veterans
are served by the Canadian state through the Department of National
Defence and Veterans Affairs Canada. We then present the unsettling
aspects of the beleaguered portfolio of Canadian veterans. We next
turn to a discussion of the special relationship between veterans and a
nation, followed by a critique of the New Veterans Charter. We close
with comments on what lies on the horizon for veterans under siege.
BACKGROUND
Veterans and their families occupy a unique position within the
Canadian state. Both the Department of National Defense (DND)
through the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF)15 and Veterans Affairs
Canada (VAC) have roles to play in the daily affairs of veterans. The
CAF oversees the initial transitioning of veterans into civilian life.
For those eligible veterans, that is, those with either honourable duty
or medical release, support is mostly limited to employment
opportunities. Skills are cross-checked with various occupations and
vocational training programs. Resources, organized by region, are
available through Integrated Personnel Support Centres (IPSCs) and
are aimed at providing access to a range of programs and benefits,
including, for example, vocational rehabilitation and return to work
programs, home modifications for injured CAF personnel and
reservists, next of kin death benefits, medical expenses, and disability
benefits.16 There is also a priority hiring in the public sector for
veterans who meet essential qualifications.17
Once the transition begins, veterans come under the purview of
VAC. Veterans Affairs Canada oversees a multitude of programs
designed to provide support for and memory of veterans as they
continue through their life course, whether transitioned or retired. All
support programs for veterans without medical release, that is to say
veterans with disabilities and those in need of mental health services,
are run through the VAC. The two key programs, the Disability
Benefits Program and the Rehabilitation Services and Vocational
Assistance Program govern the dispensing of state funds to
individuals. The Disability Benefits Program is the primary venue
through which veterans get support through pension, awards, and
allowances. A veteran diagnosed with a disabling condition or has
acquired a service-related disability fills out and submits for review
an application that is assessed through two major tools: the Table of
Disabilities (TOD) through which a veteran is assigned an
impairment rating with regard to the relevance and severity of the
condition or disability and the Entitlement Eligibility Guidelines
(EEGs) on how to assess the relevance of the diagnosis to military
service which is arranged by diagnostic category and based on
national and international medical research.
The Rehabilitation Program provides three types of assistance:
medical, psychosocial, and vocational. Medical services are
composed of numerous specialties, ranging from orthopaedic
surgeons in rehabilitation medicine to psychiatrists specializing in
trauma. Psychosocial services are made accessible to support
individual veterans adjust to and cope with physical disabilities in
order to live as a civilian. Vocational services support veterans to
hone existing skills and possible gain new ones to access employment
opportunities and provide financial stability for their families.
There are joint ventures between the DND and VAC,
particularly through the office of Director Casualty Support
Management (e.g., IPSCs). There are seven Operational Trauma and
Stress Support Centres (OTSSC) serving veterans, set up in 1999, that
focus on the medical aspects of trauma and stress. Operational Stress
Injury Support Services Centres (OSISS) grew out of a peer support
system established by veterans of the 1990s armed conflicts in
Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. There is a high degree of mutual
support among private and non-profit organizations with VAC,
particularly in the sense of rallying around the troops, supporting
troops while deployed, and welcoming the troops home. Some groups
reproduce the camaraderie of service (Canadian Army Veteran
Motorcycle Units), others advocate for veterans rights (The Canadian
Veterans Advocacy), while still others link veterans to potential
employers (Helmets to Hardhats). Many groups, however, target
service provision as part of their mission statement; they identify gaps
in available services and flaws in the designed programs to meet
those needs (Wounded Warriors). In a sense, these organizations are
extensions of the state: they act as informal information offices, as
central nodes among veteran networks, and as service providers.
HOW VETERANS ARE FARING
Some veterans seeking assistance for themselves and in some cases
their families, fare better than others. A bi-ministerial support system
complicates veteran support. Program provisioning is through two
budgets (FY 2014-15 estimates for DND at around $19 billion and
VAC just under $3.6 billion), for two sets of clientele (injured,
disabled, and transitioning to civilian life veterans and retired
veterans, who may be injured or disabled with some support to their
families). It involves two sets of program policies and procedures
(with competing eligibility requirements for rehabilitative equipment,
assistive devices, and income supports), and under two sets of
priorities (national defense and support for a group of ex-CAF
members and their families). Navigating such an unwieldy
bureaucracy necessitates guidance through members of the
bureaucracy itself, that is, transition counsellors and case workers
assigned and accessed through local VAC offices. Veterans also work
with advocates who are outside the bureaucracy yet know it very
well.
Alcoholism, substance use, and steady employment are known
challenges, especially for veterans with mental health problems.18
Housing, too, is problematic for veterans and, although data on
homelessness and veterans are limited in Canada, the number of
homeless veterans seems to be on the rise. In a report on
homelessness across five sites in Canada, just over 4% of those
surveyed identified as veterans,19 translating roughly to 92 veterans.
The City of Toronto estimates indicate a rising homeless veteran
population, from 35 in 2009-2010 to 235 in 2014.20 Today, the City
of Toronto estimates about 368 veterans are either living on the street
or are staying in shelters (about 7% of all homeless).21 All these
numbers are likely to be underestimates. Although not noted in this
research, many of the veterans who are homeless also deal with
mental health issues. Were it not for private organizations such as the
Royal Canadian Legion, Wounded Warriors, or Veterans Emergency
Transition Services Canada (VETS), as well as family and friends
providing spare bedrooms and couches, homelessness rates for
veterans would probably be higher.22
Veterans needing access to mental health care are having
difficulty accessing appropriate services. One of the most common
and frustrating snags veterans come across is around eligibility. The
scheduled (or expected) wait for an eligibility assessment for claims
for the Disability Benefits Program (using the TOD and EEGs) can be
up to 32 weeks.23 A negative assessment leads to appeals, some of
which have been in process for decades.24 Being denied access to
services is especially problematic for those seeking mental health
support because a lack of immediate help can exacerbate illness
which may have tragic consequences. A high profile suicide case
highlights the effects of how eligibility requirements play out in an
individual veteran’s life. Corporal Stuart Langridge, who served both
in Bosnia and Afghanistan, committed suicide after seeking treatment
for his post-traumatic stress. Because his condition was deemed non-
military-related, continuing services and long-term help were out of
his reach. Langridge’s family is struggling with the military police as
part of the Canadian state over several aspects of his case. Central to
their claim is that Langridge was dismissed by those in positions of
authority over him as a “drunk and drug user.”25 A recent report into
the mental health of CAF members showed an astonishing lifetime
rate of 48.4% for mental and alcohol disorders, including depression,
generalized anxiety disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, and panic
disorder as well as alcohol dependence and abuse.26 Without this
recognition, many CAF members are being, and will continue to be,
turned away, much like Langridge was.
The central element of the relationship between veterans and
the state comprises individual veterans, their families, and their post-
service lives. This focus on individuals and their close family
relationships infuses veteran discourses – both within the state and
among veterans themselves – which often treat the relationship
between the state and veterans as separate from any other relationship
that either the state or the veteran has. One effect of this focus has
been the establishment of the NVC; another has been the blurring of
possible connections to wider policy initiatives. For example, wider
economic policy in response to economic crises coinciding with the
introduction of the NVC has resulted in austerity measures that are
taking a toll on new Canadian veterans. The golden ring of a triple-A
credit rating for Canada has come on the backs of veterans, with
reneges on the promise of support and opportunities once returned to
civilian life. Since 2006, veteran benefits, and their lives, have been
transformed.
Table 6.1. Comparing Canada’s Veteran Financial Benefit
Regimes
Program
area Pension Act New Veterans Charter
Legislative
basis
Pension Act R.S.C., 1985, c.P-6
War Veterans Allowance Act,
R.S.C. 1985, c. W-3
Canadian Forces Members and Veterans
Re-establishment and Compensation Act
S.C. 2005, c. 21
Enhanced New Veterans Charter Act S.C.
2011, c. 12
Basic
disability
support
Disability Pension: non-taxable
monthly benefit until one year
after death
Disability Award: non-taxable lump-sum
payment or annual instalment of the sum
over a number of years
Other
disability
allowances
Exceptional Incapacity
Allowance: non-taxable monthly
benefit for life based on disability
assessment
Clothing Allowance: non-taxable
monthly benefit paid for life to
veterans with a disability benefit
on account of amputations or
other impairments
Permanent Impairment Allowance: taxable
monthly benefit for life for those in receipt
of a disability benefit and in VAC
approved rehabilitation services
Permanent Impairment Allowance
Supplement: taxable monthly payment for
those deemed incapable of suitable gainful
employment
Clothing Allowance: taxable monthly
benefit paid for life to veterans with a
disability benefit on account of
amputations or other impairments
Service Income Security
Insurance Long Term Disability:
monthly payment for veterans if
total income is less than 75% of
pre-release military income
Canadian Forces Superannuation:
payments to all CAF members
with 10 years or more service and
medically released, based on years
Earnings Loss Benefit: taxable monthly
benefit until age 65 of 75% of pre-release
military salary, and must be in VAC
rehabilitation services (available also to
qualified surviving spouses and
dependents) 
Canadian Forces Superannuation: monthly
annuity payments to all CAF members
with 10 years or more service and
Earnings-
related
benefits
of service and pre-release salary medically released, based on years of
service and pre-release military salary 
Canadian Forces Income Support: non-
taxable monthly benefit to veterans (and
their surviving spouse and dependent
children) with low-household income,
under age 65 and searching for suitable
gainful employment
Supplementary Retirement Benefit: taxable
lump-sum payment at age 65 to veterans in
receipt of the Earnings Loss Benefit
Family-
based
benefits
Spousal Pension: non-taxable
monthly pension until one year
after death
Children’s Pension: non-taxable
monthly benefit based on number
of children and age (up to age 25
if in post-secondary education)
Attendant Allowance: non-taxable
monthly benefit for assistance to
veterans with daily living
Family Support: can include educational
grants for surviving children
Survivor
benefits
Survivor Benefit: Non-taxable
monthly pension beginning one
year after veteran’s death
Death Benefit: non-taxable lump-sum
payment if veteran died during or within
30 days of military service, also for
dependent children under 18 or under 25 if
attending school or an adult child
prevented from earning a living due to
physical or mental incapacity
Captivity
benefits
Prisoner of War Compensation:
non-taxable monthly pension for
life if a POW for three months or
more
Detention Benefit: non-taxable lump-sum
payment paid at release from an enemy or
opposing force
War Veterans Allowance: non-  
Income
assistance
taxable monthly support to low-
income veterans at age 60 or if
permanently unemployable or
their survivors at age 55 with
additional amounts for each
dependent child or orphan
Source: Developed by the authors from information on various Government of Canada web
sites.
Comparing the two veteran financial benefit regimes – the
Pension Act and the NVC – reveals a relative, although significant
series of changes, toward an economic understanding of individual
military service, contribution to society, and impairment. One such
change is the move away from financial assistance for family
members (spousal and children’s pensions) to a focus on individual
veterans. A related change is a shift toward family-centred services,
rather than cash benefits, in the form of counselling, child care and
mental health supports. The passive support of disability insurance
pensions was replaced by more active support within the wider
economy in terms of education, rehabilitation, training and job search
assistance. Under the NVC, more financial benefits are treated as
taxable income.
Yet, most significantly, veterans no longer receive life-long
pensions. Depending on the type and severity of impairment, the
latter measured in percentages of what constitutes normal (through
the TOD), veterans are paid a disability award, a certain amount of
money, and then left to live off that money for a lifetime. They are
placed back into the model of a pension being tied to employment
history. Even with the knowledge that veterans face hardships around
secure employment, chronic illness, and mental health challenges
over their lifespan, the state continues to pursue short-term vision of
balancing the budget by cutting recurring costs through reducing
financial support and restricting access to services – a strategy used to
cut costs in other social programming in other ministries. This policy
harms veterans by putting in place mechanisms that further distance
the state from its veterans, encircling them into a web of bureaucratic
practices that enhances the careworn status of veterans and their
families.
A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP IN WHICH DISAGREEMENTS
ABOUND
When introduced in May 2005, Senator Roméo Dallaire called the
NVC “a new social contract between the people of Canada and the
new generation of veterans of the Canadian Forces.”27 The NVC, as
explained by an advisory group to the federal government, “reinforces
the social contract between Canadians and the members of the
Canadian Forces. Veterans are different from the average citizen –
because of their willingness to put their lives on the line to serve their
country and because of the long-term impact of military service on
their health. The New Veterans Charter also acknowledges the crucial
role of families in Veterans’ lives. It commits Canada to fulfill its part
of the social contract: to provide programs and services that will
promote wellness among Veterans and their families, help Veterans
reintegrate into civilian life, and enable them to reach their full
potential. This is a major commitment that must be honoured in
full.”28
Whether this special relationship, or social contract, is being
honoured has become a fundamental judicial challenge and a heated
political issue nationally. As a test of the special status of veterans in
Canadian society, six Canadian soldiers injured in Afghanistan are
seeking certification of a class action lawsuit on behalf of hundreds, if
not thousands, of injured soldiers who applied for disability benefits
after April 2006, when the NVC took effect. These veterans claim
that the NVC ignores the longstanding special relationship between
veterans and the Canadian government by providing less in disability
pensions and support for their families than previous veterans. For
these so-called new veterans (post-2006), nothing less than the
honour of the Crown, a constitutional principle, is at stake. Federal
lawyers counter, arguing “the government’s duty to give special
protections to one citizen category only applies as a legal principle in
the aboriginal context. They maintain that issues raised by the
veterans should be addressed by parliament and not in the court.”29
This legal case is about both constitutional and parliamentary
politics. With regard to constitutional law, determining the role of a
class action against the federal government and the honour of the
Crown as understood in this context as the nation’s debt of gratitude
and duty of care entails the re-establishment of veterans and their
families as special citizens in need of special treatment. For veterans,
the only route to equality is through the re-attainment of these special
rights. The lawsuit is now on hold. Veterans, in an attempt to work
with the government, have decided to see how the changes being
introduced in 2015 will play out.30 Yet even without a case in court,
left in the British Columbia Court of Appeals, the legal fight will
most likely play out for many years given the transformation of
veterans’ lives under the NVC.
With regard to the Canadian government, the site of
parliamentary supremacy, the issue of a social contract is, in 2015, the
stuff of national electoral politics. Since at least March 2013, when a
Senate subcommittee on veterans affairs noted “the absence of a
clear, universally agreed ‘social contract’ between the people of
Canada, represented by their government, on one hand, and Canadian
Forces members and veterans on the other,” there has been strife.31
Neither the Veterans Bill of Rights nor the NVC seemed to be
fulfilling the void ‘new’ veterans were navigating. Indeed, the
tremendous increase in the number of private veterans organizations
over the Harper years indicate that not all veteran needs are being
met. Without clarity over the meaning of such a social contract,
“disagreements and misunderstanding abound.”32 The Senate
subcommittee thus recommended that the Harper government “table a
document that articulates and promotes the social contract between
the people of Canada and their veterans.”33
The government document and hoped-for parliamentary
discussion on the social contract was dead in the water. Just over a
year later, in June 2014, the House of Commons Standing Committee
on Veterans Affairs recommended that “the Veterans Bill of Rights
be included in the New Veterans Charter and in the Pension Act, and
that a modified version of section 2 of the Pension Act be
incorporated into the New Veterans Charter, and read as follows:
’The provisions of this Act shall be liberally construed and interpreted
to the end that the recognized solemn obligation of the people and
Government of Canada to provide compensation to those members of
the forces who have been disabled or have died as a result of military
service, and to their dependants, may be fulfilled.’”34 In October
2014, the Harper government responded cautiously in a selective and
imprecise manner, confirming that “it will introduce legislation to
amend the New Veterans Charter with a construction clause in line
with that of the Pension Act which has served Canadian Veterans
since shortly after the First World War.”35
This lukewarm response from the Prime Minister framed the
views of the new Minister of Veteran Affairs, Erin O’Toole, who
replaced Julian Fantino in January 2015. Minister O’Toole refused to
acknowledge clearly that the Canadian government has a moral,
social, legal, and fiduciary responsibility to Canadian veterans.
Instead, O’Toole echoed the timeworn talking points that support for
the veterans is important, that the Harper Conservatives have invested
further resources in the portfolio, that while there is a recognized
obligation it is not frozen in time, and the evolving needs of new
veterans must be met.36 In February 2015, the Veterans Ombudsman,
Guy Parent, expressed disappointment that the Minister and
department had yet to provide details of fixing substantive
deficiencies of the NVC, especially regarding income support.37
These efforts are merely plugging holes in the panoply of inadequate
government programming. As a consequence, ill and injured veterans
and their families continue to wait, writhe, and agonize over what
fallout will come with the next onslaught of veiled disclosures,
broken promises, and so-called mandatory cuts.38
CRITIQUE OF THE NEW VETERAN’S CHARTER
Over the initial years of implementing the NVC – all under the
Harper government – experience from 2006 to 2010 has stoked
various concerns with the delivery of and apparent gaps in provision.
Although the intention of the NVC places veterans as valuable assets
to the country, the implementation of the Charter is not in the spirit of
generosity. Studies and evaluations on the NVC were produced by
VAC and the Special Needs Advisory Group to the department as
well as the New Veterans Charter Advisory Group. The House of
Commons Standing Committee on Veterans produced four major
reports on PTSD and services, health care, financial benefits, and the
Charter during this time. The Royal Canadian Legion and other
veteran organizations passed resolutions generally supporting the
NVC but also calling for further improvements in the spirit of the
Charter as a living document. Veterans Affairs Canada recognized
there are “critical gaps in its provisions, specifically a need for greater
financial security for particular groups, including the most seriously
disabled.”39 There are ongoing concerns that Canadian war veterans
and eligible CAF veterans are not receiving benefits and services in a
fair and timely manner.40
Much of the dissatisfaction with the NVC centres on policies
and practices of stratified provision. The NVC intentionally
introduced a marked departure from the Pension Act regime of
benefits and services, as summarized in Table 1. In crucial respects,
the new veterans are eligible for fewer financial benefits than older
war veterans who are not governed by the NVC. Yet some old
veterans are being transferred into the NVC because of the timing of a
claim. From within this dual-system approach flow differential and
competing provisions. The most significant difference, both
materially and in symbolic terms, is that under the Pension Act
regime, a disabled veteran is entitled to a pension for life while under
the NVC a disabled veteran is eligible for a disability award as a
lump-sum payment to a maximum of $250,000. One obvious concern
is that the significant divergence between the two approaches, with
new veterans with severe disabilities receiving notably less financial
support over a veteran’s lifetime compared to the Pension Act.41
There is also the issue of lump-sum payments at risk of being
inadequately saved, mismanaged, or poorly invested due to factors
that may well be beyond the control of the disabled veteran. Such
outcomes result in an insecure flow of income support, increasing the
risk of financial hardship and poverty as well as of inadequate support
for living with a disability.42This shift squarely locates a veteran
within the regular workforce, subjects payment for military service to
the same volatility of the market, and denies the special relationship
veterans have with the Canadian state.
As a partial response, new legislation, Enhancements to the
New Veterans Charter Act, came into effect in October 2011.
Changes aimed at providing improved financial support for those
most seriously injured or ill veterans. Enhancements included more
flexible payment options for those receiving a Disability Award, as
well as 90 days to choose a preferred payment option. For those who
choose the new payment option, payments are spread out over a
longer period of time instead of in one lump-sum. With these changes
and enhancements, the Harper government committed $189 million
between 2011-12 and 2015-16.43 As a result of these particular
improvements to the NVC, more Canadian Forces Veterans are
participating in VAC programs.44
Close attention to the NVC’s implementation continued
throughout 2012 to 2015 with further studies by the House of
Commons Standing Committee on Veterans, a report by the Standing
Senate Sub-committee on Veteran Affairs, a series of reports by the
Veterans Ombudsman on improving the NVC, and, perhaps most
damning, a performance audit report in November 2014 by the
Auditor General of Canada on long-term mental health disability
benefits. The audit found that between 2006 and 2014 of the 15,385
veterans who applied for long-term mental health disability benefits,
nearly one in four (3,684) were denied benefits; of those denied, only
about one-third challenged the initial decision. A number of these
veterans waited between six months and three years to find out if they
qualified for those benefits; some veterans waited between three to
more than seven years for a favourable decision. Of VAC, the
Auditor General observed that “the department doesn’t really seem to
have spent time looking at the process from the point of view of the
veteran.”45
In a classic political move of issue management, the Harper
government announced, days before release of the Auditor General’s
report that an additional $200 million for mental health care over the
next five or six years was being allocated to veterans programs. This
announcement failed in trying to get ahead of the issue. It soon came
to light that this new funding would be expended over a much longer
period, up to 50 years to cover long-term benefits.46
Criticism of how the Harper government has treated veterans
goes beyond the NVC as such, including a weak minister, the closure
of several local VAC offices, lapsed spending on programs (see Table
6.2), and downsizing of staff in the department (see Table 6.3) in the
name of less bureaucracy and faster, more efficient services. There is
also the growing role of charitable organizations in provision of
fundamental supports to veterans and their families and the
contracting out to a private insurance company the treatment
authorization process for physiotherapy and psychological services
for veterans, among other benefits.47
Table 6.2. Budgeting and Spending by Veteran Affairs Canada
Fiscal
Year
Total Budgetary
Expenditures (millions $)
Lapsed
Expenditures
(millions $)
Lapsed48 as a share of
annual spending (%)
2000-
01
2,108.6 30.9 1.46
2001-
02
2,246.5 16.1 0.71
2002-
03
2,475.1 50.9 2.05
2003-
04
2,582.9 71.9 2.78
2004-
05
2,695.3 111.7 4.14
    
2005-
06
2,881.4 20.8 0.72
2006-
07
3,027.9 270.7 8.94
2007-
08
3,196.4 246.1 7.70
2008-
09
3,533.2 115.4 3.44
2009-
10
3,412.2 118.8 3.48
    
2010-
11
3,515.3 41.1 1.12
2011-
12
3,509.8 171.6 4.89
2012-
13
3,498.1 173.2 4.95
2013-
14
3,525.0 166.4 4.72
2014-
15
3,577.0   
Sources: 2000-01 to 2013-14 are actual expenditures from Public Accounts of Canada and
2014-15 are planned expenditures from Veteran Affairs Canada Report on Plans and
Priorities.
With such policy decisions and a managerial discourse of
streamlining services, neoliberalism has truly arrived in the veterans’
portfolio. A key role of VAC is making individual veterans with
trauma or other injuries fit for participation in wider civil society
through the labour force. In an important sense, this is a longstanding
function of the department, but recent policy developments suggest
that relations between veterans and the Canadian government are
being restructured, with seemingly more emphasis on individual
responsibility and less on collective obligations. Cuts come in many
forms. The contrast between non-profits filling in the gaps and private
for-profit companies delivering services serves the interests of the
state and not the veterans. Revamping life-long pensions into lump-
sums set new veterans up as small businesses rather than citizens. The
unkindest cut of all was when federal lawyers argued in a court of
appeal that the federal government had no special relationship or
moral commitment towards Canadian soldiers and veterans.
Table 6.3. Human Resources of the Veterans Affairs Portfolio,
2006-07 - 2015-16, Full-Time Equivalents (FTEs)
Fiscal
Year
Veterans Affairs
Canada
Office of the Veterans
Ombudsman
Veterans Review and
Appeal Board Total
2006-07 3,695   3,695
2007-08 3,859   3,859
2008-09 4,039   4,039
2009-10 3,947   3,947
2010-11 3,708 45 108 3,861
2011-12 3,577 47 108 3,732
2012-13 3,328 44 107 3,479
2013-14 3,050 35 104 3,189
2014-15 2,796 38 110 2,944
2015-16 2,755 38 108 2,901
Sources: Figures for 2006-07 to 2013-14 are actuals from Departmental Performance Reports
of Veterans Affairs and the Veterans Review and Appeal Board. Figures for 2014-15 and
2015-16 are planned resources from the 2014-15 Report on Plans and Priorities for Veterans
Affairs and the Veterans Review and Appeal Board.
In the first Harper government of 2006-08, with the launch of
the NVC in 2006 and creation of the Office of the Veterans
Ombudsman in 2007, Veterans Affairs grew in human resources
reaching a high of 4,039 FTEs in 2008-09 (see Table 6.3). Since then,
staffing for the portfolio has declined by 28 per cent. As part of the
second Harper government’s budget austerity program, the target
reduction to occur in Veterans Affairs Canada over 2010-11 to 2015-
16 was approximately 800 FTEs, which appears to be exceeded in
projections, reaching a planned overall reduction of around 950
FTEs.49 Noteworthy, too, is that the Office of the Veterans
Ombudsman and the Veterans Review and Appeal Board, both arms-
length and independent offices, have not been immune from staffing
restraints, especially, in relative terms, the Office of the Veterans
Ombudsman.
Early in 2015, the Veterans Ombudsman noted with
satisfaction that progress was being made with the NVC in regard to
improving transition support, counseling and training, and access to
family services. At the same time, the Ombudsman voiced
disappointment that substantive deficiencies with the NVC remain
unresolved. To ensure the NVC suitably supports veterans and their
families, the Ombudsman identifies five priorities that need to be
addressed: financial security after age 65; better access to allowances
for those with the greatest need; income support equity for veterans
who served as reservists; better support for families; and improved
income support during rehabilitation and transition.50 In response, the
Harper government, rather than addressing the situation as a whole, is
releasing cosmetic tweaks to a broken system. Veterans now need
only confirm loss of limb every three years, and moderately and
severely injured veterans have a guaranteed pension once they reach
65.51 That these changes are heralded as committed support for
veterans by a declared pro-military government demonstrates just
how flawed the NVC is in practice.
CONCLUSIONS
Our central argument in this chapter has been that CAF members and
veterans are under siege. Rhetoric of a strong Canadian nation united
against terrorism and the bleak reality of veterans who are suffering
psychologically and emotionally as a result of doing the nation’s
bidding disturbs the quiescent image of security Canadians desire in
uncertain times.52 For CAF members, there is still considerable
stigma of disclosing an injury or illness, especially, within a
masculine and militaristic setting, one dealing with mental health and
trauma.53 For some CAF members there is the experience of being
medically released before 10 years of service and thus ineligible for a
pension. For Afghan veterans there is a stark legacy of living in the
reality of depression, fighting against despair, coping with PTSD, and
contemplating suicide. The high stakes for developing PTSD and
living life-long trauma are staggering. Yet it is not only veterans with
PTSD that are under attack; a great many veterans are besieged: those
facing disability as a result of a range mental health challenges, those
with physical impairments that have been fixed through
rehabilitation, those with families to support, those who are
precariously employed, and those who have yet to live through the
effects of long-term stress of having served in the armed forces.54
Through the Harper years, the VAC portfolio has undergone a
series of transformations. Numerically, contemporary veterans now
outnumber the traditional veterans from the Second World War and
Korean War. Programmatically, the NVC endeavours to move from a
disability income approach to more of an economic model based on
rehabilitation and (re)entry to the labour market. Culturally, the
department is adopting more neoliberal practices and discourse in
dealing with veterans and their families. Fiscally, the government has
cut spending and services through restructuring programs, contracting
administrative processes, and closing offices. And, politically, the
policy community has become more vocal and assertive, through
public protests and media statements, lawsuits and class action
litigation, and the emergence of new grassroots advocacy groups for
modern veterans. Although the NVC represents a major shift in the
design of and eligibility for several benefits and services, and thus the
character of support to veterans and their families, that shift is shaped
by the expectations and claims of new veterans and their grasp of the
policies and practices of the Pension Act. This indicates how policy
legacies influence the discursive shift within the NVC; in this case,
the key legacy is understood as a fundamental covenant and social
contract between veterans and Canada in place for a hundred years.
As no mere imaginary construct, this legacy is a long series of
concrete public policies and institutionalized practices of provision.
The Harper Conservative government is laying siege to
veterans by systematically relinquishing its responsibility to honour
its special relationship to veterans and provide suitable support for a
group of citizens whose sole purpose is to serve the interests of the
state. Transforming veterans into opponents through a modern-day
siege is likely to erode the very foundation upon which the state
relies. Yet the production of veterans continues unabated as the prime
minister attempts to buoy the image of Canada as a militarist state by
ordering sorties against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
(ISIL), offering to train Ukrainian troops, and contemplating sending
ground troops to Syria.
Veterans and their families through their service organizations
and advocacy groups are advancing claims for social justice on a
number of fronts. They are calling for equitable compensation for
injuries and disabilities; they are asking for equality of treatment
through the principle of “one veteran, one standard” in regards to all
federal government programs; they are expecting the adequate
provision for those in need of mental health services, access to
education grants, survivor pensions, family support, and disability
income; and, they are demanding effective and respectful
administration, that protects the privacy of clients, and fair and timely
procedures in all their dealings with DND and VAC. Amidst the
smoke and fall of new announcements, lest we forget, these claims
are what veterans are due.
__________________________
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Chapter 7
THE ISLAMIC STATE: IS CANADA ‘DOING THE RIGHT
THING’?
Ruby Dagher
INTRODUCTION
The Islamic State (IS) is a Sunni (Wahhabi) Muslim extremist entity
that is in control of a sizeable portion of Iraq and Syria. IS members
have committed many heinous crimes against fellow Sunni Muslims,
Shiite Muslims, Christians, and other minorities. They have also
undertaken the largest religious and ethnic cleansing campaign in
recent history.1 In October 2014, after spending more than USD $759
million in development assistance from 2003 until 2013, Canada
joined Operation IMPACT, the military coalition against IS, and
reinvigorated its delivery of humanitarian assistance to suffering
Iraqis.
This chapter assesses Canada’s contribution to the offensive
against IS and argues that Canada’s contribution is inadequate if
Canada wants to degrade, destabilise, and weaken IS so as “to protect
the vulnerable and innocent civilians of the region”2, including those
pertaining to vulnerable religious and ethnic minorities. The analysis
presented herein also demonstrates that these contributions are
unlikely to significantly reduce “the risks presented from the territory
in which it [IS] operates … [t]o those of other similar ungoverned
spaces in the broader region”.3
To accomplish this task, the chapter begins by presenting the
theoretical premise on which the arguments are built. As such, the
chapter opens with a presentation of the theory of performance
legitimacy and the role that basic social services play in conflict and
post-conflict states. With the theoretical argument made, attention
then turns to assessing the focus of Canada’s post-conflict agenda in
Iraq from 2003 until 2013. With a better understanding of the
importance of the delivery of basic goods and services in post-conflict
states and the post-conflict agenda for Iraq, the discussion then
focuses on IS, the sources of its success, and the role that service
delivery has played in its propaganda agenda. Finally, the discussion
comes back to Canada’s current role in Iraq and its response to IS.
The chapter closes with a subsequent analysis of Canada’s
contribution to the fight against IS, the gap in Canada’s response, and
the implications for Iraqis and Canadians alike.
DEFINING PERFORMANCE LEGITIMACY
Legitimacy is earned by an actor through its relationship with a
targeted group. This legitimacy allows the ‘legitimizee’ (actor) to act
on behalf of the ‘legitimizers’ (members of the population). It also
forms the base of the social contract between members of the
population and the actor where the ‘legitimizers’ and the ‘legitimizee’
agree to reciprocal behaviour. There are four major sources of
legitimacy: process or input legitimacy (as defined by democratic
political and administrative systems4, performance or output
legitimacy, shared beliefs or feelings of citizenship or community,
and international recognition of the sovereignty and legitimacy of the
state. Each source can work to reinforce the other, although all four
do not have to exist concurrently. For example, Somaliland enjoys
three out of four sources of legitimacy with international recognition
being the exception while North Korea lacks process legitimacy due
to its undemocratic political system.
By definition, process legitimacy depends on the political
system, international recognition depends on the international state
system, and shared beliefs depend on the population’s feelings of a
common sense of nationhood. As for performance legitimacy, it
depends on the delivery of basic goods and services. Performance
legitimacy is earned when the ‘legitimizee’ provides for the welfare
of citizens or a specific group of people (‘legitimizers’)5. While
desires can vary from person to person, each individual requires a
minimum level of goods and services to meet their most basic daily
needs. These include basic health care, water, sanitation, electricity,
education, traffic, roads, security, and basic justice. In essence, the
more the object responds to the basic needs of the subjects, the higher
the likelihood that the subjects will find the object legitimate. As
Inbal and Lerner note: “To the degree that governments provided
needed or desired services to the people … the people are likely to
support the government’s right to govern... and comply with the rule
of law and to submit voluntarily to the government’s authority”.6
In summary, performance legitimacy does not depend on the
type of political system in the country. It is at the core of the
relationship between the state and the citizens as well as between the
leaders and their constituencies. Moreover, unlike process legitimacy
and international recognition, performance legitimacy is not exclusive
to the state. It can be imparted on people, groups, and states. This lack
of exclusivity introduces an important variable when a government,
even a democratic one, has knowingly or unknowingly, intentionally
or unintentionally ignored a portion of its population.
As it relates to post-conflict settings, the legitimacy of the post-
conflict state is often contested, at least as it pertains to a portion of
the population, and the relationship between the state and the
population is precarious. Moreover, unlike democratic states, post-
conflict states do not “derive their capacity and legitimacy from a
long history of interaction between state and society.7 They and their
democratically-elected governments tend to continue to face crises of
legitimacy, even after modelling their institutions and policies on
democratic systems and structures.8 Moreover, given that “[s]tates
exist not only because they are successful in generating positive
payoffs for a majority of the citizens, but also because a degree of
loyalty binds citizens to the state” 9, post-conflict states struggle to
effectively demonstrate their relevance and importance to all of their
citizens.
Equally important though, conflict leads to the rise in groups10
that have taken over the role of the state in the areas under their
influence and have offered much-needed support during the difficult
times of conflict and early post-conflict stages. These events often
lead to competition for relevance, loyalty, and legitimacy between the
state, the existing indigenous structures, and the above-mentioned
groups.11 Therefore, even with the establishment of democratic
systems, including elections and the rule of law, alternative centres of
authority actively compete with the young post-conflict state for
loyalty and legitimacy. When these alternative actors are successful,
their level of legitimacy allows them to constitute a ‘state’ within a
state (e.g. regional warlords in Afghanistan and Hezbollah in
Lebanon).12 As such, the de-legitimization crises and the ever present
competition for legitimacy have led governments and leaders in
developing countries to recognise that the state’s legitimacy rests
more on its ability to provide its citizens with basic goods and
services and less on sovereignty and elections (elements of process
legitimacy).13
Still, many authors, including Inbal and Lerner cited earlier,
have argued for the need to establish process legitimacy through a
democratic system in order to then ensure distribution of basic social
goods and services and equal access to them. While this argument
presents a very important finding regarding equality and access, it
omits the fact that (a) performance legitimacy is not exclusive to the
state, (b) process legitimacy takes significant time to materialise in
order to ensure equal representation and access to basic goods and
services, and (c) other groups can step into the social services vacuum
and present challenges to the democratic development agenda. More
crucially, as the cases of many post-conflict countries demonstrate, no
such process will follow a straight line from assistance to
achievement without any regression or ‘hiccups’. These ‘hiccups’,
including a feeling of alienation by certain groups, represent
opportunities for non-state actors to earn performance legitimacy,
compete with the government and, as the case of IS demonstrates,
destabilise the state and the country. Finally, while both process and
performance legitimacy require capacity, investment in the
government’s delivery of basic goods and services can be a good first
step to minimizing the basic goods and service vacuum and limiting
or weakening the competition for legitimacy. This can be done in
congruence with building democracies and equal representation.
As it relates to Iraq, even though the Iraqi conflict did not
contribute significantly to the destruction of state physical
infrastructure and the de-legitimisation of the state’s political and
administrative institutions per se, the following factors played a
significant role in weakening the state’s legitimacy:
(a) Increased basic needs: The sanctions that were placed on Iraq
prior to the 2003 invasion had done significant damage to the
economy and led to an increase in the suffering of ordinary
Iraqis; 14
(b) Decreased state capacity: The removal of any remnants of
Saddam Hussein’s power and party through the ‘de-
ba’athification’ process led to the removal of a significant
percentage of experienced state employees;15
(c) Exclusion: The exclusion of minorities, Sunnis, and some
Shiites from the delivery of basic goods and services
(including security); the Sunni’s perception of decreased
political power; and the lack of state investment in many areas
(including Shiite areas) contributed to the de-legitimisation of
the state in the eyes of many Iraqis.16
(d) Abysmal delivery of state-sanctioned basic goods and
services: In cases where the Iraqi government did attempt to
provide basic goods and services, the quality was extremely
poor and the delivery was negatively impacted by
corruption.17
Depending on the area in question, these factors contributed to either
a service delivery vacuum or an extremely inadequate state-owned
system, thus increasing the alienation of many Iraqis from their state.
Performance legitimacy plays a very important role in post-
conflict countries even when process legitimacy is also being sought.
The delivery of basic goods and services represents a source of
legitimacy that people find easier to relate to in the short-term when
positive democratic outcomes and payoffs require significant time
and money to come to fruition.
CANADA’S POST-CONFLICT AGENDA FOR IRAQ (2003-2014)
Development Assistance
Canada’s recent engagement with Iraq took shape in May 2003
following the invasion of Iraq by the United States, the United
Kingdom, Australia, and Poland. The invasion led to the toppling of
then President Saddam Hussein and the development of Iraq’s
reconstruction plan.
In May 2003, the Canadian government, then under the leadership of
Prime Minister Jean Chretien, allocated CDN $300 million for
humanitarian and reconstruction efforts in Iraq. Canada was focused
on helping the Iraqi population by providing them with humanitarian
assistance, reconstructing the social and economic base of their
society, developing effective governance and security systems, and
promoting democratic development.
Yet, according to the project data provided by the Canadian
government to the Organisation for Economic Development and
Cooperation (OECD), Canada provided about USD $748.46 million,
more than twice the amount suggested, between 2003 and 2010.
Overall, between 1995 and 2013, Canada provided close to USD
$759 million in assistance to the Iraqi government and the Iraqi
population (USD $4.78 million in humanitarian assistance between
1995 and 2002, USD $748.46 for various types of assistance between
2003 and 2010, and USD $5.03 million in assistance between 2011
and 2013).18 About ninety percent of the assistance provided between
2011 and 2013 was focused on the delivery of humanitarian
assistance (USD $5.03 million out of USD $5.61 million).19
As is demonstrated in Graph 1, USD $548.45 million or a little
over 73 percent of the USD $748.46 million provided by Canada
between 2003 and 2010 was focused on governance activities (mostly
on elections, democratic participation, public administration, human
rights, rule of law, and public finance). The significant increase in
spending on governance in 2005 highlights Canada’s emphasis on
process legitimacy. The second highest expenditure (USD $122.04
million) was on the delivery of basic social services (water and
sanitation, health and education) with the majority being delivered
outside the state structure through non-governmental organisations
(NGOs). This amount represented only 16 percent of total
disbursements from 2003 until 2010. Humanitarian assistance was
third highest with expenditures amounting to USD $59.58 million.
This was followed by expenditure on security (USD $11.77 million)
and on the environment (USD $6.28 million).20
Overall, Canada’s expenditures were in line with the objectives of the
donor community. According to the OECD, USD $66.7 billion in
official development assistance was disbursed by donors from 2003
until 2013.21 Expenditure on process legitimacy (USD $11.7 billion)
represented 18 percent of total disbursements, second only to debt
payment, forgiveness, and cancellation (USD $28.9 billion or 43
percent of the total).22 Expenditure on basic social services amounted
to nearly USD $6 billion representing only nine percent of total
disbursements during the 10-year period. Aid disbursed on good
governance was mostly concentrated in the areas of public sector
policy and management (46 percent of the expenditure on
governance) as well as legal and judicial development (21 percent of
the expenditure on governance). The rest of the donors’ governance
aid portfolio was disbursed on public financial management,
elections, decentralisation, support to anti-corruption institutions,
democratic participation and civil society, human rights, media,
women’s equality, and legislature and political parties.
Following the end of the commitment in 2010, the Canadian
government made the decision to remove Iraq as a country of focus
and maintain a Canadian presence through “Canada-funded regional
initiatives... [with] targeted funding for humanitarian needs that
includes assistance to respond to the needs of Iraq’s internally
displaced people and to the Syrian refugee crisis”.23 As noted above,
aid disbursement levels decreased significantly to a little over USD
$5 million for the period between 2011 and 2013, with humanitarian
assistance representing over 90 percent of the disbursements.
Overall, Canada’s attempt at helping Iraq move past the post-
conflict stage rested primarily on the improvement of the central
government’s process legitimacy. Whether for the lack of capacity,
willingness, or interest on the part of Canada and/or the Government
of Iraq, this emphasis on governance and the replacement of the
visibility of the government with that of NGOs in the social services
sector did not help the Iraqi government earn performance legitimacy
by establishing itself in contested areas that were nevertheless
represented in the Iraqi Council of Representatives (the Iraqi
legislature).24 More crucially, Canada’s 2010 decision to concentrate
solely on the delivery of humanitarian assistance through non-
governmental systems came at a time when there were continued
concerns regarding stability, the feeling of alienation among many
Iraqis, and increased threats from IS.
Commercial Relationship
Canada has been one of Iraq’s long-standing trading partners.
Canadian oil companies have $750 million worth of economic
interests in Iraq and the majority of Canadian-Iraqi business
transactions have been in oil (Government of Canada 2014b).25 Oil
has represented over 99 percent of total Iraqi imports into Canada
since 2003, with the exception of 2008 when it represented 96
percent.26 As is demonstrated in Graph 2, Canada’s commercial
relationship with Iraq has grown over the last 13 years and Iraq has
become Canada’s second largest trading partner in the Middle East
(Government of Canada 2014b).27
Source: Canadian International Merchandise Trade Database.
Between 2006, when Prime Minister Harper first took office, and
2012, the year before sabotage-related activities targeting several
Iraqi oil fields and the increased power and control of IS, Canada’s
imports from Iraq increased by nearly 226 percent (as compared to
249 percent growth from 2003 and 2012). From 2002, the year before
the shock of war, to 2012, the Iraqi market also saw an increase in the
presence of Canadian products. During the same period, Canadian
exports to Iraq increased by 2,793 percent.
According to the Government of Canada (2014b, 1), Canada’s
current “mission is to contribute to Canada’s economic prosperity
through the expansion of the Canadian-Iraqi trade and investment
relationship; to promote good governance, democracy, pluralism and
respect for human rights in Iraq; and to support Canada’s
contributions to effective global governance and international
security”.28 To do so, Canada has placed an emphasis on improving
economic opportunities for Canadian companies in natural resources
and reconstruction sector and has opened a trade office in Erbil, the
area that is controlled by the Kurds. On the development front,
Canada is supposed to be helping Iraq implement public
administration reforms, modernise the relationship between the
federal government and the governorates, improve its pluralistic
federal system, and undertake fiscal decentralisation. It remains
unclear, however, how Canada is helping the Government of Iraq
through governance reforms since there is no evidence of recent non-
humanitarian assistance.29
The Trend
According to the data provided by the Canadian government, Canada
seemed to have placed a heavy emphasis on process legitimacy from
2003 to 2010. Moreover, during that period, Canada continued to
build and improve its commercial relationship with Iraq, even if it
meant dealing with a Prime Minister who was perceived by some to
be authoritative, one who is accused of alienating portions of Iraq’s
population30, and one whom the Government of Canada now
identifies as a major obstacle to a unified and representative
democratic Iraqi government. With little development assistance
offered after the end of Canada’s commitment in 2010 and the
significant growth in trading activity, including a 150 percent growth
in imports from 2010 to 2013, the Harper government’s agenda in
Iraq seems to have put a very heavy emphasis on economic
transactions. This came at a time when the Iraqi government’s
performance legitimacy was very weak in the eyes of many Iraqis (as
noted earlier) and the government was already facing severe
competition from non-state groups, including IS.
THE ISLAMIC STATE
Background on IS
While its roots date back to 1999 during the war in Afghanistan, IS
was born out of the wars in Iraq and Syria.31 It originally started in
Iraq as an offshoot of Al Qaeda, the entity that was led by Osama bin
Laden before his assassination in May 2011. Al Qaeda Iraq was led
by Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi from 1999 until his death in
2006. Its successes came at the time when Iraq was experiencing a
power vacuum following the removal of Saddam Hussein in 2003. Al
Qaeda Iraq was involved in anti-American insurgency and active
warfare against Shiites, less extreme Sunnis, Kurds, other minorities,
and the Iraqi Army. Between 2007 and 2009, the organisation lost a
lot of ground to local Sunni militias and tribal leaders supported by
the United States.32 In 2009, it consolidated its leadership and moved
to Mosul as a means to recover from the various events that had
weakened it.33 In 2012, Al Qaeda Iraq renamed itself the Islamic
State of Iraq (ISI) and moved into Syria through its offshoot, Jabhat
al-Nusra, where it found a more conducive environment for success.34
By 2013, ISI withdrew from the coalition with Jabhat al-Nusra
and established its direct presence in Syria. It also changed its name
to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). ISIS became a brutal
formidable fighting force but also an organisation known for its lack
of corruption and its delivery of social services.35 In Syria, where the
state was in near collapse, ISIS solidified its stronghold by exalting
the virtues of Islam, instilling fear of repercussions, indoctrinating
children,36 and equally as important, taking care of the basic needs of
some people who had been ignored for several years if not decades.
On the social front, ISIS offered “aid to civilian protestors in
Damascus, free medical services to locals in Jarabulus, bags of food
to the needy in rural Aleppo, and below market fuel to residents in
Deir alZour governorate”.37
ISIS soon changed its name to the Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant (ISIL) as a means to incorporate the support it received in
Lebanon and Jordan. However, with the significant growth in its
military successes in Iraq and Syria, on 30 June 2014, ISIL declared a
Sunni Caliphate covering the area under its control in Iraq and Syria,
changed its name to the Islamic State (IS), and declared its leader
(Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi) as the Caliph, or leader, of all Muslims.38
According to some reports, IS has established itself as a functioning
state in an environment where the Iraqi state’s presence in certain
areas is weak and the Syrian state has collapsed.39 Moreover, as
recent developments in the Middle East and North Africa indicate, IS
has also expanded to, and has varying levels of control over, areas in
Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and Northern Nigeria.
Sources of Success for IS
Iraq and Syria, like many other Middle Eastern countries, represent a
fertile ground for the establishment and growth of groups like Al-
Qaeda, Jabhat al-Nusra, the Shiite Peace Brigades, and IS. These
countries exhibit various sources of success for such organisations. In
many cases, the actual or perceived vacuum that has been left by a
predatory, weak, non-existent, or uncaring state has given such
groups a rich venue in which to operate.
The existence of deep ethnic and religious cleavages in the
Middle East has given some religious non-state groups the means to
galvanise oppressed groups of people. Their success is also linked to
the fact that (a) these countries’ societies are made up of very large
youth populations that face very high unemployment rates (34 percent
in Iraq, 29.8 percent in Syria, 20.6 percent in Lebanon, 24 percent in
Algeria, 31.2 in Tunisia, 33.7 percent in Jordan, and 38.9 percent in
Egypt)40 and (b) many of these youth have not benefitted from
adequate state-led social and economic services.
Unfortunately, the ability of the non-state organisations to use
this vacuum as a means to demonstrate to people the benefits of
supporting them has allowed these groups continued support,
acceptance, or at least tolerance. In the case of Iraq, there are several
reports of IS stepping into the vacuum and providing education,
humanitarian aid, health services, medication, waste disposal,
electricity supply, transportation,41 rent control,42 and free bus
services.43 In Mosul, some reports have indicated that some of the
city’s citizens have credited IS with bringing a certain level of
security to Mosul after decades of insecurity under the Iraqi Army.44
In Fallujah, IS filled the social services vacuum by providing security,
basic school equipment, assistance to the poor and elderly, and justice
through religious courts (Salaheddin and Yacoub 2014).45 The
delivery of these basic services, provided IS with a source of
performance legitimacy and allowed it to increase the territory under
its control by establishing relationships with Sunni tribesmen and
Baathist groups who had already acquired local support.46 As one IS
militant noted: “We set up soup kitchens, we rebuilt schools,
hospitals, we restored water and electricity, we paid for food and
fuel”. 47
It is their ability to present themselves as the better alternative
to the government when it comes to certain people’s basic needs that
has allowed IS to command tolerance or loyalty from some of the
beneficiaries of its social services. This has occurred even when its
followers have committed many heinous acts that are considered un-
Islamic by many moderate and some extreme Muslim scholars and
groups (including Al Qaeda). So while IS has not demonstrated
perfection or tolerance of the diversity of the population in Syria and
in Iraq, it was still considered by some of the recipients of its services
as a better, but not perfect alternative to either the Syrian or the Iraqi
state.
Nonetheless, for others, IS’s non-egalitarian approach in the
delivery of social services as well as its violence and extremism have
again led to feelings of fear and alienation. It is interesting to note that
this re-emerged vacuum is now being filled by various militias,
including the Iraqi Shiite Peace Brigades and the Badr Brigade, that
are fighting IS alongside the Iraqi Army, and that have implemented
IS’s strategy of catering to the needs of the excluded groups through
the delivery of basic social goods and services.
Within this chaotic situation, the Iraqi government has made
attempts to rectify governmental representation and treatment of
minorities and has asked for assistance in the improvement and
extension of the delivery of social services.48 Unfortunately, it has not
received funding to help it in its social services endeavour.
Furthermore, the work related to improved governance and
democratic development is not likely to (a) fill the service delivery
vacuum in the short-term, (b) rectify perceived alienation of some
Iraqis from the state in the short-term, and (c) allow the state to
compete with the performance legitimacy of the various groups acting
on its territory.
In summary, while IS has used (a) fear to control descent, (b)
religion to provide some cover for its actions, and (c) theft, oil and the
black market to raise funds by interacting with allies (Sunni
tribesmen) and foes (Kurdish traders) alike,49 its actions related to the
delivery of basic goods and service have played a significant role in
people’s tacit ‘acceptance’ of IS. IS is not the only organisation that
uses religion and fear, but it is one of the very few that has taken
advantage of the perceived vacuum to prove itself indispensable and
the most currently relevant alternative to the state. In this vain, even if
IS was defeated, the threats arising from the perceived social services
vacuum will remain and continue to be filled by other groups looking
to gain power. Given the importance of social services, the following
section assesses how Canada is reacting to what has taken place in
Iraq and Syria.
CANADA’S RESPONSE T0 IS
Canada’s response to IS is divided into two main categories: (a)
humanitarian assistance related to IS’s actions and (b) the military
response to IS’s actions in Iraq and Syria.
Humanitarian Assistance
According to the Government of Canada, Canada continues to
provide humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi population in order to
help meet “the urgent health, shelter, protection, education and food
needs of thousands of [Iraqi] civilians.” 50The government is also
providing assistance as it relates to the prevention and investigation of
and response to sexual violence and other human rights abuses.51 This
assistance is to be provided outside government channels through
NGOs and the United Nations.
The officially quoted total amount of committed humanitarian
and development funding for Iraqis since the beginning of 2014 is
$107.4 million.52 However, actual committed disbursements for
Iraqis between the beginning of 2014 and July 2015 amount to only
$52 million as indicated on the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade
and Development’s Project Browser website. As for the Syrian crisis,
the officially quoted committed amount is $503.5 million since the
beginning of the crisis in 2011 and the amount of committed
disbursements is only $287.93 million.
Response to IS
According to the Government of Canada, Canada’s official response
began on 10 August 2014 when the Government committed $5
million for humanitarian assistance. This was followed by Prime
Minister Harper’s 15 August 2014 announcement regarding the
deployment of 30 Canadian Armed Forces personnel and two
aircrafts.53 By 7 October 2014, Canada had officially joined
Operation IMPACT in Iraq.54 The motion for the undertaking of the
combat mission was passed on 6 October 2014 and it called for (a)
the recognition of the eminent terrorist threat that IS represents to
Canada and Canadians, (b) the threat that IS poses to the innocent and
vulnerable people under the control of IS, (c) the desire of the
Canadian government to respond to the needs of the Iraqi
government, and (d) the wish of the Canadian government to stand by
its allies, figuratively and militarily, in the fight against IS.55
Following the realisation of the importance of Syria for IS,
Prime Minster Harper tabled a motion on 24 March 2015 to extend
and expand Canada’s mission against IS. According to the
Government, “Operation IMPACT would be extended for up to 12
months thus moving the original deadline from 30 March 2015 to 30
March 2016. Its mandate would be expanded to authorise Canada’s
CF-188 Hornet fighters to join Coalition partners in attacking IS
targets within Syrian territory.”56 According to the Prime Minister,
the expansion would help target IS’s “safe haven in Syria”.57 The
motion was passed on 30 March 2015.
In the eyes of the Government, Canada is mounting a holistic
response to the threat that IS poses by providing military assistance,
non-lethal security assistance, humanitarian and development
assistance to the Iraqi population (including for the protection of the
vulnerable population), and counter-terrorism actions closer to home.
1. Military assistance
The lethal aspect of Canada’s contribution is referred to as Operation
IMPACT. Under Operation IMPACT, Canadian Armed Forces
personnel, aircrafts, and other equipment have been deployed to fight
against IS in Iraq and, more recently, in Syria. Under this combat
role, Canada is expected to provide equipment support to coalition
members engaged in airstrikes and assist and advise Iraqi security
forces, including Kurdish Peshmerga forces (Government of Canada
2015a).58 The total cost of Canada’s initial six-month bombing
campaign and special forces deployment has been calculated at $122
million by the Harper government and between $128 million and
$166 million by the Canadian Parliamentary Budget Officer.59 The
expected costs for the extended 12-month mission are $406 million,60
thus bringing the total cost of the combat mission to between $544
and $572 million over a period of a year and a half.
2. Non-lethal security assistance
As it relates to non-lethal security assistance, Canada has contributed
$15 million towards the delivery of equipment such as helmets, body
armour and logistics support vehicles and support to help limit the
movement of foreign fighters into Iraq and Syria.
3. Counter-Terrorism Response at Home
Canada is paying special attention to the issue of foreign-fighters.
Quite a few of IS’s foreign fighters hold Canadian nationalities and
there are fears of further recruitment, incitement, or acts of violence
on Canadian soil. Actions taken by Canada include the strengthening
of anti-terrorism legislation and the power of border control agents,
and the curbing of funding for IS by listing the organisation as a
terrorist entity under Canada’s Criminal Code.61
Implications
According to the website of Operation IMPACT, the coalition attacks
against IS have caused the group to lose “the ability to operate in 20-
25 percent of the area it previously controlled.”62 However, what do
these achievements really imply given the importance of the role that
social services have played in the success factors of groups like IS
and in the mounting challenges that the Iraqi government is facing?
First, as it relates to the earlier discussion on IS’s sources of success
and the importance of performance legitimacy, Canada has not
responded to the Iraqi government’s request for assisting the
government in decreasing the social services vacuum. If the idea is to
liberate the population by cutting off funding to IS and not allowing it
to provide social services anymore,63 then all that Canada will be
doing is leaving the vacuum intact for any other organisation to take
hold, as is already being done by the Peshmerga64 and the Peace
Brigades. Canada seems to be counting on the development of a
politically inclusive government that respects good governance,
religious freedom and human rights, which once again focuses on the
long-term.65 Canada is missing the opportunity to invest in non-
military solutions to complement the long-term governance work of
other donors by helping the Iraqi government improve its
performance legitimacy in the meantime.
Second, attacking IS might limit its funding ability, decrease its
territorial control, and improve the Iraqi Army’s capacity, but it does
not solve the problem that arises when IS is degraded. As it stands
currently, there are over 50 local militias [Shiite (Peace Brigades,
Promised Day Brigade, etc.), Kurdish (Peshmerga, Kurdistan
Workers’ Party, etc.), Christian (Nineveh Plains Protection Unit,
Dyvekh Nawsha, etc.), Sunni (Sons of Iraq, Qaraqosh Protection
Committee, etc.), Yazidi (Sinjar Resistance Units), and other militias]
fighting against IS in Iraq and over 10 fighting with IS (Ba’athist,
Sunni and Salafi groups). Most of the Iraqi non-Kurdish anti-IS
groups are regrouped under the banner of the Popular Mobilization
Forces and are working together. In Syria, there are more than 80
local militias (Syriac Military Council, People's Protection Units,
Free Syrian Army, the Islamic Front, Jaysh Al-Sanadeed, etc.)
fighting against IS and seven fighting for IS.
As in any war, many of these militias have formed convenient
coalitions that are helping them defend against IS. However, if and
when IS is removed from certain areas, the disagreements among
these militias will likely resurface. Many of the disagreements are
linked to control of territory and representation. One example is the
disagreement between the Peshmerga and the Sinjar Resistance Unit
over the control of Mount Sinjar and the right to represent the people
in the region.66 Canada’s tactics of working with the Peshmerga and
the Iraqi government as it relates to democratic governance and
representation, ignores local power struggles and their outcomes.
Third, in 2014, Prime Minister Harper indicated his desire to
increase Canada’s leadership role by claiming the following: “If
Canada wants to keep its voice in the world, and we should since so
many of our challenges are global, being a free rider means you are
not taken seriously”.67 Some have suggested that such an approach is
necessary to allow Canada more power on the international stage.
However, the fact that coalition airstrikes are leading to civilian
casualties and increased anti-coalition sentiments leads one to
question the price of achieving such a goal.68 As local innocent Iraqi
people are killed by coalition airstrikes (41 in the last week of
February alone, 43 in June, and 24 in the first two days of July (Iraq
Body Count n.d.) and many Syrians also become coalition
casualties69, the Arab population is becoming increasingly weary of
the actions of the coalition (Stewart and Bayoumy 2014).70
Moreover, given that the conflict with IS is perceived to be a
religious fight for many Muslims, the increased civilian death toll, the
inability of locals to differentiate between the actions of the various
coalition members, and some Sunni’s perception that Canada is
attacking a Sunni group in support of a Shiite group allow for a
perfect storm of hatred towards Canada and increased justification for
attacking Canadians at home and abroad.71 Hence, if the idea was to
root out terrorism or minimise it so as to protect Canadians, the
robustness of this idea has surely been challenged. As the reasoning
of performance legitimacy indicates, fighting terrorism should be
done in a way that deals with the non-wealth-related sources of
success of such organisations and that avoids giving them further
opportunity to sell their extremism to potential recruits.
Fourth, if, as noted earlier, the objective of Canada is to contain
IS so as to protect the vulnerable, then IS’s spread into Tunisia (the
so-called successful case of democratic awakening following the
Arab Spring and the country that has provided most of the recruits for
IS(Rogers 2014)), 72Lebanon, Jordan, Nigeria, Egypt, and Algeria,
among others, indicates that controlling the spread is not solely a
military operation. Containing a spread that is as much a reaction to
being ignored or excluded as it is ideological and religiously-based (at
least as it relates to the perceptions of the recruits) requires working
on the ‘soft’ aspects of development. Canada’s plans (humanitarian
assistance, economic transactions and military support) are not
concerned with the ‘soft’ aspects of development that can bring gains
in the short-term and buy time for long-term improvements. It seems
that Canada’s approach is based on a less than comprehensive
assessment of the situation in the Middle East and the important
factors at play.
CONCLUSIONS
Violence and security cannot solve all of Iraq’s problems. Iraq has a
portion of its population that is alienated from its government, not
necessarily because they have no representation in the government,
but because their representatives do not or cannot actively represent
them. Improvement in the governance system is one potential long-
term solution. Given the importance of performance legitimacy and
the proven ability of the various groups to use it as a means to
increase their power and influence, the answer to the problems in Iraq
should have an active short- and medium-term engagement to help
sustain the state’s legitimacy and allow the government to close off
the service delivery vacuum and remove low-hanging fruit for other
groups. Canada has the development expertise to respond to the Iraqi
government’s request for assistance in service delivery. If the new
Iraqi government is truly making an effort to be more inclusive then
Canada has a moral imperative to divert some of the significant sums
of money to projects that help increase the performance legitimacy of
the central government.
Furthermore, spending millions of dollars on bombing IS in one
part of the Middle East does not necessarily contain the contagion. It
would be difficult to see how Canada and its coalition partners could
attack IS militarily in all of the countries in which it is present. Yet, in
all of these countries, Canada can support the delivery of basic goods
and services and thus work on helping these governments ensure the
removal of an important aspect of the short-term success of these
groups.
Moreover, given that the coalition will not fold if Canada was
not included in it and that there are coalition members that have
brought equivalent expertise or tools (refueling boats instead of
refueling planes), Canada could instead complement the coalition’s
aerial campaign by spending on development initiatives that eliminate
the chances for these groups to earn performance legitimacy and
spread. In this way, IS, and other groups, will suffer militarily as well
as at the level of popular support, thus giving the post-conflict states
better chances at survival. This approach will help to avoid the trap of
defeating one group before others resurface. Moreover, with the
potential for rooting out some of the social factors that lead to the
acceptance of such extremist groups, Canadians are also likely to
benefit.
If Canada intends to degrade, destabilise, and weaken IS in the
hopes of protecting vulnerable and innocent civilians in the region
and reduce the risks present in the areas where IS operates, then,
given the evidence presented in this chapter, these objectives are
unlikely to be met with the current agenda of action.
__________________________
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Chapter 8
BOUTIQUE BRAND: THE UNIQUE ALIGNMENT OF THE
HARPER CONSERVATIVE BRAND AND BOUTIQUE TAX
CREDITS
Jennifer Robson
INTRODUCTION
In his 2014 summer keynote address to the Conservative Party,
Stephen Harper laid out what he and his advisors had likely hoped
would be the dominant narrative for the next campaign.1 His speech
warned that, should the Conservative Party fall from government, the
country would be immediately beset by new entitlement programs,
new taxes and bigger government. “We know”, the Prime Minister
intoned, “what [the other parties offer]: never ever cut any spending;
spend more, now and always; let the deficit rise; increase taxes.” The
contrast was crystal clear and implied that the Conservatives were
instead, the party that will always find ways to cut spending, reduce
the deficit and lower taxes, “over and over again”. If he has a hidden
agenda, some have suggested, Harper is not very good at concealing
it in his speeches. Instead, Harper tends to use a speech to frame a key
message and then repeats that same message over and over again.2
The repeated references in that Calgary speech to reducing the size of
the federal government and to lower federal taxes were not just a self-
congratulatory list of past activity, they were a deliberate statement
related to the brand of the Conservative Party.
The brand of a political party is a collection of impressions,
based on voters’ own recollections and their emotional and cognitive
response to a set of images, issues and experiences communicated by
the party.3 As with competing products in the private sector, the
brand serves to differentiate one party from another. Like retail
consumers, voters have agency and play an active role in constructing
a party brand. For a brand to take hold, voters have to make meaning
out of the symbolic images, statements and behavior of parties.
Voters also have to form either positive or negative attachments to
those meaningful symbols. Once formed, brands tend to be resilient.
That is until or unless voters perceive sufficient brand-inconsistent
behavior. In addition to thinking about website colors, venues for
speeches and a leader’s personal grooming, the political managers
cultivating and maintaining a party brand must also pay close
attention to policy choices. Quite separate from standard
considerations in policy choice–efficiency and effectiveness to name
two–different policy choices will have varying degrees of brand-
consistency.
Under some circumstances, voters may forgive or even support
a party for taking a policy direction that is a radical departure from its
brand. But this is more likely to be the case if the party has invested
in long-term efforts to gradually shift perception (as UK Labour
successfully managed in the lead-up to the first Blair government), or
if there has been some exogenous shock that demands an immediate
policy response (as in the case of the massive spending program
launched by the Harper Conservatives in 2009 following the global
financial crisis). More often, the more politically advantageous
approach is to pick a policy direction and simply stick with it.
By their own estimates, the Harper government has reduced
federal tax revenues by $30 billion per year since taking power in
2006. This is, nominally, an amount roughly equal to the annual
federal debt servicing costs.4 Furthermore, the cumulative value over
the last decade is approaching an amount equal to half the federal
debt. While the GST cuts early on in the first Harper government no
doubt account for a large chunk of the change to tax revenues, Clark
and DeVries estimated that the lion’s share of the reduction has been
achieved through reductions to the federal personal income tax.5
However, a review of the basic framework of personal income
taxes in 2006 and today suggests that the personal income tax
reductions made by the Harper government have not, as a general
rule, been broad-based in nature. The statutory personal income tax
rates today are the same they were in 2006. Likewise the basic
personal exemption has increased only enough to keep pace with
inflation. Rate cuts and basic exemptions are blunt instruments that
spread the reduction in federal taxation across a very broad base.
Instead, many of the changes made by the Harper government in the
last decade have been much narrower, especially the use of so-called
boutique tax credits.
Remarkably, there does not appear to be an accepted definition
of ‘boutique credits’ in the academic literature, although the term is
frequently used by Canadian media and in the grey-literature.6 There
is a well-established literature on tax-expenditures,7 with a robust
debate over the efficiency and equity of forgoing government
revenues through tax measures to achieve policy objectives. For the
purpose of this chapter, I suggest that so-called boutique credits are a
sub-set of tax expenditures with at least three common characteristics:
1) They are tax expenditures, as acknowledged by the
government itself. That is, there is an identifiable cost, in
foregone federal (and possibly provincial) personal income
tax revenues, as a result of the measure.
2) The justification provided by the government for the
introduction of the tax measure is a policy aim other than
efficient or equitable taxation. That is, the policy aim is to
reward certain forms of private behavior among citizens, not
to address structural issues within the tax system itself.8 These
behavioral aims might otherwise be met through direct
spending to provide services or conditional transfers to
individuals (such as vouchers or cash benefits).
3) By design, relatively few tax filers claim them each year.
Eligibility is based on personal characteristics or behaviors
shared by a minority (often a very small minority) of tax
filers. This is in contrast to blunt, structural chances that may
affect a majority or even all tax payers such as changes to the
basic personal exemption or bracket structures.
For the purpose of this chapter, I also limit my discussion to the list of
ten personal income tax credits that share the above criteria and have
all been introduced since 2006 by the Harper government.9 I do not
mean to suggest that no prior federal government had ever introduced
a tax credit meeting these three criteria. In fact, narrow tax credits
have been introduced by federal and provincial governments of all
political stripes. Neither am I suggesting that the Harper government
has relied solely on these boutique credits. In fact, as the Auditor
General made clear in his 2015 Spring reports, there are over 140
individual tax expenditures which can be split into structural
measures (which are outside the scope of this chapter) and those that
are close or even perfect substitutes for direct spending. Each credit
on its own reaches only a select slice of the population of Canadian
taxpayers. Some tax-payers will qualify for several of these boutique
credits and will then pay a substantially different and lower effective
rate compared to another taxpayers with comparable ability to pay (as
measured by total income). When this happens, the horizontal equity
of the Canadian tax system is reduced. Individual differences in
access to boutique credits also makes analysis of the vertical equity of
the tax system far more complex to assess since the final tax burden
of a tax filer is now subject to a complex interaction of income but
also behavioral characteristics. But one thing that is clear is that the
cumulative value of the foregone revenue from the proliferation of
these credits is large and has increased dramatically in the last decade.
The Harper government did not invent boutique credits but it has
certainly embraced them with a never-before-seen gusto. The
question is why?
As Harper’s Calgary speech made clear, a central part of the
Conservative vision is a smaller federal government, fewer federal
spending programs and lower taxes. But there is a puzzle in the fiscal
policy observed over the past 10 years: Why not reduce total federal
revenues and expenditures but also aggressively pay down federal
debt? Reducing taxes could be accomplished by personal income tax
changes that reach the broadest swath of taxpayers without
introducing new distortions in the system. Both debt reduction and
broad-based tax cuts would be consistent with a brand of fiscal
conservatism and with a Conservative Party brand linked to smaller
government and lower taxes.
In early October 2014, Prime Minister Harper announced that
the Child Fitness Tax Credit (created by the Conservative government
in 2006), would be doubled for the 2014 tax year and, beginning in
2015, would also be converted from a non-refundable to a refundable
credit. The announcement was notable for at least three reasons:
• First, it came just before an announcement on a package of other
tax and transfer measures targeted to parents with children. These
included a substantial increase to the Universal Child Care
Benefit, another targeted instrument introduced by the
Conservatives in 2006 and a modified version of their 2011
election promise on income-splitting for parents. Keeping the
changes to the Child Fitness Tax Credit separate and apart both
allowed the government separate an incremental tax change from
a package of new measures and prolong media attention to their
particular policy proposals.
• Second, the background information released by the Department
of Finance10 quietly but directly acknowledged that the original
design of the Child Fitness Tax Credit had done little if any good
for low-income families. As a non-refundable credit, the
instrument gave no real benefit to families who face the greatest
affordability constraints, a critique that has been pointed out
several times since it was introduced in 2006.11 It was a rare
public and official admission of policy failure.
• Third, the announcement was made by the Prime Minister, and not
the Minister of Finance who notionally bears responsibility for tax
policy and budget-making, subject to agreement with the Prime
Minister, but not the rest of Cabinet. The announcement, outside
of the House, had all of the usual trappings of an orchestrated
communications event, marking it as something crafted by
political managers surrounding the Prime Minister. Remarkably,
this window dressing managed to turn an admission of policy
failure into a positive announcement. This was in contrast to 2006
when the Child Fitness Credit was created and all communications
were led by the Minister of Finance. Then, the Minister of Finance
had also been publicly responsible for naming an external tax
force on the design of the new credit and had received their
recommendations directly. By 2014, the Prime Minister took on
the role as the key government spokesperson for the policy, a
move that increased the political capital involved.
Previous analyses of the myriad minor tax credits introduced by the
Harper government have already noted the non-negligible fiscal costs
and the tenuous evidence that any of these has a measurable and
positive effect on tax-payer behavior or generate economic returns.12
So why is the government doubling-down on its predilection for
small-scale tax credits? I suggest that attention to the economic and
fiscal impacts of these credits is of limited use in understanding this
pattern. The persistence of the pattern cannot be explained as
evidence of ignorance of general principles of tax policy, fiscal costs
or impact evaluations. In fact, as the background information from the
Department of Finance made clear on the Child Fitness Tax Credit,
the government has ample information on the take-up, distribution
and impacts of its own tax credits. If these were not working or were
leading to un-intended consequences, it’s likely that the Finance
Department would be the first to know.
I argue that two variables should receive far more attention in
making sense of the recent trends on tax credits from both critics and
supporters of the government’s approach. These are, first, the
attractiveness of tax-expenditures as policy tools and, second, the
goodness of fit between tax credits and the political brand of the
Conservative Party. The remainder of this chapter first describes tax-
expenditures as a policy instrument, then discusses the qualities that
might make these instruments particularly attractive to political
decision-makers and finally discusses the way that myriad boutique
credits are consistent with the Conservative Party brand, at least thus
far under Stephen Harper.
TAX CREDITS: ANOTHER WAY TO SPEND
Remarkably, money that a government spends is not always
recognized as an expenditure. Federally in Canada, transfers to other
orders of government, costs to service the debt, program operations
and administrative costs, and direct program transfers to individuals
(such as OAS or CPP payments) are all “booked” in federal estimates
and submitted to Parliament for authorization through the business of
supply. However, when the government opts to offer an exemption
from tax, a tax deduction or a credit against taxes payable, this results
in a net cost to the fiscal framework. These changes to the overall
flow of collecting and spending tax revenues may not be consistently
recorded in the annual or supplementary estimates of government
departments13, nor are they subject to regular scrutiny or approval by
Parliament. In fact, a Spring 2015 report by the Auditor General of
Canada concluded that the existing information provided on tax
expenditures (including but not limited to the ‘boutique’ variety
which is the focus of this chapter) “does not adequately support
parliamentary oversight”.14
The term “tax expenditure” was first coined in a 1967 speech
by Stanley Surrey who used it to describe the set of exemptions,
deductions and credits that reduced taxation (and therefore increased
income) for eligible claimants while reducing the overall revenues to
government.15 Similarly, Maslove defined expenditures as a set of
“special provisions in the tax laws providing for preferential
treatment”16 either to grant relief to individuals under certain
circumstances or to provide tax-payers with incentives to behave in
certain ways through tax exemptions, deductions or credits. Given
some benchmark tax system, any deviation that reduces tax revenues
is deemed an expenditure.17 The disagreements amongst economists
on this matter seem to come from both defining that benchmark
system and, in turn, defining a deviation.
There are, arguably, several cases among the 140 items
identified by the Department of Finance in their annual report on tax
expenditures18 in which an exemption of certain income or
recognizing costs incurred to generate income are not actually
deviations from a baseline system of taxing income. These are the so-
called ‘internal’ or structural items. In those instances, credits may be
thought of more as the arithmetic needed to determine what and how
much to take out of gross measures of income to align an individual’s
tax burden with the desired benchmark system. For example,
expenses such as child-care that have been incurred to earn income
are deducted from taxation on the basis that the tax filer’s true taxable
income should be treated as the net after compulsory costs to earn that
income. In other instances, the tax system is used to pursue particular
policy objectives as determined by the government.
Historically, changes to tax credits, exemptions and deductions
have generally been announced in the Budget. Projected information
on their cost has only been made available for these new or altered
measures, both to Cabinet and to Parliament, for which ever period of
forecasting the Finance Minister wishes to use. The ongoing cost of
continuing to maintain the current set of exemptions, deductions and
credits is not made public for scrutiny except through periodic
(though largely annual, since 1997) reports prepared by the
Department of Finance. By contrast, direct spending by departments
can be tracked more frequently through mandatory quarterly reports
and with more granularity in the detail through Departmental
Performance Reports. As noted by Lester,19 there have been very
recent changes to the federal accounting of one type of tax credit–
refundable credits, where a cash transfer is paid to an eligible
recipient even if he or she has no tax liability. These refundable
amounts, identical for all intents and purposes to direct income
transfers to individuals, are now recorded as spending in the annual
public accounts. However, other tax expenditures such as non-
refundable credits, exemptions and deductions are not.
As Burman, Todder and Geisser note, “like direct spending
programs, tax expenditures crowd out other spending” (p.13).20 All
else being equal, a deviation from the baseline balance between
revenues and spending has to be made up in some other way, whether
through reductions in other spending or through increasing revenues.
In either case, the tax expenditure represents a shifting of the tax
burden and public benefits between and among Canadian tax payers.
Table 8.1 (below) provides a list of the personal income tax
expenditures introduced by the Harper government since 2006 that
meet the three criteria (proposed earlier) as ‘boutique credits’. I also
include the estimate, as calculated by the Department of Finance, of
the projected cost of each measure for the 2014 tax year, the
proportion of tax filers who claimed the credit and the average value
of the claim, based on data reported by the Canada Revenue Agency.
Box 1: The different fashion lines in the boutique
Store managers have at least four major options in crafting new tax credits or
adjusting existing ones:
• Exemptions: These allow a tax payer to exclude some or all income from
a defined source. Examples include the exemption of investment income
in registered savings (such as RRSPs) and capital gains on a primary
residence.
• Deductions: These allow a tax payer to subtract some amount, generally
based on a calculation of eligible costs or expenditures. The deduction
may be from taxable income for both federal and provincial taxes, such as
the Childcare Expenses Deduction, from gross federal taxes, such as the
political contributions tax credit, or from combined net federal and
provincial tax, such as the deduction for refundable medical expenses.
• Non-refundable credits: These allow a tax payer to reduce net taxes
payable and are generally based on a calculation of eligible expenditures
or tax payer characteristics. These credits can reduce taxes payable to
zero but cannot give rise to a refund. Examples include the credits for
tuition, amounts for public transit and for volunteer firefighters.
• Refundable credits: These allow an eligible tax-filer to collect a direct
transfer. Amounts are generally tied to tax payer characteristics and
individual or household income. Amounts may be paid in a lump sum or
may be paid in installments during the year. In either case, they are
triggered only when a return has been filed for the tax year. Examples
include the GST/HST credit, the Working Income Tax Benefit and the
Canada Child Tax Benefit.
Poterba has noted that “a tax expenditure estimate measures the
amount of federal income tax revenue that is lost as a result of a
particular tax provision, given current taxpayer behavior. It is not
necessarily and estimate of the revenue that might be collected if the
tax provision were modified, since such a change might affect
taxpayer behavior.”21 In other words, while the estimates provide a
dollar value of the likely cost (all else being equal), in the real world,
individuals and households make choices and decisions based on the
available alternatives.
Table 8.1: Boutique tax measures introduced by the Harper
government and projected annual expenditure
Tax Measure 2014
(projected),
$ millions
% of returns with
claim (most recent
data published)
Average amount claimed per
return (most recent data
published)
First-Time Donor’s
Super Credit
7 NA NA
Children’s Arts Tax
Credit
42 2.09% $76.55
Volunteer
Firefighters'
Amount
17 0.15% $449.99
Family Caregiver
Tax Credit
65 0.85% $763.65
Family Tax Cut
(income splitting)
1,915 NA NA
Child Tax Credit
(cancelled for 2015
onward)
1,620 14.08% $576.91
Children’s Fitness
Tax Credit
130 6.36% $81.86
Public Transit Tax
Credit
190 6.36% $122.32
First Time Home
Buyer's Amount
110 0.72% $675.90
Search and Rescue
Volunteers'
Amount
4 NA NA
Sources: Author’s calculations using Finance Canada (2015). “Tax Expenditures and
Evaluations, 2014”. Ottawa and Canada Revenue Agency (2014). “Final Statistics: 2014
edition for the 2012 tax year”. Ottawa.
In Table 8.1, above, the cost of each individual item is
estimated independently. That is, the reported figure is based on a
model that holds all other factors constant but cancels that one tax
item and looks that the change in federal income tax revenues. This
has several implications. The first is that no behavioral change is
included in the model. For example, if the non-refundable
Employment Tax Credit22 were cancelled, the model (reasonably)
assumes that Canadians would not decrease their paid labour,
resulting in a systematic reduction in taxable incomes and therefore
federal revenues. In this case, the cost of the single credit is likely to
be more accurate. But the same assumption of no behavioral change
is also maintained for items such as the Tax Free Savings Account
where cancellation of the favorable tax treatment might reasonably be
expected to lead to shifting assets to other tax-favoured savings like
Registered Retirement Savings Plans.
In these cases, reasonable assumptions of behavioral response
may lead to higher or lower estimates of the true cost, and,
furthermore, point to interactions between various line items. In these
cases, the exact effects, in terms of foregone tax revenues, of
interactions between expenditure items depends in part on the
marginal tax rate of the individual tax payer. For individuals in the
midpoint of a tax bracket, one or more small changes in their taxable
income or tax payable are unlikely to result in any net change to taxes
paid. But, when the cumulative effect of a series of credits serves to
reduce a tax-filer’s taxable income to a lower bracket or even to
reduce their tax liability to $0, then the true cost is greater than the
sum of the individual items. However, if items are substitutes for one
another, then the true cost of the combined items is potentially
smaller than the sum of the individual items. It is impossible to know
this unless the model involved can account for each individual tax-
filer’s effective and marginal tax rates under multiple scenarios, as
well as accurately predicting their likely behavioral response. The
absence of good measures of substitution between credits and
cumulative costs are the other key implications of estimating each
credit in isolation.
Outside of Canada, researchers have conducted analysis of the
effects of interactions between items in the US federal income tax
code. For example, Burman, Todder and Geisser estimate that the
interactions between US tax expenditure items lead to estimates of
total tax expenditures that are between 5% and 8% higher than the
sum total of individual items, depending on the combinations of items
used.23 The smallest interactions may be, they argue, in non-
refundable tax credits that are limited by taxpayer’s income tax
liability. Here the presence of more credits leads to a smaller marginal
value for each credit alone and removing one has a small effect on the
remaining credits. Burman, Todder and Geisser find that deductions
have the greatest interactions since American taxpayers unable to
claim one will shift into other itemized deductions. But this effect is
likely larger in the U.S. system where taxpayers can use a standard
lump sum deduction or calculate the total of other deductions based
on their personal circumstance (such as the deduction for mortgage
interest) that may not be comparable in Canada.24
In short, the total cost, including behavioral and interaction
effects, of all the various boutique credits that have been introduced
by the Harper government is likely unknowable. In nearly all cases,
the behavioral effects of each tax credit are likely negligible or zero.
The net dollar values for the average tax filer claiming each of these
boutique credits are too small to reasonably imagine they will have an
impact on use of public transit, willingness to volunteer as a
firefighter or, as the research bears out, parental spending on
children’s physical activities.
Many of the credits are aimed at parents, which raises the
question of the interaction of the credits. In a separate study, I find
that tax filers with incomes of $100,000 to $150,000 are substantially
more likely to claim each of these credits.25 If the subset of taxpayers
who are claiming any one of these credits are the same as the subset
of taxpayers claiming the other credits, then the interactions by
stacking the credits is at least the same or slightly more than the
notional sum ($4.1 billion) of the measures in Table 8.1.26
Whatever the net dollar figure might be, it is big–in the order of
billions of dollars per year and certainly large enough to have
financed any number of new spending programs and government
expansion, or alternately, to have avoided some share of the deficits
and accumulated debt from 2008 through at least 2015.27
THE GENERAL POLICY AND POLITICAL ADVANTAGES OF
TAX EXPENDITURES
Compared to other OECD countries, the use of taxation as a way for
government to ‘spend’ may be particularly appealing to Canadian
governments, regardless of political stripe. In fact, one estimate from
the Parliamentary Budget Office suggests that as much as 28% of
total federal spending is now in the form of tax expenditures.28 29 As
a percentage of GDP, Canada is more reliant on tax expenditures than
many countries including Spain, Japan and even the United States.
Part of the appeal no doubt owes something to our combination
of both a Westminster and strong federal system. In a system that
requires the Executive to seek regular Parliamentary approvals to
collect and spend public revenues, policy instruments that offer some
shelter from scrutiny must be particularly appealing. Tax
expenditures are not subject to the same scrutiny as program
expenditures, neither at the time they are introduced– even in a
federal budget–nor on an ongoing basis.30 This is partly a result of the
above-mentioned accounting practices that exclude the vast majority
of tax-expenditures from the spending estimates. Because tax
expenditures are fiscal policy measures, they can be added into a
budget or economic update by the Minister of Finance (with the
agreement of the Prime Minister), without the need for any Cabinet
deliberation. This permits those at the center of the core executive to
make policy changes quickly to suit their own priorities and even
their own preferences.
Furthermore, as Lester has noted, the current treatment of tax
expenditures also excludes them from the now-routine spending
reviews that are applied to direct spending alternatives,31 a fact also
highlighted in the 2015 Spring reports by the Auditor General.32
When tax expenditures are first created, or when they are amended,
public announcements are followed by a legislative package to make
any necessary changes to the Income Tax Act. When these are
bundled into budget implementation bills or other omnibus
legislation, Parliamentary scrutiny of any one individual expenditure
item is necessarily reduced. Further, particularly in the case of budget
implementation bills, because these are confidence measures, a
majority government can be confident of whipping enough votes to
guarantee passage. Even a minority government can be assured that
opposition parties would have many disincentives to bringing down a
government over tax cuts while cancelling a targeted spending
program may be politically easier to defend, particularly in an
environment of fiscal restraint.
In fact, while the Family Tax Cut33 may be an exceptional case,
most tax credits engender little or no political opposition, a second
advantage. The changes to the Child Fitness Tax Credit announced in
the same month as the Family Tax Cut received nothing approaching
the same criticism from federal opposition parties or outside
observers. In addition to a widespread reluctance by any political
party in Canada, of any stripe, to be viewed as a “tax and spend”
party, there is also the technical difficulty of conducting any analysis
of the potential impacts and offering a feasible alternative.
Detailed analysis and critiques of tax expenditures in Canada
depend on access to very limited information about individual tax
measures, a fact highlighted by the Auditor General.34 Even if data is
made available, opposition parties must have a high degree of
technical expertise and adequate time to make use of that information.
For parties with limited Parliamentary budgets and multiple demands,
the time and effort necessary to conduct their own analysis is unlikely
to be seen as a worthwhile effort relative to the expected political
return.
A third advantage of tax credits for policymakers is that tax
expenditures are a way for federal governments to take action without
facing the same challenges of other policy instruments in a federal
system. Education is, for example, a clear area of provincial
jurisdiction. So, for federal policy-makers a $100 million envelope
could be spent as a transfer to provincial governments who may, or
may not, deliver on signed commitments regarding its allocation
within their jurisdiction. Negotiating the conditions of that transfer
are almost certain to be difficult and slow, with multiple provincial
actors engaging in complex strategic moves designed to extract the
maximum possible benefit for themselves out of one single federal
actor. Alternatively, that same $100 million could be spent through
the tax system, in a new or improved education credit, where the
federal government enjoys direct control over the policy objectives
and implementation.
New credits can be announced at any time during the year with
application granted as soon as the next tax year. The time lapsed
between, for example, the announcement of the revisions to the
Family Tax Cut and its implementation will have been not more than
two or three months when the earliest eligible tax filers will have
been claiming the new tax credit. Program spending requiring any
degree of intergovernmental agreement cannot match that speed.
In addition to minimizing or skirting intergovernmental
hurdles, tax credits also require very little, if any, incremental
increase to the size and cost of public administration. Perhaps the
most costly portion, over the long-run, of any public administration
system is labour. Employing additional workers to manage and
administer a program increases the cost of salary dollars and benefits,
not only during the lifetime of the program, but for the long-term in a
unionized environment. Administrative systems and architectures can
differ significantly in labour intensity.
A tax system based on annual self-assessment subject to
official review, with the threat of audit, needs vastly less
administrative infrastructure than a policy architecture based on tools
such as regulatory oversight or voluntary application with
verification. Once the tax administration workforce and capital costs
have been created, each incremental increase in the number or value
of self-assessed credits need not lead to a tandem increase in
operating costs. In the time between fiscal years 2007-08 and 2013-
14, the number of full-time employees (or equivalents) at the Canada
Revenue Agency has remained virtually unchanged, notwithstanding
the major changes to the tax code and rising complexity of verifying
the myriad new credits. By comparison other portfolios require far
more effort to verify applications and enforce rules. The comparable
change in the labour force of one such administratively-heavy
portfolio, Citizenship and Immigration, has ballooned 48% over the
same seven fiscal years.35
In fact, the tax system has proven such an administratively lean
and flexible instrument that the Canada Revenue Agency now
administers 42 separate federal and provincial benefits (for example
income-tested federal and provincial child benefits) and verifies
compliance on another 85 benefits (such as provincial social
assistance or workers’ compensation). Annual income tax returns
provide a robust but also very efficient way to verify eligibility and
deliver support to only the intended target population of a policy
measure by relying on existing administrative data alone. Returns,
particularly when they can be linked between members of a family or
household, can verify personal income, household income, the
number and disability status of dependents, participation in retirement
savings or higher education and even housing purchases.
This expanded administrative function–without an increase in
the departmental workforce–may even have permitted other federal
departments to reduce their workforce. The largest programmatic
portfolio, Employment and Social Development (formerly Human
Resources and Skills Development), oversees a little more than $100
billion in federal spending, nearly one third of total budgetary
spending. Many benefits that might normally be viewed as part of its
portfolio, education savings grants, child benefits and seniors’
benefits, are now largely administered or verified through the tax
code. So it’s less surprising to find that the number of full-time
equivalent employees in the department has decreased 13% from
23,168 in 2007-08 to 22,832 in 2013-14.
Finally, to the extent that governments are concerned with the
durability of their policies once they leave office, tax expenditures are
very attractive for their resilience. Program expenditures that are
“booked” and periodically reviewed and audited are easier to see and
easier to cut. As noted by Lester, leaving tax credits out of regular
spending reviews creates a broad swath of public spending that is
effectively excluded from public accounting policy and best
practice.36 Because they are less visible, tax expenditures are much
harder to cut. Furthermore, because existing credits are built-in to
projections of current and future tax revenues prepared by officials,
policymakers are primed to treat credits as sunk-costs.
Tax expenditures, once introduced, become part of the fiscal
framework. While we define a tax expenditure as a deviation from
some benchmark system, over time, various credits come to be seen
as part of that benchmark. For example, in a 2012 study of tax
expenditures, Lester defined Registered Retirement Savings Plans–
including foregone taxation on investment income, the cost of annual
deductions and tax-sheltered withdrawals–as part of the benchmark
tax system rather than a deviation from it.37 Yet, when RRSPs were
first debated and introduced in 1957, it was clear that policymakers
understood they were introducing a deliberate deviation into the tax
code of the day. Like so many other budgets that have introduced
other, new deviations since, the 1957 budget offered an estimate of
the future annual cost in foregone federal revenues from the new
RRSP policy. It seems almost quaint now that the then Minister of
Finance (Walter Harris) told the House of the new RRSP that “in
subsequent years, if widespread use is made of the plan, it is possible
that the annual yield of the income tax may in the future be reduced
by as much as $40 million.”38 Today the net cost of RRSPs (after
taxable withdrawals) reported by the Department of Finance is $13.2
billion, 39 times larger than the original projection after inflation.39
What’s more, that $13.2 billion figure, is never mentioned in budget
speeches or documents delivered by present-day federal ministers of
finance. It (like so many other tax exemptions, deductions and
credits) has come to be viewed as part of the baseline tax system.
Over time, layers of these credits accumulate on the tax code, like
layers of wallpaper. Any single layer becomes politically difficult to
remove, particularly if it isn’t quickly replaced by some similar
alternative.
For example, when the Harper government announced its new
income-splitting Family Tax Cut, it also announced the termination of
the Child Tax Credit, a non-refundable tax credit of $2,234 (at 15%
for a net value of $335) per child under age 18. The Child Tax Credit
was a measure introduced years earlier by the same government.
Cancelling the CTC is projected to save $1.75 billion in fiscal year
2015-16, which is very nearly enough to full off-set the projected
$1.94 billion cost of the new Family Tax Cut.40 The slight of hand of
course, is that while all families with children up to age 18 were able
to claim the CTC, only some will be eligible to claim the Family Tax
Cut and only a very few will receive any real benefit from it. In this
case, the Child Tax Credit was only terminated when something else,
and something more politically valuable to the government, was
introduced.
CONCLUSIONS
The previous section described, at some length, the various policy and
political advantages of tax expenditures for policymakers in the
Executive. These advantages are available, regardless of partisan
affiliation and they are not new. So why have the Conservatives
embraced boutique credits with such gusto? The answer is a particular
alignment between the advantages of the policy instrument, the
political circumstances the Harper government found itself in through
its first and second mandates, and, most importantly, the brand the
Harper government sought to establish and maintain.
The election platforms of the Conservative Party for 2006,
2008 and 2011 are instructive. Each provides a detailed list of
commitments across economic, family, criminal justice, international
affairs, aboriginal rights and public administration/governance policy
fields, as nearly all federal party platforms have done since the mid-
1990’s. Despite the scope of policy topics covered, there is a
remarkably repetitive use of boutique credits and tax measures,
sometimes even the very same tax measures, across all three
Conservative platform documents. Take the use of personal income
tax measures alone. The 2006 platform41 listed13 separate
commitments based on tax credits, exemptions, refundable credits, or
other reductions all aimed at individual tax payers. The 2008
platform42 offered nine similar commitments based on tax credits for
individual tax payers and, in fact, the entire chapter on benefits for
families is based solely on tax credits. Many of the nine commitments
involve little more than many tweaking or enhancing measures
already implemented by the Harper government, such as changes to
the Registered Disability Savings Plan and the Universal Child Care
Benefit. The 2011 platform43 lists another 10 commitments based
again on tax credits including a blanket commitment to not raise taxes
on individuals or corporations. In fact, the emphasis on low-taxation
in that platform is so strong that it was included in the title of the
document itself. It was the central message of the Conservative’s
electoral campaign in 2011 but it was also present in 2008 and 2006,
reflecting deliberate choices by political managers, not happenstance.
Having, in 2006, chosen some personal income tax instruments,
the subsequent platforms returned to the same trough again and again.
Perhaps the best illustration of this trend is in the treatment of the
Child Fitness Tax Credit. In 2006, the party promised to introduce a
new federal credit of $500 for parents with children aged 16 and
under enrolled in programs to promote physical fitness. No cost
projections were included in the platform itself. In 2008, the party
again included the Child Fitness Tax Credit in its platform with a
commitment to make it a refundable, rather than non-refundable,
credit. The platform lists the cost of all measures aimed at “health and
fitness” in one lump-sum amount of $40 million per year. The exact
share attributed to the proposed transformation of the one credit is
unknown. Despite being returned with a second, though larger,
minority government, the promised change to the Child Fitness Tax
Credit was never made. Then, in 2011, the party proposed again to
tweak the Credit by doubling its value and making it refundable,
conditional on eliminating the federal deficit. The October
announcement made by the Prime Minister was, in actuality, no less
than six years in the making although it was framed, in the
announcement, as a fulfillment of a promise made in the most recent
election campaign.
Keeping, or at least being seen to keep, electoral promises is
critical to governments of all political stripes and at all levels who
need to maintain political support. It is one of a dwindling number of
measures to guard against further erosion in public confidence in
elected offices and political parties. But the fact that the Harper
government, in office, has regularly and repeatedly returned to the
same trough of boutique credits cannot be explained simply in terms
of keeping campaign commitments. The question is why they made
the boutique commitments to begin with. I think there are at least
three features of these tax credits that have made them so attractive to
the Harper government in particular.
First, as described earlier in this chapter, tax credits are,
compared to many other policy instruments, far easier to implement.
For a government that did not have a majority of Commons seats in
either of its first two Parliaments, more expedient mechanisms for
delivering on policy commitments would have been deeply attractive.
The language of the 2006 Conservative election platform is also
instructive on this point. In the opening message from the party
leader, Harper wrote “it’s time for a new government that will get
things done.” That same text also told “everyday Canadians” that
“this election provides them with a chance to tell Liberal Ottawa that
they’ve had enough; that they’re tired of being forgotten; that it’s
finally their turn.”44 Having framed a narrative that positioned the
Conservatives as outsiders in an unfriendly government town, a
policy agenda that relied heavily on boutique credits would have
allowed them to be seen to deliver changes for those “everyday
Canadians”. Insiders do not need to worry so much about potential
obstacles to getting things done. After nearly ten years in government,
the Conservative brand continues to cultivate that position outsider in
a “Liberal Ottawa”, a point emphasized in the Prime Minister’s 2014
Calgary speech.
Second, boutique credits are, by definition, highly targeted
instruments that rely on self-assessment in a way that direct spending
measures cannot. That targeting is especially symbiotic with political
communications based on finding narrowly defined voter segments.
When implemented in sufficient numbers, targeted tax measures can
create multiple political communications opportunities for a
government in perpetual campaign mode. The most recent change to
the Child Fitness Tax Credit, for example, was announced not in the
traditional venue of the House of Commons but instead at a state-of-
the-art community centre that delivers accessible sports and
recreational programs in Whitby, Ontario. Likewise, the
announcement of the new Family Tax Cut (and changes to the
Universal Child Care Benefit and Child Care Expenses Deduction)
was made at a community centre in Vaughn, Ontario in what was
widely described as another “campaign-style event”, complete with
photos of the Prime Minister doing a craft project with children.45
Shortly after the announcement, the Conservative Party distributed
(through email, social media and their own website) an interactive
info-graphic that invited users to learn more about the recent income
tax changes by selecting the cartoon image that best represented their
own family.46
Like other cross-platform electronic communications from all
federal political parties, the info-graphic also included prominent
hyperlinks marked “Join” and “Donate” to encourage viewers, so
excited by the boutique credit on offer, to immediately deliver a
financial reward to the Conservative Party. Future re-announcements
of both boutique credits can then be duplicated by Conservative MPs
in ridings across the country in community settings far more visually
appealing and accessible to individual voters (and local media outlets)
than dull footage from a faraway House of Commons. For a party that
relies on identifying segments of a voting population to assemble a
minimum-winning coalition,47 boutique credits allow its political
managers and leaders to craft communications experiences directly to
and with those same crucial subsets of the population.
More than most other instruments in the federal policy tool-
chest, boutique credits allow for something approximating a direct-to-
consumer strategy. That direct relationship and interaction with
individual voters, in turn, reinforces the brand identification of party
as one that delivers measureable benefits to self-identified “everyday
Canadians”. Using a public choice frame, this approach significantly
reduces the information asymmetry in transactions between taxpayers
and custodians of public revenues. For those selected taxpaying
members of the voting public, the benefit of the credit is tangible and
the government providing it can be perceived as immediate and
responsive, if only as they fill in their annual tax return, rather than
remote and uncaring in distant Ottawa.
Finally, boutique credits come with little or no noticeable
marginal increase in administrative overhead requirements. The
Canada Revenue Agency already has the capital and labour to
administer the tax code. A boutique credit–even one costing billions
in foregone revenues–requires no concurrent increase in labour or
capital costs to be implemented. For a party brand that emphasizes
smaller government and fiscal restraint, boutique credits allow them
to spend billions without making government bigger. Under the
Harper government, total government revenues as a share of GDP
have fallen from near 16% in 2006-07 to just over 14% in 2014-15.48
Likewise, following a short-lived stimulus spending spree in 2009
and 2010, program expenses as a share of GDP have returned to pre-
recession and record low levels of just under 13%. But, according to
Sheikh, the ratio of government spending to GDP increases
significantly when tax expenditures are taken into account, in fact
nearly 25% higher than traditional measures of public revenue and
spending.49 While Sheikh’s data show that the gap between the
published and his estimated measure predates the Harper government,
they also seem to suggest that the gap has increased and remained
higher (by about 3% of GDP) since 2006. But, for a wide range of
standard practices in fiscal management and public accounting,
neither voters nor their representatives in Parliament will receive
information that reframes all tax expenditures as spending. From a lay
perspective, it seems counterintuitive to label a tax reduction as
“spending”. And yet, in terms of public finances, that is exactly what
each boutique credit is. Boutique credits, like all tax expenditures, are
a way to spend without being seen to do so.
For a party brand that deliberately promises to avoid new
spending yet needs to provide a regular stream of targeted policy
announcements that can be quickly and easily implemented, boutique
credits are an ideal instrument choice. Critiques that point to a lack of
evidence for any economic return, large windfall gains or the
regressive nature of credits whose value rises with taxable income,
are all missing a key point about a central function of boutique credits
in a Harper government–they help to communicate the brand. Like a
boutique retailer selling brand name goods, the boutique will stay
open for as long Canadians are willing to keep buying.
__________________________
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Chapter 9
BALANCED BUDGET LEGISLATION: LESSONS THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT CAN DRAW FROM THE
EXPERIENCES OF CANADIAN PROVINCES
Genevieve Tellier
INTRODUCTION
The issues discussed in this chapter centre on the theme of balanced-
budget legislation in Canada. This is a salient topic, as the federal
government announced in its most recent Speech from the Throne
that it would table balanced-budget legislation (see postscript at the
end of the chapter). This announcement comes as something of a
surprise. While a government strongly committed to sound, prudent
budgeting may reasonably be expected to adopt such legislation,
surprisingly, no such federal legislation had been enacted before the
outbreak of the 2008 financial crisis, even though a large majority of
Canadian provinces have done so over the last twenty-five years.
Furthermore, balanced-budget legislation has recently become
popular in several countries. While only four countries had balanced-
budget legislation in 1990, this number had risen to 41 in 2000 and 67
in 2013.1 Consequently, the Canadian federal government seems to
be somewhat at odds with current trends.
The objective of the chapter is to examine why the federal
government has not yet enacted balanced-budget legislation. I argue
that the primary reason for governments to adopt such legislation is to
signal competency, not to balance public budgets. The Canadian
experience pertaining to the elimination of public deficits clearly
shows that legislated rules are neither necessary nor sufficient
conditions to ensure fiscal discipline in the budget process. On
several occasions, federal and provincial governments were able to
balance their budgets without being forced to do so by legislation.
Furthermore, balanced-budget rules do not automatically prevent the
occurrence of deficits. Governments introduce balanced-budget
legislation to demonstrate that they are committed to fiscal discipline
and that they will manage public funds accordingly.
Consequently, governments enact legislation with objectives
that they are confident they can achieve, and they will not hesitate to
amend or repeal legislation if these objectives change.
Notwithstanding this instrumentalization of legislated rules by
governments, however, balanced-budget laws also yield benefits for
citizens. As governments wish to demonstrate their competency, they
need to articulate their budget initiatives publicly. Hence, balanced-
budget legislation creates greater openness and transparency in the
budget process.
The analysis begins with a brief description of the evolution of
public deficits and debts in Canada. This overview explains the
growing popularity of balanced-budget legislation in the country over
about the last twenty-five years. Next, I examine how the federal
government has addressed the issues of deficits and debts since the
1980s, as Canada began to experience a significant deterioration of its
fiscal position. This section also explains why the federal government
has not introduced a balanced-budget law and why it is now doing so.
The following section centres on provincial legislation. In the analysis
in this section, I examine the circumstances that led to the
introduction and subsequent maintenance (or not) of legislated rules
and draw some lessons from the provinces’ experiences. The analysis
concludes with a general appreciation of balanced-budget legislation
in our democracies.
THE EVOLUTION OF PUBLIC DEFICITS IN CANADA: A BRIEF
OVERVIEW
A few facts about federal and provincial fiscal positions
Public deficits and debts have recently been the focus of substantial
attention and debate in Canada. However, their presence is certainly
not a novelty in the country. As far back as the early years of
Confederation (to say nothing of the previous period), federal and
provincial governments have borrowed monies to finance public
programs. Until the mid-20th century, however, the use of deficits was
not systematic. Rather, they occurred irregularly, typically to finance
vast infrastructure projects, economic recovery programs, or wars.2
This situation also prevailed after World War II until the 1970s.
Between 1947 and 1970, half of all budgets tabled by federal and
provincial governments forecasted budgetary surpluses.3 From
Confederation until the mid-1970s, public deficits were also of small
magnitude, helping limit public debt. In 1970, federal and provincial
net debts amounted to 13.4 and 3.1 per cent of Gross Domestic
Product (GDP), respectively.4 Net debt equals total liabilities minus
total financial assets. Unless indicated otherwise, all debt figures cited
refer to net debt at the end of the fiscal year (31 March). Debt charges
were also small, representing approximately 2 per cent of Gross
National Product for the federal government and .2 per cent for the
provinces before 1970.
The fiscal position of the country changed significantly during
the last quarter of the 20th century. The federal deficit began to
increase markedly from 1975, reaching unprecedented levels in the
early 1990s. This new trend coincided with the establishment of
several welfare programs, the oil crises of the 1970s, and the 1981/82
and 1991 economic recessions. By fiscal year 1989-90, federal
interest payments had reached record levels: for every dollar collected
by the government, 35 cents was allocated to debt servicing (total
debt servicing costs were equal to 6.1 per cent of GDP). That same
year, the federal debt alone reached 39.6 per cent of GDP.5 Provincial
public deficits also began to grow significantly after 1975, although
not simultaneously in all provinces. The size of provincial debt also
varied across provinces. In 1990, the total provincial debt represented
15.6 per cent of GDP, while debt charges stood at 1.8 per cent of
GDP.
A distinct pattern, however, had clearly emerged by the end of
the 1990s. The federal deficit began to decline during the 1993-94
fiscal year, leading to the government to realize a surplus five years
later in 1998-99. Federal surpluses would continue to appear every
year until 2008-09, and these surpluses were substantial. From 1998-
99 to 2003-04, for instance, they amounted to $95.6 billion, which
represents an annual average of $16 billon. Two-thirds of these
surpluses ($59.2 billion, to be precise) were used for debt repayment.6
By 2008-09, the federal debt had declined to $464 billion, or 29.0 per
cent of GDP, from an historic peak of $563 billion, or 68.4 per cent of
GDP, in 1995-96. Moreover, debt servicing costs had returned to their
pre-1970 level, at 1.9 per cent of GDP (or 13.1 per cent of total
federal revenues).
Most provincial governments also generated surpluses during
the same period, although not of similar magnitude to the federal
surpluses (with the exception of Alberta, which eliminated its net debt
in 2004). Similar to the federal debt, the total provincial debt also
decreased markedly, from 29.3 per cent of GDP in 1999-2000 (its all-
time high) to 20.5 per cent in 2007-08. Debt charges decreased from
3.6 to 1.5 per cent of GDP during the same period. All ten provincial
governments were ultimately able to generate budget surpluses in
2007-08, the fiscal year that preceded the financial crisis of 2008.
This financial crisis significantly altered Canada’s fiscal
position. Public deficits had returned, with consequential effects. The
federal deficit for fiscal year 2009-10 alone reached nearly $60
billion. Although a record high in absolute terms, the ratio of the
federal deficit to GDP remained well below the levels attained during
the 1980s and 1990s, standing at 3.5 per cent of GDP in 2009-10, and
this figure has declined every year since, reaching .3 per cent in 2013-
14. The federal debt also increased after the financial crisis, yet it too
remained below the levels witnessed decades earlier. As of 2013-14,
the federal debt stood at $682.3 billion, or 36.3 per cent of GDP,
while debt charges remained below 2 per cent of GDP after 2008.
The financial crisis also altered the fiscal position of provincial
governments. All provinces ran deficits after 2008, although some
were able to rely on reserve funds to balance their budgets (especially
Saskatchewan and Alberta). Similar to the federal government,
provincial deficits, debts, and debt charges have not returned to their
previous record levels (representing 1.7, 25.4, and 1.5 per cent of
GDP, respectively, in 2009-10). However, most provinces still incur
deficits. Only three provinces (Saskatchewan, Alberta, and British
Colombia) tabled budgets that anticipated surpluses for 2014-151.
Provincial debt has increased since 2009-10, standing at 28.6 per cent
of GDP, close to its all-time peak (which was 29.3 per cent of GDP in
1999-00).
How did we get there?
The fiscal position of the country has changed considerably since the
mid-1970s. Public deficits and debts have grown significantly over
the last forty years, and although the financial burden of public
deficits and debts has been reduced to some extent over the past ten to
twenty years, their presence remains significant. Given this situation,
one may ask why governments have allowed the extensive use of
deficits and why it seems so difficult for them to adhere to strict fiscal
discipline. According to some scholars, the persistence of public
deficits is a direct consequence of our democratic institutions. In
democracies, public spending is inevitably higher than what is
appropriate, as the adoption of a policy requires that only a majority
of voters (or a majority of their elected representatives) support it.
This rule creates a “common pool problem”, as the individuals
benefiting from and supporting a particular initiative assume only a
portion of its financial costs because the total cost of the policy is
distributed across all taxpayers, including future taxpayers if the state
borrows. The true benefit of a policy is therefore underestimated by
the majority that supports it, leading to total spending in excess of a
socially desirable level.7 In addition, decision-making rules for
parliamentary budgeting do not require decisions on spending and
taxation to be made simultaneously, exacerbating the common pool
problem.8
According to other scholars, a government’s lack of
commitment to fiscal discipline is rooted in the nature of budget
administrative procedures. As Wildavsky explains, participants in the
budgetary decision-making process belong to one of two groups:
“spenders”, who are responsible for the delivery of public programs
and services, and “guardians”, who are responsible for ensuring that
public monies are managed efficiently and that governments live
within their means.9 Decision makers from both line departments
(spenders) and Finance and other central agencies (guardians) must
collaborate in an environment that has become increasingly complex.
Consequently, budgetary decisions are made incrementally (the
current year’s budget is based on the previous year’s budget), and
they result from compromises between spenders and guardians.
Over time, spenders have learnt to ask for more money each
year, and guardians have learnt to oppose some but not all of their
demands, simultaneously demonstrating fiscal discipline and
flexibility.10 Overall, increasing public spending is easier than
reducing it: “Whenever there is a crunch, administrative agencies will
add on the costs of their programmatic proposals; they will not, unless
compelled, subtract one from the other. Subtraction suggests
competition in which there have to be losers; addition is about
cooperation in which (within government) there are only winners.
When the economy produces sufficient surplus, spending grows
painlessly; when there isn’t quite enough to go around, spending
grows noiselessly as inflation increases effective taxation or tax
expenditures and loan guarantees substitute for amounts that would
otherwise appear in the red. The budget grows. A downward dip now
and again does not slow its inexorable progress”.11
Both the common pool problem and the incremental model
suggest that the problem of public deficits and debts results from a
disconnect between spending and revenue decisions. Balanced-budget
legislation can therefore provide a solution insofar as it attempts to
eliminate that divide. As we will see, however, balanced-budget
legislation is not an essential prerequisite for doing so. We find
examples of governments achieving a balanced budget without
balanced-budget legislation at the federal and provincial levels. The
next section examines the federal case.
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE TO DEFICITS
As shown in the previous section, the size of federal deficits and debt
began to decline significantly in the mid-1990s. However,
government efforts to restore fiscal discipline began several years
earlier. Once they were elected in 1984, the Progressive
Conservatives under the leadership of Brian Mulroney indicated that
they were committed to reducing the deficit and controlling public
debt. The Tories nonetheless failed to balance the budget. The
principal cause of this failure was their inability to control the growth
of public expenditures. Despite several initiatives by central agencies
to limit spending increases, most cabinet ministers were able to
appeal directly to the prime minister to support their own initiatives,
thereby circumventing the Department of Finance’s plans.12 As
former Finance Minister Michael Wilson confessed: “I could never
get the support I need in cabinet to get it [the deficit] under control,
and I’m sorry for it”.13 In other words, spenders dominated the budget
process.
The Spending Control Act introduced in 1992 seems to have
been the Tories’ decisive initiative to curb spending. Tabled near the
end of their second electoral mandate, the legislation targeted the core
of the problem, it seems, by imposing strict legal ceilings on
spending. The law would limit the rate of growth in program
spending to 3 per cent per year on average for a five-year period
(from 1991-92 to 1995-96). In reality, however, the legislation
changed little. It merely compelled the government to do exactly what
it had “been doing since 1984”14, as the annual growth in spending
programs had already averaged 3 per cent since the Progressive
Conservatives took power. Furthermore, the Spending Control Act
imposed retroactive limits, as it was enacted after the government had
already tabled its 1991-92 and 1992-93 budgets (the legislated limits
were for estimates, not actual spending).
Therefore, the government knew that it was in compliance with
the law, at least during the first two years covered by the Spending
Control Act. Ultimately, the legislation did not change the balance of
power between spenders and guardians. Instead, the initiative aimed
to provide legitimacy and visibility to a government that was
struggling with an increasing deficit and debt while facing low
popular support among voters and growing competition from the
Reform Party (which was advocating balanced-budget legislation).
The strategy used by the Liberal government led by Jean
Chrétien and Minister of Finance Paul Martin to eliminate of the
federal deficit was entirely different. Once they came to power in
1993, the Liberals showed no interest in using legislative rules to
engender fiscal discipline. In his first budget, Paul Martin clearly
rejected the idea of extending the period covered by the Spending
Control Act: “The Spending Control Act also requires that the
government make a recommendation in the 1994 budget, as to
whether or not the Spending Control Act should be extended beyond
1995-96. The government will adhere to the spending control limits
set out in the current legislation, but is not recommending the
extension of the Act beyond 1995-96. The control of expenditures
which this government is exercising clearly makes the Act
redundant”.15
Instead, the government announced a major deficit reduction
plan for the coming years in its 1995 budget. Among other initiatives,
the plan imposed a two-year freeze on the salaries of federal public
servants, made major cuts to certain programs (even if such cuts
entailed sacrificing some election promises contained in their Red
Book, such as cuts to the Unemployment Insurance program),
established a Program Review to examine the relevance of each
federal program, significantly reduced the government’s financial
contribution to federal/provincial programs, and relied on prudent
macroeconomic assumptions.16
Within four years, the federal deficit was eliminated. Although
the success of the Liberals in balancing the budget resulted from a
combination of various factors, this outcome would likely not have
occurred were it not for Chrétien and Martin’s strong commitment to
fiscal discipline. Paul Martin not only vigorously pledged to reduce
the deficit "come hell or high water" but also received the
unconditional support of the prime minister, himself a former finance
minister.17 The power clearly shifted from the spenders to the
guardians under the leadership of Chrétien and Martin.
This success can also be attributed to the skilful communication
strategy developed by the Department of Finance. Once he became
finance minister, Martin took on the task of holding large public
consultations involving both budget experts and citizens. The 1994
budget, for instance, was preceded by several public roundtables and
conferences held in various cities, which were attended by the finance
minister himself, as well as debates in the House of Commons.18
These initiatives were representative of the new style of leadership
emerging from the Finance Department. Martin transformed the
budget process in a way that allowed him not only to justify
budgetary initiatives but also to shape public expectations and
mobilize public support for the government’s initiatives.19
Upon taking office in 2006, Harper’s Conservatives inherited
an excellent fiscal position. The government’s books had been
balanced for some years, the country was experiencing a period of
economic growth, and the federal debt was showing a downward
trend. The previous Liberal government had pledged to reduce the
federal debt-to-GDP ratio to 25 per cent by 2014-15.20 One of the
Conservatives’ first announcements was their intention to achieve this
objective one year earlier, in 2013-14.21
Under the leadership of Stephen Harper, the federal
government would clearly behave in a strictly fiscally responsible
manner. However, the 2008 financial crisis seriously challenged the
Conservatives’ commitment. Faced with the treat of a vote of no
confidence in Parliament, the then-minority Conservative government
reluctantly presented a stimulus package totalling $62 billion.
However, the Conservatives immediately committed to return to a
balanced budget as soon as possible.
Similar to the previous Liberal government, the Conservatives
were committed to adhering to principals of strict fiscal discipline. A
noteworthy difference between the Liberals and the Conservatives,
however, resides in the strategy they selected to establish their
respective competency and credibility on budgetary matters. While
the Liberals emphasized openness and transparency, by encouraging
public consultations and debates, the Conservatives focused on
demonstrating their successes to convince the public of their
economic management skills, especially by cutting spending and
increasing the efficiency of government programs.22 They developed
a sophisticated marketing communication strategy to highlight their
competency (millions were spent on advertising for budget initiatives)
and limited the participation of opposing political parties in budget
debates (with the extensive use of large omnibus budget bills, among
other strategies).
The proposed balanced-budget legislation announced in the
2013 Speech from the Throne was well suited to this communication
strategy. The announcement was made when the fiscal position of the
government was improving significantly (a recent economic update
indicated that the current deficit would be nearly $7 billion lower than
projections six months beforehand), and the legislation would
presumably come into force after the budget was balanced.
Overall, two factors significantly contributed to the success of
the federal government’s efforts to eliminate its deficit. First,
balanced budgets became a reality when fiscal discipline was clearly
the government’s top priority. The federal experience suggests that
balanced-budget initiatives must be unreservedly supported by key
decision makers (e.g., the prime minister) who are strongly
committed to fiscal discipline (and who therefore act as guardians).
Second, an extensive communication strategy was used to
demonstrate the government’s strong commitment to eliminating
deficits publicly, as difficult decisions were made to cut spending.
The enactment of legislation that contains strict fiscal targets can be
one element of such a communication strategy. However, such
legislation is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition to achieve
a balanced budget.
The federal case suggests that right-wing parties could be more
inclined to use legislation to demonstrate their commitment to fiscal
discipline. Furthermore, the introduction of legislation might be
influenced by the electoral calendar, as both the Spending Control Act
and the Conservatives’ proposal were presented at the end of their
electoral mandate. An examination of the circumstances that led to
the adoption (and subsequent amendment) of provincial legislation
will provide useful information to determine whether ideology and
elections matter.
SURVEYING THE PROVINCIAL SCENE
The federal case alone is insufficient to formulate generalizations
regarding the origins and purposes of balanced-budget legislation.
Canadian provinces, however, provide an excellent opportunity to
analyse balanced-budget rules, as most have enacted legislation to
that effect. Furthermore, all provincial laws were introduced more
than a decade ago, and all were subsequently amended; therefore,
provincial balanced-budget laws provide a rich and diverse set of
observations.
Why do provincial governments adopt balanced-budget legislation?
The Canadian federal experience suggests that balanced-budget laws
are regarded more positively by right-wing governments and are more
likely to be introduced just before elections. Neither explanation,
however, finds empirical support in the provincial context. As the
information contained in Table 9.1 shows, more than half of
provincial balanced-budget laws were enacted by centrist or left-wing
governments, and fewer than half were introduced less than a year
before general elections.
Table 9.1 First enactment of provincial balanced-budget
legislations
Province Legislation Date of
Enactment
(Royal Assent)
Governing
Party
General
Election
Dates
Nova Scotia Expenditure Control Act 17 May 1996 * Lib 25 May
1993
24 March
1998
New
Brunswick
Balanced Budget Act 7 May 1993 Lib 23
September
1991
11
September
1995
Quebec An Act Respecting the Elimination
of the Deficit and a Balanced
Budget
23 December
1996
PQ 12
September
1994
30
November
1998
Ontario Taxpayer Protection and Balanced
Budget Act
14 December
1999
PC 3 June
1999
2 October
2003
Manitoba The Balanced Budget, Debt
Repayment and Taxpayer
Accountability Act
3 November
1995
PC 25 April
1995
21
September
1999
Saskatchewan The Balanced Budget Act 18 May 1995 NDP 21
October
1991
21 June
1995
Alberta Deficit Elimination Act 14 May 1993 ** PC 20 March
1989 
15 June
1993
British
Columbia
Taxpayer Protection Act
The Balanced Budget Act
22 March 1991
**
6 July 2000 *
SC
NDP
17
October
1991
28 May
1996
16 May
2001
* The Expenditure Control Act was initially introduced in 1993 to limit spending. It was
amended in 1996 to forbid deficits.
** A Spending Control Act was enacted in 1992, limiting spending only.
*** The Taxpayer Protection Act was repealed in 1992. The province had no legislated
rules until 2000.
Another factor that may have prompted provinces to adopt
balanced-budget rules is the deterioration of their fiscal position. All
provincial balanced-budget laws were first introduced when
provincial deficits had increased significantly nearly everywhere in
the country. Some have suggested that stricter provincial legislation
was necessary because financial markets perceived Canadian
provinces to be at greater risk of default than the federal
government.23 This hypothesis is also not confirmed. Examining the
data presented in Table 9.2, we observe that legislation was
introduced after deficits began to decrease and while credit-rating
agencies maintained their scores for most provinces. Even
Saskatchewan, which likely faced the most serious financial
challenge at the time, introduced balanced-budget legislation in 1995,
once it had gained control of its spending and balanced its budget.24A
reverse relationship between balanced-budget rules and deficit size
seems more plausible. Indeed, provincial balanced-budget laws are
the consequence, not the cause, of fiscal discipline.
Table 9.2 Annual deficits and credit-rating scores of Canadian
provincial governments, 1990-91 to 2000-01
First row shows public account provincial deficit, $Millions (Department of Finance, Fiscal
Reference Tables, 2014) and second row Moody’s credit-rating scores
(https://www.moodys.com/). Rating Scales are (in descending order): Aaa; Aa1, Aa2, Aa3;
A1, A2, A3; Baa1, Baa2, Baa3; …; Gray cells show years legislations were enacted.
Therefore, governments primarily introduce balanced-budget
rules to provide a public signal that they are fiscally disciplined and
thus competent. What follows the enactment of such legislation?
Some have argued that, notwithstanding the reasons for their initial
introduction, legislated rules force governments to achieve balanced
budgets, as legislation conveys a strong symbolic message and as
elected officials wish to demonstrate their competency by complying
with the law.25 We find only partial support for this hypothesis in
Canada. On the one hand, provincial governments take great care to
demonstrate that they are acting in accordance with the law. For
instance, they frequently show their commitment in budget speeches,
news releases, public discourses, and so forth.
On the other hand, they do not hesitate to change the law when
they are confronted with the prospect of running a prohibited deficit.
Clearly, governments can more easily abide by the law when
economic conditions are favourable. Occasionally, improvement in a
province’s fiscal position will encourage some governments to
introduce new legislated fiscal targets. Such targets typically compel
governments to dedicate budget surpluses to specific uses (such as
paying down debt, establishing reserve or “rainy-day” funds, or
creating capital accounts to finance long-term projects).
However, when a province’s fiscal position is deteriorating,
governments systematically weaken legislated balanced-budget rules.
Such a situation occurred in British Columbia in 1992, Ontario in
2004, and in British Columbia, Alberta, Manitoba, Quebec, New
Brunswick, and Nova Scotia after the 2008 financial crisis. Deficits
were legally authorized in Saskatchewan and Ontario. Alberta
legislation forbids deficits even in the presence of transfers from the
province’s stabilization fund. Therefore, provincial governments
prefer to amend the law by introducing greater flexibility rather than
to face the prospect of running a deficit and being labelled
incompetent fiscal managers.
Changing legislated rules, however, can be detrimental to a
government’s popularity. Any attempt to soften balanced-budget
provisions can steer public debates and provide a basis for opposing
parties to question the government’s competency. This precise
situation occurred in Manitoba in 2010, when the government
suddenly decided to reduce cabinet minister pay cuts that were to
come in effect because the province was forecasting deficits. The
opposition and several interest groups were quick to denounce what
was regarded as opportunistic behaviour, while voter support for the
government plunged.26 By contrast, most provincial governments that
sought to lessen balanced-budget legislation took time to develop
sophisticated communication strategies to support their initiatives.
These strategies were based on extensive public consultations.
Extensive popular consultations were launched in Ontario in 2004,
Nova Scotia in 2010, and Alberta in 2013. All three provincial
governments faced important constraints that limited their ability to
present new budget initiatives. In Ontario, financial penalties were
imposed on cabinet members if deficits were anticipated; the Nova
Scotian government was required to achieve a balanced budget every
year; and the Alberta government was forbidden to use borrowing
under any circumstances.
All three governments employed online polling and town hall
meetings and/or discussion groups to gather information on the
population’s preferences with respect to a balanced budget. In
Ontario, voters were also randomly selected to participate in citizens’
jury sessions held across the province. Ontario and Nova Scotia also
required that experts formulate recommendations to improve the
province’s fiscal accountability framework2. Amendments that
precisely matched the opinion expressed by the majority of the
participants in the consultations were subsequently introduced in all
three provinces.
Ontarians indicated that they wanted the government to find
alternatives to its “deficit-obsessed approach” and to report on the
state of the deficit before the next election.27 Penalty provisions were
removed, and new rules requiring the Ontario government to
regularly publish detailed budgetary information on the province’s
actual and future fiscal position (including a pre-election report) were
introduced. Currently, Ontario’s law can be considered the most
comprehensive of all Canadian legislation to this effect. The
government is required to produce reports on estimates, objectives,
and outcomes, which include quarterly updates, annual pre-budget
consultation reports, annual risk assessment reports, annual multi-
year fiscal plans, and post-election, long-term fiscal sustainability
reports (covering the next twenty years).
Nova Scotians stated that they were opposed to severe cuts to
eliminate the deficit within one year, adding that they would
recommend that the government return to a balanced budget as soon
as possible.28 The province’s requirement to balance the budget
annually was subsequently repealed. Albertans indicated that they
would support borrowing for infrastructure “under the right
conditions”.29 Under the new legislation, the government is
authorized to borrow to finance spending provided that debt-servicing
costs remain below a precise threshold (3 per cent of the province’s
average revenues).
However, initiating vast public consultations is time
consuming. This type of exercise involves the use of several
consultation mechanisms (e.g., town hall meetings, online polls,
expert panels) and requires that governments have sufficient time to
draft alternatives to present to the population, as these consultations
typically focus on a few specific themes3. These two conditions were
seriously lacking when the financial crisis of 2008 unexpectedly
forced all provincial governments to reconsider their budget plans.
This situation likely explains why all provincial governments
that were unable to balance their budgets without breaking the law
elected to suspend their legislation for a specific period instead of
taking the risk of been accused of acting illegally (even Nova Scotia
and Alberta initially suspended their legislation before amending it).
Notably, prior to the 2008 financial crisis, in only two provinces
(Quebec and Ontario) were governments authorized to incur deficits
during periods of severe economic recession. Surprisingly, only one
other province (New Brunswick) added such provisions after 2008. If
another severe economic crisis occurs, most provincial laws will not
provide governments with the necessary flexibility to face
“exceptional economic events”.
Until the 1990s, few restrictions existed to limit the power of
provincial budget decision makers to spend financial resources. The
1990s can then be regarded as a new era, when new fiscal rules were
adopted to constrain budget decision makers. Why have a majority of
provincial governments decided to adopt legislation in this regard,
whereas the federal government has not? This situation is more easily
understood if we regard legislation as an instrument of
communication that is used by some governments to demonstrate that
they are fiscally responsible. Balanced-budget legislation is not a
policy motivated by ideology or electoral considerations or caused by
deteriorating fiscal conditions. Rather, such legislation represents a
tool that a government can use to signal its competency as a sound
fiscal manager.
As balanced-budget rules introduce rigidity in the budget
process, not all governments will desire to be constrained by such
legislation (the Chrétien and Martin Liberal federal governments,
Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, Newfoundland, and Labrador).
Furthermore, legislated rules are not a prerequisite for achieving a
balanced budget. Should we therefore conclude that such legislation
serves only the interest of governments? To answer this question, it
seems relevant to examine what lessons we can now draw from the
provincial experimentation with balanced-budget legislation more
closely
WHAT LESSON CAN WE DRAW FROM PROVINCIAL
LEGISLATION?
One interesting feature of provincial balanced-budget legislation is
the wide variety of rules that have been enacted over the years to
create greater fiscal discipline.30 For instance, some laws forbid
governments from forecasting deficits when budget estimates are
tabled (ex ante rules), whereas others require that governments
balance actual budgets at the end of the fiscal year (ex post rules – in
certain provinces, both ex ante and ex post rules are imposed). In
some cases, deficits are prohibited on an annual basis, whereas in
other cases, budgets are balanced at the end of a longer period
(typically the end of electoral mandates). Furthermore, deficits
occasionally include deficits or surpluses of crown corporations and
other public entities (e.g., boards of education, health agencies)
and/or special reserve funds (e.g., capital funds, reserve funds). Some
laws impose financial penalties on cabinet members when a deficit
occurs (ex ante and/or ex post), while others contain provisions to
establish reserve funds (typically contingency funds to provide
additional resources if unexpected circumstances arise during the year
and stabilization funds to help achieve balanced budgets over a longer
period). This diversity offers an excellent opportunity to examine
whether balanced-budget legislation effectively engenders fiscal
discipline.
First, we find that rules that impose financial penalties on
elected officials if deficits are incurred are ineffective. Deficits have
occurred in the three provinces that have (or had) such a provision:
Ontario, Manitoba, and British Columbia. Both Manitoba and Ontario
subsequently formally repealed or softened these rules, whereas
British Columbia decided to maintain them. Note that British
Columbia’s penalties are not substantial, although the legislation
tends to imply the opposite. While the law stipulates that the salary
payable to each cabinet member must be reduced by 10 per cent if the
province runs a deficit, and/or by another 10 per cent if a minister
does not achieve his/her annual spending targets, in practice, cabinet
members have incurred penalties averaging only 3.3 per cent of their
total annual salary, or approximately $5,000 per year, between 2009-
10 and 2013-14. This difference results because the penalty applied
only to the portion above the basic compensation for members of the
Legislative Assembly. Thus far, cabinet members have incurred only
a collective penalty.
By comparison, Alberta cabinet members recently volunteered
for a salary cut of approximately $10,000, as the province is facing a
serious revenue shortfall for 2014-15. Alberta’s balanced-budget
legislation does not contain penalty provisions. Even if salary cuts do
not dissuade governments from running deficits, they can convey a
message of empathy to the population during times of economic
hardship. Accordingly, governments often appear more inclined to
agree to voluntary cuts or freezes than to add such provisions in
balanced-budget legislation (Nova Scotia, Ontario, and New
Brunswick also adopted voluntary salary restraints for elected
representatives after the 2008 financial crisis). New Brunswick
amended its legislation in 2014 to include a financial penalty of
$2,500 on cabinet members in the event of a deficit. The provision
will enter into force for the 2018-19 budget.
Second, the rigidity imposed by balanced-budget legislation
conflicts with the flexibility that is occasionally required to design
budget plans. Thus far, provincial governments have not identified a
mechanism to resolve this issue. Their response to the 2008 financial
crisis is quite revealing in that respect, as most provinces chose to
suspend their legislation without subsequently amending it (by
including provisions that would address exceptional circumstances
such as a severe economic crisis). The case of Quebec likely explains
why provinces generally chose such a response, as Quebec’s
legislation contains the most detailed directives with which the
government is required to comply if a deficit occurs. One of the main
features of these provisions is to establish different rules for different
circumstances. Deficits of less than $1 billion must be resorbed
within a year, whereas larger ones must be eliminated over a multi-
year period in accordance with a prescribed financial plan.
Notwithstanding these provisions, Quebec was unable to comply with
the law after 2008; thus, it had to suspend its legislation. This
example illustrates how difficult it is to anticipate all future economic
circumstances. More generally, the provinces’ reluctance to include
escape clauses that would permit the suspension of the law under
extraordinary economic circumstances (escape clauses nevertheless
exist in most provinces for natural disasters and wars) suggests that
such provisions would be perceived as affording governments with
excessive discretionary power.
Third, balanced-budget legislation has clearly engendered
transparency and openness to the budget process. Although the
Ontario example suggests that governments compensate for less-
stringent fiscal rules with greater budget transparency, other
provinces’ legislation shows that both features can coexist. Similar to
the Ontario legislation, the laws in British Columbia and Alberta
require the presentation of detailed reports to provide information on
the province’s current and future financial position, the assumptions
used to produce budget estimates, interim and up-dated reports, multi-
year forecasting, risk assessment analyses, outcomes, and so forth.
Some have argued that legislated rules are ineffective because
governments can circumvent the law relatively easily by adopting
“creative” accounting methods to conceal the true extent of public
deficits.31 Such behaviour, however, does not seem to be the norm in
the provinces: most governments appear cautious and willing to
provide accurate information on the province’s fiscal position,
especially by complying with the recommendations presented by their
provincial auditor4. Furthermore, most provincial government have
taken action to provide more detailed information since the 2008
financial crisis. Whether citizens are interested in obtaining and using
this information, however, remains to be confirmed.
Fourth, the provinces that best weathered the 2008 financial
crisis were those that had accumulated financial reserves in previous
years. Both Alberta and Saskatchewan used part of their previous
budget surpluses to establish stabilization or “rainy-day” funds, which
were used to balance their budgets after 2008. Quebec and Manitoba
were also able to partially reabsorb their respective deficits by using
similar stabilization funds. However, the extent to which this outcome
can be attributed solely to stricter balanced-budget rules is unclear.
Alberta and Saskatchewan enjoyed exceptional economic growth
before 2008, which helped them to generate appreciable budget
surpluses. Furthermore, Saskatchewan accumulated its reserves
without being compelled to achieve strict numerical targets5. By
contrast, Manitoba’s reserves were insufficient to help the province
cope with the financial crisis even though the value of its stabilization
fund was above 5 per cent of the government’s operating expenses,
the minimum target prescribed by law. Reserve funds do help
governments cope with economic recessions. However, establishing
precisely how much should be set aside (i.e., how much current
taxpayers should pay for unforeseeable future events) seems difficult.
CONCLUSONS
As the federal government introduces balanced-budget legislation, a
close examination of the accomplishments of similar legislation in the
Canadian provinces is relevant. Legislated rules are often regarded as
effective tools that can force budget decision makers to behave in a
more fiscally disciplined manner. However, we do not find evidence
that supports this assertion. Canadian provinces were able to balance
their budgets without being constrained by legislated rules, and they
ran deficits despite the presence of such rules. However, balanced-
budget legislation did provide benefits.
First, such legislation benefited governments themselves, as it
can be part of an effective communication strategy to demonstrate
that governments are competent fiscal managers. Second, such
legislation may benefit citizens, as balanced-budget rules necessarily
increase the openness and transparency of the budget process.
Without clearly explaining their budget initiatives, governments
cannot establish their credibility as skilful managers.
Overall, balanced-budget legislation thus provides benefits for
the entire democratic process. However, these benefits are not
generated by stricter and simpler rules that force governments to
behave in a predictable manner. Budgets are conceived in a complex
environment that is in constant evolution. Governments must
therefore make decisions that are adapted to such circumstances. The
real benefits of balanced-budget laws lie in their capacity to open up
the budget process and to foster meaningful public debates on
important issues (such as the sustainability of public finances, the tax
burden on current and future taxpayers, the use of non-renewable
natural resources – i.e., issues relating to “common pool problems”).
Such debate, in turn, requires greater citizen involvement in the
decision-making process.
Postscript
On 21 April 2015, the federal government tabled a balanced budget.
A few weeks later, it also presented a balanced budget bill to the
House of Commons (as part of the omnibus bill C-59), which was
adopted on 22 June and came to force retroactively with the 2015
federal budget. The federal legislation contains three main elements.
The first is a financial penalty in the event of a deficit: the salaries of
the prime minister, cabinet ministers and deputy ministers would be
reduced by five per cent. This said, if a deficit is the result of
extraordinary circumstances (the bill identifies the following: natural
catastrophes, armed conflicts, and economic crises), salaries would be
frozen rather than cut. The second element is the appearance of the
minister of finance before the Standing Committee on Finance
whenever there is a deficit. The minister would be required to explain
the government’s financial situation and submit a recovery plan. The
third element is the requirement to allocate all budget surpluses to
paying off the debt.
Compared to provincial legislation, the federal bill can hardly
be said to be innovative. It contains only one unprecedented measure
—that of imposing financial penalties on non-elected officials. Civil
servants would thus be held at least partly responsible for the
occurrence of deficits. For the remainder of the bill, the government’s
initiative is quite timid compared to provincial bills. What are we to
make of the measures contained in the federal bill?
The government initiative relies largely on sanctions. Yet, as
the provincial cases have indicated, sanctions do not work. The
federal bill also creates an accountability mechanism by forcing the
minister of finance to appear before the Standing Committee on
Finance. However, this appearance would take place before a
parliamentary committee, which is not completely free of partisan
debates. This measure could well be advantageous to the government,
which would then be provided with an additional tribune to justify is
economic policy and recovery plan. Furthermore, the federal
government’s bill contains no measures that would enable it to create
a financial reserve to cope with unforeseen circumstances. We can
thus wonder whether budget surpluses should not also be used to
create a financial reserve. Lastly, the legislation contains no rules that
would force the government to publish detailed financial statements.
To conclude, the federal balanced legislation was presented at a
time when the government was able to table a balanced budget for the
first time during the last seven years. For that reason, the legislation
can certainly be beneficial for the federal government since it allows
it to show that it is concerned about the state of public finances and
that it manages it budgets in a competent and responsible manner.
However, it is less clear whether the federal law will contribute to
significantly improving the budget process and, above all, to help the
government deal with economic downturns (which may come sooner
that later, according to the latest economic forecasts).
__________________________
Footnotes
1 The situation changed for some provinces in 2015-16: Québec has tabled a balanced
budget, while Alberta’s then conservative government has forecasted a deficit (although the
budget was not adopted).
2 Ontario’s Report on the Review of the 2003-04 Fiscal Outlook (presented by former
provincial auditor Erik Peters) and Nova Scotia Economic Advisory Panel (Chaired by D.
Savoie).
3 For instance, the Dollars and Sense consultations asked Albertans to respond to four precise
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Chapter 10
FROM PATHWAYS TO “ASETS” IN ABORIGINAL
EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMMING1
Donna E. Wood
INTRODUCTION
Like all developed countries, Canada has a public employment
service (PES) that connects job seekers to employers. Until 1996 the
PES was run by a network of about 500 federally-managed Canada
Employment Centres across the country. They were also responsible
for delivering unemployment insurance benefits. Starting with
Alberta in 1996 and finishing in the Yukon in 2010, PES
responsibilities have now been devolved to each of the 13 provinces
and territories2 through bilateral administrative agreements, not
constitutional reform. Today it is provincial governments that carry
the prime responsibility for the design and delivery of government-
funded services to help the unemployed and underemployed upgrade
their skills and connect with employers through entities called
(among other names) ‘Emploi-Québec’, ‘WorkBC’, ‘Employment
Ontario’ or ‘Alberta Works’.
Since section 91 (24) of the Canadian constitution assigns
responsibility for ‘Indians and the Lands reserved for the Indians’ to
the Government of Canada. Its labour market services for Aboriginal
people3 were not part of the 1996 devolution offer to provinces.
Ottawa first developed a native employment policy and dedicated
Aboriginal programming in the 1970s; in the 1990s most of these
resources were placed under the direct control of Aboriginal labour
market agencies. Over the past 25 years Pathways to Success,
Regional Bilateral Agreements, the Aboriginal Human Resource
Development Strategy, and the Aboriginal Skills and Employment
Training Strategy (ASETS) have been used as the way to ensure that
labour market services for Aboriginal people are locally designed,
flexible, and culturally sensitive.
Managed and delivered in 2015 by 85 Aboriginal organizations
through 600 points of delivery in urban, rural and remote locations
across the country, ASETS is Ottawa’s flagship Aboriginal
employment program. From time to time ASETS has been
supplemented by project-specific initiatives; there is also
complementary programming through the Urban Aboriginal Strategy.
All of this federally-funded Aboriginal programming has defined time
limits, including the current ASETS agreements which officially were
to end March 31, 2015. In the fall of 2014 they were extended to
March 2016; further extensions to March 2017 were announced in
spring 2015.
An effective PES is critical to ensuring that the Canadian
economy has enough workers with the right skills to meet its labour
market needs. Canada’s Aboriginal population is the fastest-growing
population cohort in Canada and could be a rich source of potential
workers. Most indictors demonstrate, however, that Aboriginal people
lag significantly behind their non-Aboriginal peers. Data from the
2011 National Household survey shows that employment rates among
the Aboriginal population were at 52.1 per cent, compared to the non-
Aboriginal population at 61.2 per cent. Similarly, the non-Aboriginal
population had the lowest unemployment rate in 2011 at 7.5 per cent,
compared to 15.0 per cent among the Aboriginal population and 22
per cent for those living on reserve.4
Given these problems, employers often do not consider
Aboriginal people as a solution to filling their labour market gaps.
Many look instead to temporary foreign workers. Challenges in hiring
Aboriginal people include where they live, their low education levels,
language and cultural barriers, as well as racism.5
This chapter assesses the support provided by the Government
of Canada to Aboriginal employment and training services: the
second chance programs that pick up the pieces and provide access to
new opportunities when the K-12 Aboriginal education system fails.
How has the programming developed and changed over time? How is
it managed and delivered in 2015? Who are the key Aboriginal actors,
what institutions connect them, and how do they relate to each other
and to the Government of Canada? How does Aboriginal employment
programming get coordinated with the mainstream PES now under
the responsibility of provincial governments? How are industry
partnerships working? What kinds of outcomes are being achieved?
What issues are Aboriginal employment organizations facing in 2015
given federal indecision on an ASETS successor agreement and long-
term renewal of the arrangements?
To answer these questions I looked to the academic literature
and government reports. I also secured internal material from federal
officials and experts employed by National Aboriginal Organizations
(NAOs). Over the past two years the federal government has
consulted on Aboriginal employment programs through regional
round tables as well as the House of Commons Standing Committee
on Human Resources, Skills and Social Development and the Status
of Persons with Disabilities (HUMA). HUMA testimony and its final
report released in May 2014 provided a rich perspective on issues
with the current arrangements.6 The most important insights came
from 25 interviews with key actors directly involved in Aboriginal
employment programming including federal officials in Ottawa,
representatives of National Aboriginal Organizations, as well as
provincial officials and ASETS holders in all provinces across
Canada. These were carried out between 2012 and 2015 as one
element of a larger story I am writing on the devolution of Canada’s
public employment service between 1996 and 2014.
POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONTEXT
As of the 2011 census, Aboriginal peoples in Canada totaled
1,400,685 people, or 4.3 per cent of the national population. In 2011,
49.8 per cent were Registered Indians (spread over 600 recognized
First Nations governments or bands), 15.5 per cent were non-status
Indians, 29.9 per cent were Métis, and 4.2 per cent were Inuit. It is
estimated that 54 per cent of Aboriginal people live in urban areas,
and that 70 per cent live off-reserve. Eight out of 10 Aboriginal
people reside in Ontario and the four Western provinces. Five NAOs
represent Aboriginal people at the intergovernmental table: the
Assembly of First Nations (AFN); the Congress of Aboriginal people
(CAP); the Métis National Council (MNC); the Inuit Tapiriit
Kanatami (ITK); and the Native Women’s Association of Canada
(NWAC).
Aboriginal people continue to feel the effects of having been
marginalized for much of Canada’s history. In 1982 the written
constitution of Canada was amended to explicitly recognize the
special status and rights of First Nations, Inuit, and Métis people.
Subsequent attempts at constitutional reform in 1992 failed, leaving
in its wake a host of unsettled questions impacting Aboriginal people.
Between 1991 and 1996 a Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples
(RCAP) assessed past government policies toward Aboriginal people.
Setting out a 20-year agenda for change, the five-volume, 4,000-page
report covered a vast range of issues; its 440 recommendations called
for sweeping changes to the interaction between Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal people and their governments in a range of policy areas.
Released in 1997, Gathering Strength, Canada’s Aboriginal Action
Plan committed the Government of Canada to renewal of the
relationship building on the principles of mutual respect, mutual
recognition, mutual responsibility and sharing as identified in RCAP.7
Federal policy since 1995 has recognized the inherent right to
Aboriginal self-government, to be implemented through non-
constitutional means. In exploring this concept, Papillon identified
three narratives over the past 30 years: self-government as self-
administration; self-government as an inherent right; and self-
government as co-existing sovereignties.8 His work demonstrates
how federal and provincial governments appear to have backed away
from their commitments to self-government in recent years, focusing
instead on limited partnership arrangements. This chapter also
examines how the state of Aboriginal employment programming has
played out over time against these different approaches to Aboriginal
self-government.
HISTORICAL DEVEOPMENTS IN ABORIGINAL
EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING PROGRAMMING
There have been five distinct phases in Aboriginal employment
programming.
1970s and 1980s: The Employment Equity Period
In the 1970s and 1980s employment equity emerged as an issue and
an Employment Equity Act was passed in 1986. Targeted programs
for natives, women, and youth were created within the then
Employment and Immigration (CEIC) department – later Human
Resources Development Canada (HRDC) – including a 1977 Native
Employment Policy, delivered by Aboriginal people serving as native
employment counsellors. Aboriginal outreach programs were also put
in place. In 1989 Ottawa created non-government advisory boards
(national, provincial and local) to forge stronger partnerships between
governments, business, and labour. Out of this an Aboriginal
Employment and Training Working Group (AETWG) was created,
bringing together senior Aboriginal representatives with federal
officials.9
1991-1996: Pathways to Success
Pathways to Success was born out of the work of the AETWG. Five
partnership principles were collectively articulated and agreed to –
local decision making; funding stability; Aboriginal infrastructure and
delivery control; a proactive approach to employment equity; and
reducing barriers to program access.10 These principles were
important as the Aboriginal community was not interested in being
accountable for the administration of programs that were limited in
scope and restrictive in criteria and intent.11 In 1991, national,
regional and local Aboriginal Management Boards were created to set
training priorities for Aboriginal communities and develop
partnership and co-management practices. Over time 100 local
boards, 12 regional or territorial boards, and one National Board were
set up.12 During this period some of the regional and local boards
evolved from an advisory role into incorporated service delivery
agents.13(Virtuosity Consulting 2003).
Problems soon developed, however. Disputes arose over the
allocation of funds across regions and to particular Aboriginal
constituencies (RCAP 1996). The pan-Aboriginal approach did not
recognize the separate Indian, Métis and Inuit decision-making
structures. Off- reserve Aboriginal people felt left out. And then there
was the question of authority: were the Pathways Boards full self-
government or were they merely advisory bodies? During 1994 and
1995 Ottawa initiated a review of Pathways. Out of this came new
arrangements that represented a further step towards Aboriginal
control (RCAP 1996).
1996-1999: Regional Bilateral Agreements (RBAs)
By 1996 the single Pathways table had fractured amongst the
different Aboriginal constituencies, resulting in separate national
agreements between HRDC and the Assembly of First Nations, the
Métis National Council, and the Inuit Tapirisat of Canada. These
agreements outlined detailed financial accountability and results-
based performance requirements for the employment programs and
services on offer through their respective constituencies (Virtuosity
Consulting 2003).
The national framework agreements set up the Aboriginal-
government relationship; then service delivery agreements were
developed at the local level. As identified by the three NAOs, 54
Regional Bilateral Agreements (RBAs) with local Aboriginal groups
allowed them to design programs suited to their needs, provided they
met HRDC program objectives. The RBAs effectively devolved
responsibility for Aboriginal employment programming from the
Government of Canada to the designated local Aboriginal
organization.
This was also the time that Ottawa was negotiating the transfer
of federal employment services – focused primarily on Employment
Insurance or EI recipients – to provinces and territories through
Labour Market Development Agreements or LMDAs. Services for
Aboriginal people – as well as youth and pan-Canadian programming
– were not on offer to provinces. As an outcome of Gathering
Strength, in 1998 the Aboriginal Human Resource Council (AHRC)
was founded as a non-profit national organization to “bring business,
labour, academic and Aboriginal experts together to encourage the
private sector to share responsibility for improving Aboriginal access
to the labour market”.14
1999-2010: Aboriginal Human Resource Development Strategy
(AHRDS)
In 1999 Ottawa replaced the RBAs with the five-year Aboriginal
Human Resource Development Strategy or AHRDS. The framework
agreements with the three NAOs were replaced by National Protocols
with what are today’s five NAOs, adding the Congress of Aboriginal
Peoples and the Native Women’s Association of Canada. Left out
from the AHRDS funding envelope was the Friendship Centre
movement, excluded by Ottawa as it was not a political organization.
New programs were added to AHRDS, including youth,
disability, capacity building, an urban component and child care. This
was viewed as a huge windfall for Aboriginal organizations. By 2003
there were 70 AHRDA agreements with 200 sub-agreements
involving some 390 points of service.15 Over time this grew to 79
AHRDA agreements, including status-blind urban agreements in
Vancouver and Winnipeg. At the time, ensuring accountability for
government expenditures was not a prime focus. That changed,
however, when HRDC was rocked by an accountability crisis in
another program area. Their tightened administrative procedures
forced many AHRDA holders to re-align resources from client
service to administration. They also acquired new bosses with the
2005 establishment of Service Canada that separated federal service
delivery responsibilities from strategic policy making.
The agreements were renewed in 2004 for another five years
under AHRDS 11. There were a number of changes, including a new
emphasis on private sector skills needs; a more stringent
accountability framework; and delinking the Aboriginal Human
Resources Council from the AHRDA community. More importantly,
in 2003 Ottawa decided to fund Aboriginal labour market
programming outside the AHRDS umbrella through a new program
called the Aboriginal Skills and Employment Partnership (ASEP),
designed to increase access to job opportunities for Aboriginal
peoples in major economic development initiatives.16 Run directly by
federal officials out of Ottawa, bidders had to set up new partnerships
and legal entities. In some cases AHRDA holders qualified to run or
partner on ASEP projects; in other places they became competitors.
It was during the AHRDS 11 period that the federal
government concluded negotiations to transfer responsibility for the
mainstream PES to all provinces through devolved LMDAs.
Ultimately 2,800 federal civil servants and more than 1,000 service
delivery contracts transferred over. In 2007 provinces were given
additional money to provide employment services for non-EI clients
through Labour Market Agreements. Many – especially British
Columbia and Saskatchewan – used the funding to expand
programming for their Aboriginal citizens.
2010- 2016: Aboriginal Skills and Employment Training Strategy
(ASETS)
The Harper Conservatives inherited the AHRDS structure and in
2010 changed the name again, rebranding it as ASETS or the
Aboriginal Skills and Employment Training Strategy. A new Skills
and Partnership Fund (SPF) was also announced to support smaller
ASEP-like projects. The basic infrastructure and the Aboriginal
delivery agents remained the same. Program principles, however,
were re-focused on demand-driven skills development; partnerships
with the private sector and the provinces and territories; and
accountability and results.
All of this was very different from the Pathways, RBAs and
AHRDS 1 principles where Aboriginal organizations were expected
to develop and implement their own employment and human
resources programs. Federal monitoring was also increased. No new
money was given to ASETS holders to operationalize these pillars.
They – as well as provinces and territories – have been working with
the same core funding since 1999.17
The most employment disadvantaged Aboriginal people are
receiving social assistance on reserve. With close to 170,000
beneficiaries in 2012, the on-reserve income assistance program is the
4th largest in Canada.18 It is managed by First Nations Bands with
funding from Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada
(AANDC). While ASETS holders have always been available to
provide employment supports on reserve, before 2013 there was no
requirement to participate. The 2013 federal budget provided
dedicated funding to enhance employment resources for youth aged
18-24, and made participation compulsory through a new program to
be delivered by ASETS holders called the First Nations Job Fund.
ABORIGINAL EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMMING IN 2015
In 2014 the federal department responsible for Aboriginal
employment programming was rebranded as Employment and Social
Development Canada (ESDC). This section of the chapter outlines the
program architecture in 2015, highlighting key elements of the
structure. While it is the most important component, as detailed in
Table 10.1, ASETS is just one part of Aboriginal employment
programming in Canada. This structure has now been extended to
2017.
Aboriginal Skills and Employment Strategy (ASETS)
The 85 ASETS agreements are distributed asymmetrically by
jurisdiction and by Aboriginal identity group. Table 10.2 provides a
summary, including the total value of the agreements. The number of
agreements by province is a direct result of the governance structure
chosen during the RBA/AHRDA era. Facilitated by federal field staff,
arrangements were struck to suit jurisdictional circumstances. Almost
all ASETS holders have sub-agreement holders. For example, in
Saskatchewan there is only one First Nations ASETS holder – the
Saskatchewan Indian Training Association Group (SITAG) – while in
British Columbia there are 13 different First Nations ASETS holders.
With 65 sub-agreement holders, SITAG’s allocation of about $24
million in annual funding rivals that provided to the entire province of
Saskatchewan which receives about $36 million from Canada through
its LMDA. Given their large Aboriginal populations, ASETS
allocations to the three territories (almost $18.5 million) are almost
double that provided by Ottawa to territorial governments under the
LMDA (almost $9.5 million).
TABLE 10.1: FEDERALLY SUPPORTED ABORIGINAL
EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING PROGRAMMING
2014/20151
Program name Federal funding
allocations
Responsibility Comments
Aboriginal
Skills and
Employment
Strategy
(ASETS)
$343.7 million/yr ESDC $94 m comes from EI account.
Also covers $55 m for child
care. Current agreements ended
in March 2015. Extended to
March 2017.
Skills and
Partnership
Fund (SPF)
$45.6 million/yr ESDC Renewed in 2015 budget to
2020.
First Nations
Job Fund
(FNJF)
$25.2 million/yr to
ASETS holder and $33
million/yr to First
Nations Bands
ESDC/AANDC In place until 2017.
Aboriginal
Human
Resource
Council
(AHRC)
$675,000 for labour
market information
ESDC Delinked from ASETS under
AHRDS 11. Core federal
funding ended in 2013.
Friendship
Centres
None dedicated AANDC The Urban Aboriginal Strategy
has a strong employment &
training focus.
There are 57 First Nations, seven Métis, eight Inuit, and
thirteen urban ASETS holders; the money is distributed about two-
thirds to First Nations, 18 per cent to Métis, 5 per cent to Inuit, and 11
per cent to urban ASETS holders. The distinctions-based approach is
now embedded. The previous generic National Aboriginal
Management Board under Pathways was viewed as a failure, and
replaced with framework agreements with each NAO, recognizing
that each of the Aboriginal people have a different history and culture
and face different labour market challenges.
TABLE 10.2: DISTRIBUTION OF ASETS AGREEMENTS BY
JURISDICTION AND ABORIGINAL IDENTITY 20152
Jurisdiction First
Nations
Métis Inuit Urban Total # of
agreements
Value of
agreements
by
jurisdiction
(000s)
British Columbia 13 1  1 15 $39,613
Alberta 11 2   13 $40,533
Saskatchewan 1 1   2 $34,816
Manitoba 2 1  1 4 $43,226
Ontario 13 1 1 3 18 $57,718
Québec 3  1 1 5 $31,894
New Brunswick 3   1 4 $4,074
Nova Scotia 1   1 2 $4,827
Prince Edward Island 1    1 $675
Newfoundland &
Labrador
3  2 2 7 $6,015
Northwest Territories 5 1 1  7 $8,014
Yukon 1   1 2 $3,120
Nunavut   3  3 $7,334
National    2 2 $4,000
Total number of
agreements
57 7 8 13 85  
Value of agreements by
Aboriginal identity
(000s)
$188,668 $51,456 $14,294 $31,442  $285,860
Each ASETS holder has a community board and a non-political
Executive Director who then hires the necessary staff. While ASETS
Executive Directors are guided by their respective Aboriginal
political leadership, they are all expected to provide the same
Employment Benefits and Supports Measures as provinces do
through the LMDAs, with one key exception. Since 1996, First
Nations and Inuit ASETS holders have been allocated about $55
million in dedicated child care funding for day care centres on reserve
and in northern communities. Métis ASETS holders are excluded
from this funding envelope.
The Skills and Partnership Fund (SPF)
Started in 2010 as a smaller version of ASEP, by December 2013 80
SPF projects were operating. These included the Ring of Fire in
Northern Ontario, shipbuilding in the Atlantic and on the west coast,
and pipeline projects in BC. SPF-type projects are popular with
politicians as they result in ‘announceables’ that profile the Minister
and local MP. While ASETS holders could bid on SPF projects, the
separate organizations that were required often competed with their
programming. At the HUMA hearings many ASETS holders
complained about how SPF was structured, suggesting that the
funding should have been given to them to manage. Unlike ASETS,
SFP has been renewed to 2020 and calls for proposal are expected
sometime in 2015.
First Nations Job Fund (FNJF)
The FNJF was announced in 2013 without input or advice from the
ASETS holders. A call for proposal was put out to match suitable
First Nations bands with willing ASETS holders across Canada; as a
result, many projects did not become fully operational until 2014.
Some ASETS holders object to the threat of people losing their
income assistance benefits and are reluctant to participate. The
current funding runs until 2017.
Aboriginal Human Resource Council (AHRC)
Over the past 17 years AHRC has failed to build connections with
ASETS holders, with neither seeing a benefit to be gained and each
doing their own thing. The federal government no longer provides
core funding; however, in July 2014 $675,000 from ESDC was
allocated to the Council to provide labour market information on
major projects located near Aboriginal communities.
Friendship Centres
Friendship Centres were mostly cut out of the AHRDA funding
stream in 1999, but have remained in the employment services
business as ASETS sub-agreement holders, recipients of SPF and
other federal funding, and as provincial government contractors. They
are primarily supported with $43 million in annual funding from
AANDC’s Urban Aboriginal Strategy (UAS) to the National
Association of Friendship Centres (NAFC). The UAS has a strong
training to employment focus. Friendship Centres are keenly
interested in regaining access to ASETS funding in order to build on
their existing urban Aboriginal labour market service delivery.
MANAGING RELATIONSHIPS
Aboriginal employment programs are just one part of Canada’s
broader public employment service. For services to be effective,
Aboriginal employment organizations need to successfully manage
the relationship with their key funder – the Government of Canada –
as well as with each other. They also need to connect with employers
(who provide the jobs), as well as provincial governments who
manage the mainstream PES and provide access to training through
their postsecondary education and apprenticeship systems.
The Federal-Aboriginal relationship
The federal-ASETS relationship is defined through contribution
agreements between each ASETS holder and the Government of
Canada. These are managed by Service Canada (SC) officials
working in each province. The smallest agreements have a value of
less than $500,000; the largest is almost $25 million. All ASETS
holders are subject to an extensive accountability regime involving
direct oversight, monitoring, and correction of expenditures by
federal auditors. Service expectations, reporting, and accountability
requirements are outlined in the individual agreements as well as in
detailed federal documents that are considered to form part of the
agreements. While in the 1990s Aboriginal delivery of employment
programming was viewed as a step towards self-government, today
ASETS holders are viewed by the Government of Canada as hired
contractors being paid for providing services through one of their
many program lines.
Over the years the national agreements and political framework
accords with the Assembly of First Nations (AFN), the Métis
National Council (MNC), and the Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami (ITK) fell
by the wayside while the Congress of Aboriginal people (CAP) and
the Native Women’s Association of Canada (NWAC) acquired
ASETS agreements of their own. The AFN, MNC and ITK receive
annual ESDC funding to support working groups to assist with
program management. For example, two to three times per year some
of the 57 First Nations ASETS holders – as well as Aboriginal
politicians – meet with federal officials. There are parallel and
separate technical working groups for the other Aboriginal
constituencies. While useful for information sharing, Aboriginal
informants consider that limited action gets taken; for example, few
of the recent recommendations from a task force on reducing the
reporting burden have been implemented.
Ottawa used to regularly host cross-Aboriginal conferences and
sharing of best practices, especially in the late 1990s-early 2000s
under Liberal Ministers Bradshaw and Blondin-Andrews. However,
engagement has significantly diminished under the Conservatives. A
federal official characterized the relationship as one of “benign
neglect” on the part of Ottawa politicians. Diane Finlay – Minister
from 2006-2013 – showed very little interest. Collective engagement
improved under Jason Kenney, Minister from 2013-15. However,
Aboriginal informants interviewed felt that the consultation sessions
undertaken on ASETS renewal were pro-forma and failed to
incorporate Aboriginal feedback.
The Aboriginal-Aboriginal Relationship
Since the federal-Aboriginal relationship is managed in siloes – using
the distinctions-based approach chosen in the late 1990s – finding a
coordinated Aboriginal voice is challenging as there are no
institutional structures to support the work that would be required to
overcome their differences. This contrasts with provinces and
territories who work together through the Forum of Labour Market
Ministers (FLMM). Using this mechanism, they were somewhat
successful in pushing back against Ottawa’s 2014 unilateral
imposition of the Canada Job Grant.
Over the past few years AFN and MNC officials have tried to
collaborate and initiate pan-Canadian and pan-Aboriginal best
practices sessions; however, this has been difficult without federal
funding. In 2015 the MNC took the initiative to host an ASETS
conference in Vancouver, billed as the ‘first annual’ spring ASETS
conference. While over 150 people from across Canada attended, it
did not receive endorsement from the other NAOs. Some informants
suggested that it was more of a business undertaking for the
organizers.
At the operations level, Service Canada engagement with their
respective provincial ASETS and SPF holders varies from one
province to another. Federal officials in Ontario routinely bring all
ASETS holders together on a quarterly basis. This is viewed as very
helpful. This also used to occur in British Columbia, but stopped after
Ottawa became more prescriptive about how Service Canada regions
could use their funding. First Nations ASETS holders in BC still
come together through an Aboriginal Human Resources Labour
Council; however non-First Nations ASETS holders are not part of
the conversation.
Provincial-Aboriginal Partnerships
Partnerships with provinces and territories and the private sector
formally became one of three ASETS pillars in 2010. It is easy to see
why partnerships with the provinces are being prescribed by Ottawa.
Collectively they receive about $2.7 billion annually from the federal
government to run the provincial PES, reinforced by postsecondary
education, social assistance, and child care programs funded primarily
from the provincial tax base. Post-devolution provinces have
developed expertise, competence, and capacity – in labour market
information, training of career development practitioners, client
management systems – that ASETS holders could benefit from.
Federal officials no longer have this kind of expertise.
However, provincial partnerships with ASETS and SPF
agreement holders are weak. A federal official noted that “Building
partnerships with the provinces [around Aboriginal employment
programming] is our biggest challenge and weakness”. ASETS
holders seem to agree. The regional engagement report on ASETS
renewal noted that “with respect to partnerships with provincial and
territorial governments, many agreement holders expressed that there
were either no partnerships in place or they were not as beneficial as
they could be”.19 An ESDC evaluation noted that while ASETS
holders tended to collaborate with provinces, SPF agreement holders
did not, citing a lack of inclusion in provincial strategies and friction
from duplication of services. This leads to competition for clients.20
Partnerships vary from one province to another. New
Brunswick has a long-standing Aboriginal Employment Strategy
Initiative (AESI) committee where all ASETS holders meet quarterly
with federal and provincial officials. In Québec, ASETS holders
formally engage with the Commission des partenaires du marché du
travail or CPMT. However, Ottawa is not involved. Relationships in
other provinces are mostly ad hoc and locally-based. While these can
be productive, ASETS holders interviewed for this research would
like to see a more formal relationship with their provincial
government, one that recognizes them as a ‘partner’ as opposed to
being considered as just another ‘contractor’.
Only the federal government can assist ASETS holders gain
this kind of standing with provincial governments. Despite a
commitment in each bilateral Canada Job Fund Agreement signed in
2014 – like the Labour Market Agreements that preceded it in 2008 –
to “better coordinate the delivery of their respective programs for
Aboriginal persons”, Ottawa has been ‘hands-off’ on how to
operationalize the partnership in each province. There have also been
no attempts to develop a pan-Canadian employment framework to
formalize the relationship, either through the FLMM or with NAOs at
the Aboriginal Ministers’ table.
Private Sector-Aboriginal Partnerships
This ‘partnership’ pillar was meant to formally add a labour market
demand component to ASETS. This direction has been supported by
Ottawa since 1998 through the establishment of the Aboriginal
Human Resource Council. However, problems with private sector
partnerships include a lack of labour market information; the fact that
most Aboriginal clients are multi-barriered; political sensitivities
between some First Nations and specific industries; and employer
preferences to use temporary foreign workers over Aboriginal
people.21
Interviews for this research did not include an assessment of
Aboriginal partnerships with the private sector. However, a 2012
Conference Board of Canada study on business engagement with
Aboriginal workers identified that a significant portion of businesses
surveyed (31.4 per cent) were not aware of, or had limited knowledge
of, government funded programs for Aboriginal employment and
training. It also noted that “the large number of Aboriginal
organizations that exist in Canada acts as a labyrinth of information
that is too complex for employers to navigate in their desire to reach
out to potential Aboriginal workers”.22 A simplification of points of
contact between organizations and employers, as well as increased
opportunities for sharing best practices among ASETS holders was
recommended.
WHAT RESULTS ARE BEING ACHIEVED?
An Aboriginal informant noted that “ASETS is Canada’s greatest
hidden asset”. Other than a page on ESDC’s website listing the 85
ASETS holders that links readers to each ASETS site23, little other
consolidated information is available to the public. AHRDA was
evaluated in 2009, ASEP in 2013, and ASETS/SPF in 2015 (HRSDC
2009, HRSDC 2013, ESDC 2015). These reports were generally
positive. A reference to RBAs/AHRDA/ASETS results has usually
been included in the annual Employment Insurance Monitoring &
Assessment Report, as well as departmental performance reports.
Available information on program results is summarized in Table
10.3.
TABLE 10.3 PERFORMANCE DATA FOR ABORIGINAL
EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMS3
Since 2005/06 almost 53,000 clients have been served each
year through AHRDA/ASETS, with an average 16,000 returned to
work and 6,600 returned to school. These numbers have been fairly
consistent from one year to the next. ASEP/SPF has served an
average of 6,400 clients over the same period, with an average of
2,200 employed. To put these numbers in context with the larger PES,
provinces served 693,904 clients in 2013/14 using LMDA funding
(EI Commission 2015) and over 300,000 annually using LMA
funding.24
A great deal of client information is collected by ASETS
holders and uploaded to a database managed by ESDC. However, all
that ASETS holders can access is their own data plus national
summaries, so results cannot be compared. Changes promised by
Ottawa to the client management system have never materialized and
many Aboriginal organizations have had to develop their own
alternative client reporting systems.
CURRENT ISSUES
A number of issues have been identified throughout this chapter. The
first is a loss of autonomy that Aboriginal people have over the
programming on offer. Pathways principles established in the early
1990s were designed to ensure Aboriginal control and management
so that labour market services were locally designed, flexible, and
culturally sensitive. This continued under the RBAs and AHRDS 1.
However, it seems to have disappeared under AHRDS 11 and
ASETS, with agreement holders now treated by the federal
government as just another contractor to be used at their discretion,
subject to line by line supervision and contestation of expenditures by
federal employees. Ottawa’s decision in 2003 to directly manage
ASEP also effectively took control away from Aboriginal experts
already charged with this responsibility.
ASETS holders today are almost completely dependent upon
the federal government for their funding, and significantly limited in
their capacity to adopt policies outside of the framework established
by Ottawa. Given the power imbalance between the parties, ASETS
does not even fit with Papillon’s previously mentioned concept of
self-administration as a form of delegated authority. With the closing
of the constitutional window and the rise of neoliberal ideas in the
1990s, the focus in ASETS has shifted from a rights-based view of
self-government to autonomy based on ‘good governance’ that
emphasizes accounting and reporting.25 The democratic input of the
Aboriginal population into employment programming today is barely
greater than the old model of direct federal control. ASETS holders
are significantly challenged in making room for culturally relevant
employment and training programming choices.
Issue number two is the amount of money on offer, how it is
distributed, and uncertainty around the arrangements. ASETS
holders are very concerned over the delay in renewal, despite
consultations and public hearings that have demonstrated the
program’s continued relevance. There are also funding concerns;
there has been no increase to the core ASETS allocations since 1999,
despite increases in the cost of living as well as a significant increase
in the number of Aboriginal people requiring services. Just
accounting for inflation would have increased ASETS allocations by
an additional $33 million.
The overall Aboriginal population grew at an average rate of
3.6 per cent per year from 2006 to 2011, four times faster than the
non-Aboriginal population.26 Given their current disadvantage in the
labour market, Aboriginal people require dedicated employment
services – publicly funded – to access the labour market. Not only can
ASETS holders not continue to do more with less, the existing
allocation formula that distributes funding across regions and
Aboriginal groups is seriously outdated. Putting the formula on a
principled footing is only possible with funding increases to minimize
losers.
The third issue of fragmentation and complexity is felt mainly
by employers. With 85 ASETS labour market agencies across Canada
segmented into First Nations, Métis, Inuit and off-reserve agencies,
plus separate SPF funded projects (up to 80 at one point in time), plus
117 Friendship Centres offering employment services in urban areas,
it is understandable why employers find it hard to figure out where to
find suitable Aboriginal workers. Some kind of consolidation and
integration to achieve economies of scale – including having SPF
projects managed by existing ASETS holders – would provide an
opportunity to improve and stabilize the brand on a pan-Canadian
basis, as well as build capacity among perhaps fewer but stronger
Aboriginal labour market organizations. Provinces like British
Columbia, Ontario and Nova Scotia have recently grappled with
consolidating and branding their PES and may have lessons to offer.
Insufficient coordination with provinces and territories is the
fourth issue identified through this research. Over the past 20 years
Canada’s PES has been devolved by Ottawa to two different agents: a
large one (provinces and territories) and a much smaller one
(Aboriginal organizations). Provinces are developing significant
capacity in this area. Defined efforts to bring all ASETS holders
within each province into closer alignment with each other and their
respective provincial government through formal partnership accords
– as are used in New Brunswick and Québec – would build
institutional capacity among ASETS holders as well as concrete
partnerships with provincial governments. The model is not new: over
the past ten years Aboriginal politics have increasingly become a
trilateral affair, led by provincial governments and Aboriginal
organizations, not Ottawa.27
Dealing with the final issue – siloed management, weak
stewardship, and transparency – requires federal leadership. Despite
the fact that they are the prime funder of labour market programs,
federal-provincial and federal-Aboriginal conversations on important
issues – labour market information, on-line career resources, client
tracking systems, indicators and targets, labour mobility, the use of
temporary foreign workers, how money gets distributed – take place
in silos, with different federal civil servants involved in each. The
Aboriginal conversations are further segmented into First Nations,
Inuit, Métis, and off reserve groupings. In July 2015 the Forum of
Labour Market Ministers announced the formation of a national
Labour Market Information Council. This presents a new opportunity
to enhance transparency in pan-Canadian reporting, including data
that would allow for comparisons across jurisdictions and Aboriginal
constituencies to promote policy learning. NAOs and ASETS holders
should look to this institution as a way to forge better connections
with the mainstream Canadian PES.
CONCLUSIONS
There have been many changes to federally-funded Aboriginal
employment programs over the past 25 years, as well as external
developments that have impacted the programming. The federal
commitment to expansion and growth, along with supporting
Aboriginal control and empowerment evident in the late 1990s has
diminished significantly; there are important new actors in the game
as provincial and territorial governments have taken on new labour
market responsibilities; funding arrangements have tacked new
programs on to the old ones leading to greater fragmentation between
the Aboriginal organizations delivering the programs; and federal
support for capacity-building and coordination between the
Aboriginal organizations on a pan-Canadian basis and within each
province has become much weaker.
Despite these changes, there is an enduring commitment to
retaining the current service delivery platform through the Aboriginal
Skills and Employment Training Strategy (ASETS) – as heard at the
HUMA parliamentary committee in 2014 and cross-Canada regional
roundtables in 2013 and 2014 (ESDC 2014). Support for ASETS
renewal was also reiterated by Canada’s Premiers through a letter to
the Prime Minister of Canada in the fall of 2014. Despite this, the
2015 federal budget did not commit to ASETS renewal. Instead, the
much smaller project-related Strategic Partnership Fund (SPF) was
renewed to 2020, with projects to be started in 2015/16.
Increasing the participation of Aboriginal people in the labour
market and closing the socio-economic gap will require new attitudes
and openness on the part of Aboriginal people and employers, as well
as considerable support from government policies, programs and
practices that promote training, education, upgrading, skills
development, and labour force attachment for Aboriginal people.
Canada’s Aboriginal population is the youngest cohort in the country
and the fastest growing. Without direct federal government support
and solid institutional structures to facilitate integration into the
economy through an effective public employment service, employers
will continue to bypass Aboriginal people, leading to their continued
marginalization in Canadian society.
The Pathways to ASETS legacy over the past twenty-five years
has made a significant difference to Aboriginal labour market
outcomes in Canada. Governments and Aboriginal organizations need
to come together to build on and strengthen the existing ASETS
platform. Renewal discussions in 2015 – no matter who forms
government after the fall federal election – provide a window of
opportunity to address a number of issues that are impeding improved
labour market outcomes for Aboriginal people. Hopefully the
research outlined in this chapter provides timely information to assist
in those deliberations.
__________________________
Footnotes
1 Funding allocations are from ESDC 2014/15 Report on Plans and Priorities and federal
press releases.
2 Calculations done by the author based on financial information provided by ESDC in May
2015. Sums have been rounded. Some urban ASETS holders are also First Nations. Does not
include funding for the First Nations & Inuit Child Care Initiative (FNICCI).
3 Adapted from data provided by ESDC, drawing on Departmental Performance Reports, EI
Monitoring and Assessment Report, and 2015 ESDC Evaluation Report. Data for all years
between 1997/98 and 2013/14 is available; only selected years are presented. Spending
allocations exclude federal stimulus funding through ASTIF.
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Development Agreements (AHRDAs), and Aboriginal Skills and Employment Strategy
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5 The Aboriginal Skills and Employment Partnership (ASEP) program started in 2003. The
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